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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the visible frontiers along borders within Europe are being dis-
mantled, equally significant movements to remove less visible barriers 
are occurring all over the continent. Although a tourist might more 
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readily recognize the disman tling of border checks, 1 the Member States 
of the European Union ("EU") are also moving forward in lowering 
barriers to the movement of capital and financial services across state 
borders. Germany stands at the crossroads of both of these changes, 
as the geographic center as well as the economic engine and largest 
economy of Europe. Germany is actively moving to expand its role as 
a major force in the financial markets not only within Europe, but 
throughout the world. The movement to strengthen Germany's finan-
cial markets vis-a-vis international competition is embodied in the 
concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland. 
The process of integration of the Member States of the EU has 
shaped much of the recent reforms in Germany. Both changes men-
tioned above, the dismantling of barriers and the movement of persons 
and capital, are designed to promote the "fundamental freedoms" of 
the EU.2 In the economic arena, the EU Council has relied upon a 
program of harmonization of the economic and financial policies of 
the Member States. A series of directives of the Council of the EU have 
established the framework by which the Member States shall imple-
ment this harmonization. 
Germany occupies a special position in this process, not only due to 
its central location and postwar leadership in pursuing European inte-
gration, but also from its status as the Member State with the largest 
population, the largest economy, and the strongest currency. In effect, 
the continued success of economic and financial harmonization within 
the EU is largely dependent on one of two options: (1) the ability of 
other countries to adopt German-style policies, or (2) the reform of 
practices within Germany to reflect union-wide or international stand-
ards. This Article discusses a number of recent reforms in which Ger-
many has taken the latter approach. 
The reforms in Germany reflect not only the aspirational goals of 
the ideal concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland, but also reflect the cur-
rent strengths and weaknesses of the German markets, some of which 
stem from before the World War II era. For this reason Part II of this 
I As of March 26, 1995, 7 of the 15 European Union members formally dismantled border 
controls: Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Portugal. Austria 
shall join in April of 1995. See Alan Cowell, 7/:<"uropean Union Nations Form a Passport-Free Zone, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at A6. 
2 The goal of the common market is defined as follows: "The internal market shall comprise 
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured .... " TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNION art. 7a (as 
amended by TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (1992)) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. 
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Article examines not only where Germany wants to go with its reforms, 
but also provides an overview of the current status of German markets, 
in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the reforms. 
Part III of this Article briefly discusses the most direct forces from 
outside Germany shaping these reforms. Over the past few decades, 
financial markets have become internationalized, and competitive forces 
loom not only from across town, but from across oceans. To a large 
extent, the standards for securities markets were established by the 
United States, home of the world's largest financial markets, and were 
followed by the rest of the world. Although individual western Euro-
pean countries had implemented some of these standards to varying 
degrees, the EU has officially adopted many of the established U.S. 
standards with the promulgation of a number of directives. By their 
nature, however, EU directives require the individual Member States 
to implement the provisions of the directives through their own do-
mestic legislation. This Article focuses upon recent German laws which 
have implemented EU directives concerning the regulation of insider 
trading, transparency in the securities markets, the disclosure of hold-
ings in stock exchange-listed companies, and rules of conduct for 
companies engaged in investment services, among others. 
The centerpiece of the recent reforms in Germany is the Act on 
Securities Trading and for the Modification of Regulations Governing 
the Stoc~ Exchanges and Securities (Gesetz iiber den Wertpapierhandel 
und zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften) , 
commonly referred to as the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
(Zweites FinanzmarktJorderungsgesetz) ,3 which went into full effect as of 
3 Gesetz liber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung bi:irsenrechtlicher und wertpapier-
rechtlicher Vorschriften, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI.] I, 1749 (July 26, 1994) [hereinafter 
Zweites Finanzmarktfi:irderungsgesetz]. The text of this Article will refer to the Second Financial 
Market Promotion Act as well as concepts from it in an English version where readily translatable. 
Except where otherwise noted, all translations in this Article are the sole work of the author, who 
shall bear all responsibility for any mistakes. 
This Act is called the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, because it does have a predeces-
sor, the Act for the Improvement of the Overall Conditions of the Financial Markets (Financial 
Market Promotion Act). Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbedingungen der Finanzmarkte 
(Finanzmarktfi:irderungsgesetz), BGBI. I, 266 (Feb. 22, 1990). This earlier Act consisted of six 
articles; the majority of its provisions went into effect on Mar. 1, 1990, with the full Act in effect 
as of Jan. 1, 1992. Finanzmarktfi:irderungsgesetz, art. 6. The major changes in this earlier Act 
stem from Article 3, which amended the German Investment Company Act to expand the range 
of allowable investment activities. See infra notes 332 to 339 and accompanying text (further 
amendments to the Investment Company Act by the Second Financial Market Promotion Act). 
Article 2 of the "first" Financial Market Promotion Act amended the Act Concerning the Sale of 
Shares in Foreign Investment Funds and the Taxation of Gains from Such Funds ("Anderung des 
Gesetzes fiber den Vertrieb ausliindischer Investmentanteile und fiber die Besteuerung der Ertriige aus 
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January 1, 1995.4 This Act is actually a compilation of twenty articles 
which promote broad reforms throughout the German financial mar-
kets, primarily by amending existing laws in furtherance of ongoing 
regulatory and market improvements. 
The most celebrated changes in the Second Financial Market Pro-
motion Act, however, appear in the first article promulgating the Se-
curities Trading Act (Gesetz uber den Wertpapierhandel),5 which represents 
an entirely new addition to German federal jurisprudence. Among 
other things, this article creates the Federal Securities Trading Super-
visory Authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel), the first 
German federal agency responsible for oversight of securities trading 
activities. The Securities Trading Act also makes insider trading crimi-
nally punishable in Germany for the first time, imposes a broad 
range of reporting and disclosure requirements to promote the overall 
transparency of the German financial markets, and imposes Rules 
of Conduct for investment service companies in dealing with their 
customers. The new Supervisory Authority shall oversee these new 
obligations. 
The next most important changes from the Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act occur in Article Two, which amends the existing Ger-
man Stock Exchange Act (Borsengesetz)6 significantly. Part V of this 
Article will detail the provisions of the Second Financial Market Pro-
motion Act, with an emphasis on the first two articles in Parts V.A and 
V.B followed by an overview of the other articles in Part V.C. 
To fully comprehend the goals of reform, one must not only have 
the proper background information, but must also understand the 
legislative process in Germany which shaped the Second Financial 
Market Promotion Act. To this end, Part IVA discusses the German 
legislative process from a political standpoint, while Part IV.B examines 
ausliindischen Investmentanteilen", BGBI. I, 986 (July 28, 1969), last amended in BGBI. I, 1545 
(Aug. 20, 1980». See Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, art. 2. The amendments of the "first" Act do 
not nearly approach the scope of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act in terms of the 
reforms discussed infra in Part V of this Article. 
4 Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 20. 
5 Gesetz tiber den Wertpapierhandel, art. 1, Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 
3, at 1749-60 [hereinafter Wertpapierhandelsgesetz]. Due to the importance of the Securities 
Trading Act and the repeated references to it in this Article, it shall be cited separately. The same 
is true for amendments to the Stock Exchange Act in Article 2 of the Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act. See infra note 6. References to Articles 3-20 shall be cited under the more 
common format, as articles of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act. 
6Borsengesetz (June 22, 1896), printed in BGBI. III, Gliederungsnummer 4110- 11, as 
amended by Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 2. Hereinafter, unless stated 
otherwise, all references to the Stock Exchange Act shall include the most recent amendments 
of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, and shall be cited as "Borsengesetz." 
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the history of the Act. As in the United States, a study of the legislative 
history of a law can reveal a great deal not only about the meaning of 
individual provisions, but also about the purposes of the law in general. 
The draft bill (Gesetzentwurj) 7 is especially of interest where provisions 
have been changed prior to promulgation. One other very important 
document in the legislative history of the Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act is the official government explanation of the Act (Be-
grundung),8 sent to Parliament with the draft bill and detailing the 
meaning behind the text, provision by provision. This Article will refer 
repeatedly to both documents in analyzing the significance (and at 
times the shortcomings) of the reforms of the Act. 
Part VI analyzes the Second Financial Market Promotion Act in the 
context of German reforms designed to increase the overall attractive-
ness of Finanzplatz Deutschland. In some respects, an Article such as 
this makes one aspect of the reforms self-fulfilling in that the reforms 
are designed to increase the transparency of the German markets, just 
as this Article examines those reforms and sheds light upon the under-
lying markets and participants affected by these reforms. This Article 
reveals that many aspects of German regulation and market activities, 
as well as market protections in particular, have reached international 
standards, in part as a result of these specific reforms and other ongo-
ing changes, some of which are discussed in Part VII. Taking the 
German goal of greater transparency one step further, this Article 
reveals gray areas where the success of the reforms remains to be seen, 
the difficulties and ambiguities of implementation, further steps nec-
essary to implement some of the legal reforms, and additional changes 
yet to be enacted. 
Comparisons with the system of securities regulation in the United 
States reveal some interesting insights. Germany now has a single 
federal regulator for securities and derivatives as opposed to the di-
vided jurisdiction in the United States between the Securities and 
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission. Nonetheless, fewer instruments fall under the German 
7 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes tiber den Wertpapierhandel und 
zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz), Bundesrat Drucksache 793/93 (Nov. 5, 1993), Bundestag Drucksache 
12/6679 Oan. 27, 1994) [hereinafter Gesetzentwurf]. All references in this Article shall refer to 
pages in the Bundestag publication. 
R Begrtindung to the Entwurf eines Gesetzes tiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung 
borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsge-
setz), Bundesrat Drucksache 793/93, 100-284 (Nov. 5, 1993); Bundestag Drucksache 12/6679 
(Jan. 27, 1994) 33-93. This explanation is addended to the back of the text of the draft bill. 
Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7. 
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definition of regulated securities, and the scope of German oversight 
is much narrower. Additionally, the mandate of the German agency 
appears to favor the marketplace and the promotion of Finanzplatz 
Deutschland over the investor protection goals central to the SEC. 
While the German system provides none of the private rights of action 
vital to United States securities regulation, the Germans have clearly 
defined "insider," rather than leaving this concept to the common law. 
Other issues such as the liability of third parties as well as knowledge 
and materiality requirements remain unclear. Early stages of imple-
mentation of the German reforms look promising, but the key to the 
future will be enforcement of the laws, especially when one considers 
the depth of SEC investigations. The establishment of the new German 
Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority has filled a significant 
gap in the overall financial regulatory structure; the reforms appear to 
have created a viable and working system of cooperation among the 
German regulators. 
This Article provides a detailed analysis of the recent changes in 
Germany. The majority of the information contained herein stems 
directly from primary sources-texts of the laws, draft bills, official 
government statements and explanations of the provisions of the bills, 
and official reports of the exchanges and financial institutions in Ger-
many. The author has examined all of these documents in their original 
German form. These written sources are supplemented by interviews 
with Germans directly responsible for the shaping, drafting, implemen-
tation, and ultimate success of these reforms as well as through the 
author's own experience working in the German and U.S. financial 
markets. This Article purports to serve as a guide to these reforms for 
the English-speaking reader and a lengthy affidavit of successful steps 
in Germany towards the goal of achieving Finanzplatz Deutschland. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Germany is currently undergoing a period of growth and reform in 
its financial markets. The traditional German model for business financing 
consists of a reliance by businesses upon internal financing and bor-
rowing from credit institutions as opposed to the equity financing 
relied upon by a large share of American corporations. As a result, the 
large German credit institutions dominate the economy, while the equity 
markets have been until recently relatively illiquid and dominated by 
the same credit institutions as institutional investors. The German uni-
versal banking model has also been called into question as both a result 
and a perpetuator of the position of banks in the control of industry. 
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The reforms discussed in this Article represent to some extent a new 
way of thinking in Germany. Most Germans have realized that a strong 
banking system alone cannot support the country's financial markets 
in a globally competitive environment. As a result, the German reforms 
discussed here focus primarily on raising the attractiveness of the 
securities markets in Germany for trading both on and off the tradi-
tional auction stock exchanges. 
Although the outside pressures for change in Germany, such as the 
EU directives, are clear enough, the pressures for change from inside 
Germany are much less visible. The first five years since unification 
have brought many unforeseen strains within Germany9 in addition to 
the costs and burdens of deeper integration within the EU. The costs 
borne by a social welfare state, increased unemployment levels through-
out Europe, unexpected capital needs for the rebuilding of eastern 
Germany and eastern Europe, and the domestic costs of a rising Deut-
sche Mark in a trade oriented country have probably all had effects 
upon the desire of Germany to reform its financial markets. 
The issues of reform are only sensible in the context of their goals 
and the starting points. The following Parts will address these opposite 
ends of the spectrum with a discussion of the specific goals of the 
concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland and overviews of the three major 
financial sectors in Germany-banking, securities, and only a very brief 
discussion of the insurance industry, which the most recent reforms 
only tangentially address. This summary includes historical background 
information that shaped the current structure, references to reform, 
and a few comparisons with systems in the United States or other third 
countries to lend perspective. This Article then describes the activities 
in Germany's financial capital, Frankfurt am Main, in greater detail, 
and offers a brief overview of the agencies responsible for monitoring 
the respective financial actors. 
A. Finanzplatz Deutschland 
Just as Germany has begun to reassert itself on the world political 
stage, in the post-unification era, Germany has publicly claimed a 
position as an economic power. The clarion call came from Theo 
9 The federal government has imposed a solidarity tax of an additional 7.5% of personal or 
corporate income tax due for all but low-income households. This surcharge purports to offset 
the costs of unification and raising the new Bundesliinder to western levels. Solidaritatszuschlag-
gesetz 1995, BGBI. 1,944,975. 
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Waigel, the German Federal Minister of Finance, to establish an inter-
nationally competitive Finanzplatz Deutschland with financial markets 
appropriate for the world's third largest industrial nation. lO Such a 
financial metropolis would exhibit the generally recognized legal stand-
ards for insuring both investor protections and the functioning of the 
markets. ll He delineated three elements of central importance for the 
future: (1) a solid and dynamic universal banking system, (2) interna-
tionally competitive stock exchanges, and (3) a business oriented in-
surance market with high capacity.12 This Article discusses many of the 
reforms required to achieve these elements, with an emphasis upon 
the most recent reforms of the stock markets and securities industry 
in particular. 
Waigel explained the reforms as an essential part of the development 
of the single European Common Market and the necessary free move-
ment of capitaI.l3 Until the eventual completion of the economic and 
monetary union, the economies of the Member States must grow 
together and create competition for the international finance centers 
of New York and Tokyo,14 while German markets must also rival those 
of London and Paris. IS In recent years, London has been the most 
obvious competitor with Frankfurt in a contest for financial supremacy 
in Europe. 16 Some people already view the willingness of the large 
10 Theo Waigel, Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, Konzept Finanzplatz Deutschland, Public 
Statement (Jan. 16, 1992), art. I(l) in 46 WERTPAPIER MITTEILUNGEN: ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRT-
SCHAFTS-UND BANKRECHT [WM] 420, 420 (Mar. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Waigel, Finanzplatz 
DeutschlanllJ . 
11 See id. art. 1(2), at 421. 
12 See id. art. I (l), at 420. 
13 See id. art. 1(2), at 420. Recall that movement of capital is one of the four fundamental 
freedoms of the EU. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
14 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. 1(2), at 420. 
15 See id. art. 1(3), at 421. 
16 In the banking sector, for example, there are over 500 banks from 70 countries operating in 
London, as opposed to half that many in Frankfurt. See Claus Geissmar, London-Geldhauptstadt 
Europas, BERLINER MORGENPOST, Oct. 23, 1995, at 26. For a discussion of Frankfurt as a financial 
metropolis with facts and figures, see infra Part ILE. In terms of foreign exchange trading, 
London is unquestionably the world leader. Frankfurt's daily turnover is only 10% that of London. 
Geissmar, supra, at 26. In terms of internationalization, London is also far ahead. Trading in 
foreign stocks accounts for 56% of the turnover on the London Stock Exchange. See Die Londoner 
Biirse kiimpft gegen die Konkurrenz, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 1, 1995, at 28 
[hereinafter Londoner Biirse]. A more disturbing figure for Frankfurt is that 70% of all trading in 
German federal bonds takes place in London. See Frankfurt kann im Wettbewerb der Finanzpwtze 
nicht aujholen, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 8, 1995, at 30. 
10 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No.1 
German banks to move operations to London as a type of capitula-
tion,17 but the competition is far from over.IS Waigel posited that Ger-
many had great success with previous measures to liberalize standards 
for financial services, and that this trend must continue in the future. 
The system should, therefore, strive to remove unnecessary measures 
limiting flexibility, innovation, and product competition in the devel-
opment of financial instruments. 19 
Waigel found support for inner-German reform in the global inte-
gration of financial markets, reflected in international cooperation in 
deregulation and regulation. Outside of the EU, this has been reflected 
in bank reform in the United States and modernization in the field of 
financial services in Japan.20 The goal of all these efforts is to increase 
both efficiency in the financial sector and the potential for economic 
growth. Additionally, the modernization of the economy in eastern 
Germany, which furthers the attractiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland 
in terms of transactions costs, transparency, financial instruments, and 
quality standards, lends support for nationwide reforms. In the post-
Cold War era, Germany will playa key role in financing the develop-
ment of central and eastern Europe as well. 21 
From a competitive standpoint, Waigel outlined three factors neces-
sary to achieve the goal of Finanzplatz Deutschland. First, the underlying 
economic environment must be in place-a growing economy based 
upon a stable currency and solid government financial policies. Sec-
17 The traditional three largest German private banks, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and 
Commerzbank, have all moved their offices for the international coordination of new stock 
issuance and stock placements from Frankfurt to London. See Geissmar, supra note 16, at 26. 
Many of the other German banks have followed suit by setting up London offices or buying stakes 
in foreign investment banks. Commentators have criticized the German banks for such moves. 
The German banks playa key role in the growth of a stock culture in Germany and must be 
prepared to pursue their activities in Finanzplatz Deutschland and make their trades over German 
exchanges. See Verknupfung von Banken und Borsen bringt den Miirkten Nachteile, FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 9, 1995, at 21 (comments by Hans Biischgen, Professor for Banking 
at the University of Cologne, Germany). 
IH The London Stock Exchange has recently been criticized for its failure to modernize fast 
enough and for its lack of cooperation with other exchanges. The Chairman of the British 
subsidiary of the Swiss Bank Corporation went so far as to say that the London Stock Exchange 
had lost its chance to be the leader for trade in European stocks. See Londoner Borse, supra note 
16, at 28. Turnover in European stocks has actually fallen in London, and a number of investment 
banks have reported that they no longer see any reason to issue stock in London as opposed to 
the national stock exchanges where the corporation is based. See id. 
19 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. 1(2), at 420. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
1996] INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY 11 
on diy, from a regulatory standpoint, there must be a liberal tax and 
legal framework so as not to hinder financial transactions and invest-
ment and to promote efficient allocation of financial resources. The 
final factor shall be efficient markets in banking, the stock exchanges, 
and the insurance industry, with functioning market oversight. 22 
While the federal government would be responsible for the frame-
work conditions for internationally competitive financial markets, 
the Minister of Finance called upon the Liinder,23 stock exchanges, 
and market participants to lend their technical and organizational 
expertise.24 
By the beginning of 1992, Germany had already taken steps in the 
right direction. The government had addressed the second factor and 
lowered investment costs by removing taxes on financial transactions. 25 
The Stock Exchange Act had been amended to allow for trading in 
options and futures, and these markets had been opened up to invest-
ment companies.26 In addition to these government actions, parallel 
steps had been taken by market participants. This included the estab-
lishment of the German Futures Exchange (Deutsche Terminborse) in 
Frankfurt, the development of electronic securities trading systems, 
and improvements in information and settlement systems.27 
Yet these were still only single steps. The next giant leap in realizing 
these reforms occurred in the form of a law called the "Finanzplatz 
Deutschland Act" or, as an alternative, the "Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act" (" Zweites Finanzmarkiforderungsgesetz"). 28 Waigel pro-
posed that this new Act would change the oversight structure of the 
German stock exchanges and establish a new federal oversight agency, 
enact laws regulating insider activities according to international stand-
ards, and implement varying EU directives regarding the financial 
services industry-the overall purposes of these directives include in-
creased transparency of capital markets, strengthening the rights of 
investors, and regulating participation in stock exchange and securities 
22 See id. art. II(l), at 421. 
23 A Land is the German equivalent of a state or provincial level government (Lander = plural). 
24 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. IIO), at 421. 
25 Between January I, 1991 and January 1, 1992, the stock exchange turnover tax, capital 
contribution and transfer tax, and the stamp duty on bills of exchange were abolished. See id. 
art. III (2), at 421. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. art. IlI(3), at 421. 
28 See id. art. V (l), at 423. 
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transactions.29 Waigel set the deadline for enactment by the second half 
of 1992.30 The following Parts of this Article discuss the structures and 
key market participants in the main financial sectors in Germany upon 
which Waigel based his call for reform. 
B. Banking 
In addition to the importance of a strong banking industry in and 
of itself, credit institutions play a fundamental role in the overall 
infrastructure of financial transactions within a country's economy, 
acting as intermediaries and agents of the country's payment system. 
The dominant actors in the German banking industry are the private 
"universal banks," which, as their name suggests, provide a wide range 
of financial services, including those that in the United States would 
be divided between investment and commercial banking. The broad 
range of banking services provided by the German universal banks 
compensates for internal risk, further contributing to the stability and 
overall services of the German financial sector. 31 Healthy banking and 
bank oversight in Germany have dampened shocks to the financial 
markets. 32 
The German banking industry is composed of multiple types of 
financial institutions, which, although they provide many similar serv-
ices, differ substantially in form and structure from their counterparts 
in the United States. The most notable and oft-cited difference is the 
presence in Germany of "universal banks." These German financial 
institutions are not subject to an artificial delineation of credit versus 
securities functions such as that imposed in England and in the United 
States (under the Glass-Steagall Act) .33 
29 See Waigel. Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. V, at 423. 
30 See id. art. V (1), at 423. 
31 See id. art. 1(2), at 420. 
32 See id. 
3312 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1994). For the text of this provision, see infra note 564. Numerous 
attempts have been made to repeal or at least amend the Glass-Steagall Act to allow U.S. banks 
to engage in more securities activities. The most recent Congressional attempt in the summer 
and fall of 1995 almost succeeded. The House Banking Committee drafted a bill that would have 
repealed Glass-Steagall. There was general agreement in the Clinton Administration, among 
Republicans and Democrats from both Houses of Congress, among financial regulators, and 
throughout the three financial industries (banking, securities, and insurance), that the time was 
ripe for such legislation. In response to pressure from the insurance industry, however, the House 
leadership under the direction of Speaker Newt Gingrich inserted a rider to the bill that imposed 
a five year moratorium on banks entering the insurance industry. The banking lobbies opposed 
this provision, and, therefore, changed their position from favoring to opposing the legislation. 
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Although there are numerous universal banks in Germany, the field 
is dominated by the three largest banks based in Frankfurt am Main 
which operate throughout Germany as well as internationally: Deut-
sche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank. "The big banks playa 
dominant role in the [underwriting] business and all international 
fields of business. They handle approximately 60% of all payments 
within the framework of German foreign trade. "34 By the end of 1993, 
these three banks were ranked worldwide in the following positions 
based upon total tier one capital assets: Deutsche Bank, 14; Dresdner 
Bank, 37; and Commerzbank, 60.35 By the end of 1993, the Deutsche 
Bank Group had over 73,000 employees, 2400 branches (including 
over 1700 outside Germany), and total assets of over DM 550 billion.36 
The German banking industry has proven no easier than that of 
most other countries for foreign banks to enter on a retail level. In 
addition to the difficulty in establishing a deposit business without a 
branch network, the strong ties between German businesses and their 
primary banks make it difficult for foreign banks to establish commer-
cial links with German industryY The strength of foreign banks in 
Germany, however, lies in securities transactions.38 Foreign banks have 
expanded traditional banking activities in Germany through the intro-
duction of innovative products, including swap deals and trading in 
See Keith Bradsher, No New Deal for Banking; Efforts to Drop Depression-Era Barners Stall, Again, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at Dl. The presidential elections in 1996 and the partisan division over 
the 1996 budget debates make it unlikely that a serious attempt to overhaul the Glass-Steagall Act 
will be raised again in Congress before 1997. 
Banks can already engage in limited securities activities in the United States through exceptions 
to the Glass-Steagall Act, such as by establishing a securities trading subsidiary under § 20 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act. See infra note 564 and accompanying text. The need to prevent 
insider trading within an institution that provides multiple investment services for its customers 
and trades on its own account requires the establishment of Chinese Walls. For a discussion of 
Chinese Walls, see infra note 384 and accompanying text. Because of concerns over the flow of 
material non public information within a financial institution offering a variety of banking and 
financial services, the end result in the debate between the universal banking system and a system 
divided between commercial and investment banking functions ultimately leads to a compromise 
of the two systems. 
34 See FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, infra note 37, at 18. 
35 See Top 1000 by Country: Germany, THE BANKER, July 1994, at 180. 
36 DEUTSCHE BANK AG, 1993 ANNUAL REpORT, Highlights (1994). 
37 See INDUSTRIE-UND HANDELSKAMMER FRANKFURT AM MAIN [THE FRANKFURT CHAMBER OF 
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE], FRANKFURT AM MAIN: INTERNATIONALER FINANZPLATZ [FRANKFURT 
AM MAIN: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL METROPOLIS] 38 (Aug. 1994) (text in German and English; 
cites to English version) [hereinafter FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT]. 
38 See id. 
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futures and derivatives. 39 American banks command the leading posi-
tion in the derivatives business in Germany.40 
The major financial center for foreign banks, as well as domestic 
banks, is Frankfurt am Main, discussed infra in Part ILE. in greater 
detail. Next to Frankfurt, and arguably Dusseldorf, Berlin has a claim 
of its own as a banking center. In the four years after unification, from 
the end of 1989 to the end of 1993, the number of financial institutions 
active in the city grew from 101 to 147.4l Next to Frankfurt, Berlin also 
has one of the largest, and definitely the fastest growing international 
banking presence in Germany. In the four years after unification, the 
number of foreign banks with representative offices or branches in 
Berlin grew from sixteen to thirty-eight,42 and had reached forty-five by 
September of 1995.43 Although reasons may vary, the financing oppor-
tunities for the construction boom and emerging businesses in Berlin 
and eastern Germany, as well as throughout eastern Europe, have 
provided ample customers. 
Although much foreign discussion of banking in Germany refers to 
the private universal banks, a very important, yet relatively low-keyed 
sector of the banking industry is that of the Sparkassen (savings banks). 
While the private universal banks are responsible for over eighty per-
cent of all securities activities, the Sparkassen hold a majority of the 
retail deposits and often dominate the local municipality in which they 
are based. Through their semi-public, Land based, central clearing 
banks, the Sparkassen can provide a universal range of credit functions 
with a stable, amalgamated deposit base. The last major sector of the 
market aside from specialized credit institutions are the Genossen-
schaftsbanken (credit cooperatives) which have a long tradition in small 
business and agricultural financing but play primarily a local role. 
C. Securities Markets 
While German banks have strong international presences, the Ger-
man stock markets have lagged behind. In large part, it could be 
argued that the weak securities markets are inversely related to the 
strength of the banks and credit institutions. German corporations 
39 See id. at 38-39. 
40 See id. at 39. 
41 See INDUSTRIE-UND HANDELSKAMMER ZU BERLIN, BERICHT 1993/9436 (1994). 
42 See id. 
43 Norbert Schwaldt, Berlin wird Magnet fur Auslandsbanken, BERLINER MORGEN POST, Sept. 22, 
1995, at 23. 
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have traditionally relied very heavily upon internal financing and debt 
(lending from their primary bank), in contrast to more prevalent 
reliance on equity financing in the United States.44 From the other 
side, German shareholders are predominantly institutional; private 
investors playa much smaller role in the markets than in the United 
States.45 In conjunction with the markets themselves, formal regulation 
of the German stock exchanges has lagged behind international stand-
ards. These factors are interrelated: both conducive regulatory struc-
tures and willing participants are necessary to establish vibrant securi-
ties markets. The government hopes that structural improvements will 
further market liquidity and ultimately the attractiveness of issuing 
stock as a vehicle for financing. 46 
In the process of modernization, not only must the rules govern-
ing the stock exchanges develop, but the actual structures of the 
exchanges, both literally and figuratively, must change. The need 
for multiple regional exchanges has been questioned. The develop-
ment of computerized trading increases overall efficiency, but may 
lead to the demise of some of the smallest exchanges. The introduc-
tion of new financial products, such as futures, options, and other 
derivatives has gained early success in Germany and promises future 
growth. 
1. The German Stock Exchanges 
Germany has eight regional stock exchanges upon which traditional 
securities are traded in an auction format. 47 Of the eight stock ex-
changes in Germany, the Frankfurter Wertpapierborse of Frankfurt am 
Main is by far the largest-currently the fourth largest in the world.48 
44 See Mark J. Roe, Some Difference in Corporate Structure in Germany, japan, and the United 
States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927, 1960-61 and n.96 (1993). 
45 See id. at 1936--38. 
46 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. IV(3), at 423. 
47The eight exchanges (and their locations), listed in order of size, are the following: Frank-
furter Wertpapierborse (Frankfurt am Main), Rheinisch-WestJiilische Borse zu Dusseldorf (Dusseldorf), 
Bayerische Borse (Munich), Hanseatische Wertpapierborse Hamburg (Hamburg), Baden-Wurttember-
gische Wertpapierborse zu Stuttgart (Stuttgart), Berliner Borse (Berlin), Niedersiichsische Borse zu 
Hannover (Hannover), Bremer Wertpapierborse (Bremen). DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, 1993 DEUTSCHE 
BORSEN: .JAHRESBERICHT 3 (1993). See alw DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, DEUTSCHE BORSEN: 1993 AN-
NUAL REPORT 3 (1993) (English translation). Generally, this Article will refer to the exchanges 
only by their location, rather then by their full title (e.g., Dusseldorf stock exchange). 
Despite the current overpopulation of exchanges, there has been a movement to reopen an 
exchange in the former East Germany that has been closed for over fifty years. 
4H See Deut~che Borse AG, The Fourth J~argest Stock Exchange in the World, GALLERY: A BRIEF 
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The Frankfurt exchange handles over seventy percent of the trading 
in stocks and bonds for the entire country.49 Aside from the stock 
exchange in Dusseldorf, the other regional exchanges are considerably 
smaller and less liquid. 50 
One must question why a relatively small country with still develop-
ing securities markets needs eight exchanges when the United States 
has only two primary and five regional stock exchanges to serve a much 
larger geographical area with significantly greater capitalization.51 The 
theoretical comparison of the current system in Germany with multiple 
regional exchanges as opposed to a single central exchange in Frank-
furt has been a central part of the discussion of the attractiveness of 
Finanzplatz Deutschland.52 The notion that Germany needs a strong, 
internationally competitive primary exchange to compete with the 
large exchange locations of the world favors centralization.53 A concen-
tration of trading on one exchange would increase liquidity, drive 
down transaction costs, create better prices, and make that exchange 
more attractive. In the communications age, with the same dealers 
trading the same stocks on the different exchanges, there is a substan-
tial redundancy and overlap of resources. On the other hand, the 
fact that the regional exchanges have played an important role in 
the development of the Lander and in bringing small and medium-
sized companies to the organized capital market is beyond ques-
tion.54 The latter role will continue to be important in the future, 
but that reasoning does not justify the existence of each individual 
exchange.55 At a minimum, however, the tendencies toward oligopoli-
DESCRIPTION OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE SYSTEM 1, 1 (1994). The three largest are New York, 
Tokyo, and London, respectively. See id. 
49 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, DEUTSCHE BORSEN: 1993 ANNUAL REpORT 33 (1994). 
50 See generally id. 
51 The two primary exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the American 
Stock Exchange ("Amex"), upon which most of the exchange traded stocks in the United States 
are listed. The five U.S. regional stock exchanges are the Boston Stock Exchange ("BSE"), the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange ("Phlx"), the Cincinnati Stock Exchange ("CSE"), the Chicago 
Stock Exchange ("CSE"), and the Pacific Stock Exchange ("PSE"). ''These exchanges primarily 
trade securities that are also listed on the primary markets." DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, 
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY II: STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. 
EQUITY MARKETS, IN MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOP-
MENTS II-I, II-6 to -7 (footnote omitted) (1994). 
52 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. N(1), at 422. 
53 See id. art. N(2) (a), at 422. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
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zation or even monopolization of securities trading must be miti-
gated.56 
The federal government has taken a hands off approach to the 
question of the future of the regional exchanges. This issue is inti-
mately tied to the growth of computer trading as an alternative to the 
auction exchanges, discussed infra.57 Federal lawmakers seek to provide 
the most efficient regulatory system for the operations of both the 
auction stock exchanges and for computer stock trading, so that the 
individual markets shall compete for trading.58 
The individual stock exchanges have worked together very closely in 
the past, and the establishment of the Deutsche Borse AG in Frankfurt 
am Main in 1993 has institutionalized this relationship. Before this 
period, the exchanges were controlled by the city Chamber of Com-
merce, which explains why the two entities may still be found at the 
same location. The Deutsche Borse AG is a private stock corporation 
that serves as the supporting authority for the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change (owner of the premises and provider of the facilities and 
personnel), as well as the owner of all shares of the German Futures 
Exchange, and the Deutsche Kassenverein AG, which functions as a 
settlement system for securities transactions.59 The concept of Deutsche 
Borse AG is a decisive breakthrough, because it allows stronger cen-
tralization of important duties while allowing the further development 
of the regional exchanges.6o Germany's four most important stock 
exchanges, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Munich, and Berlin, are currently 
involved in negotiations to improve cooperation and extend the Deut-
sche Borse AG's support functions to all four in 1997.61 
56 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining art. 2, no. I of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktfiirderungsgesetz, creating § 2a of the Biirsengesetz). 
57 See infra Part II.C.2 and accompanying notes. 
58 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. IV(2) (a) (aa), at 422. 
59 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, DEUTSCHE BORSEN: 1993 ANNUAL REpORT 28 (1994). "Shareholders 
are those banks and [brokers] who are trading on the stock exchange. A stake of 10% is owned 
by the regional stock exchanges. Ownership is evidenced by registered shares which are transfer-
able only with the company's consent." See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION 
9 (Mar. 1994). 
60 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. IV(2) (a) (bb), at 422. 
61 See Dusseldorf stimmt fur die Borsenkooperation, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 4, 
1995, at IS. The advisory board of the Dusseldorf stock exchange has already approved the 
cooperation contract, and Munich and Frankfurt should make their decisions in December of 
1995. In Dusseldorf, the fought over issue of the development of a computerized exchange was 
omitted, so that the debate could concentrate on the question of how the regional exchanges 
could ensure their continued existence without detracting from Finanzplatz Deutschland. The 
four exchanges here will establish a common order system. Of the stocks in the broader DAX-I00 
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Although the future remains unclear, most analysts agree that a 
consolidation of the eight stock exchanges within Germany will be 
necessary. Despite the attempts at cooperation, there has also been 
some competition and politicking between the exchanges to retain or 
gain market share.62 While the two largest exchanges, Frankfurt and 
Dusseldorf, will certainly survive, at least in the near term, the very 
smallest, in Bremen, will almost certainly close at some point. Aside 
from survival and closure, a third option is for the exchanges to 
specialize beyond the corporate shares and high grade debt tradition-
ally traded. The two most oft-cited examples are Hamburg and Berlin. 
As the country's largest port and hence the landing point for many 
commodities, most Germans expect Hamburg to establish a commodi-
ties futures exchange relatively soon.63 Hannover, Hamburg's neighbor 
in the agricultural area of Niedersachsen to the south, however, ap-
pears to have taken concrete steps toward establishing a commodity 
futures exchange by 1997.64 
Berlin appears ready to reassert itself as a commercial financial 
center65 by preparing its stock exchange for the next century. The area 
of greater Berlin is undergoing a period of intense growth.66 The city's 
proximity to the emerging economies of eastern Europe and its his-
torical ties in the area make the Berlin stock exchange a logical choice 
for eastern European countries interested in raising capital by selling 
equity on a Western exchange.67 The city is already preparing the 
index, Frankfurt will process orders for the 30 stocks in the DAX index (comparable to the 30 
American stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average) as well as 22 other stocks, Dusseldorf will 
be responsible for 31, Munich for 14, and Berlin for 3. See id. 
62 The chairman of the board of the Deutsche Borse AG in Frankfurt recently rebuked the 
Dusseldorf exchange, saying that the conditions there were less than desirable and that Dussel-
dorf is definitely second best among the German exchanges. The retort from Dusseldorf was a 
reminder that Frankfurt still trails London in trading volume and should be weary of Paris as well. 
See Ein Frankfurter droht mit Dusseldorf, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 23, 1995, at 27. 
63 The amendments to the Stock Exchange Act in the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
have removed the legal obstacles to creating such an exchange. See infra notes 326 to 330 and 
accompanying text. 
64 The Hannover stock exchange is currently preparing the infrastructure. The construction 
will take 15 months and will cost between 15 and 20 million DM. The prospects for the Hannover 
exchange are good, because currently there are only three commodity futures exchanges in 
Europe (London, Paris, and Amsterdam) as compared to ten in the United States. See Warenter-
minborse in Hannover wahrscheinlich, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 9, 1995, at 21. 
65 See INDUSTRIE-UND HANDELSKAMMER ZU BERLIN, BERICHT 1993/94 28 (1994). 
66 The economic role of Berlin is expected to continue to grow not only with the rebuilding of 
the city, but also with the expected political integration with the surrounding Land Brandenburg. 
See id; see also, Berlin and Brandenburg Sign Agreement to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A13. 
67 Additionally, an expected eastern expansion of the EU in the future would leave Berlin in a 
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infrastructure to meet this need. In April 1994, construction began 
upon the "Ludwig-Erhard-Haus," which will serve as a commercial 
center and source of information and support for businesses in the 
area.58 Upon completion in 1997, this new building will hold the offices 
of the city Chamber of Commerce and the renovated Berlin Stock 
Exchange.59 Although still relatively modest in size by international 
standards, the pace of growth at the Berlin stock exchange has been 
astounding-1993 saw not only records for turnover, but also the 
largest growth in turnover in the postwar period, moving Berlin into 
fifth place among the German exchanges.7o Traders have named the 
recent connection of Berlin to the computerized trading systems and 
a lengthening of trading hours until 3:55 p.m. in order to let them see 
the opening tendencies at the New York Stock Exchange as grounds 
for the growing attractiveness.71 In the first nine months of 1995, the 
number of firms admitted to trading on the exchange grew to fifty-
seven from forty-eight at the end of 1994, reaching almost twice as 
many traders as in 1989.72 
2. The Advent of Computerization 
Computerized securities trading systems seek to employ modern 
technology to reduce costS.73 The success of the NASDAQ system in the 
United States shows the potential for securities trading by computer 
systems to compete directly with regional stock exchanges. Although 
the German government seeks to promote optimal conditions for both 
systems to operate, the government will allow the market to decide the 
relative success of the systems.74 Waigel set forth the goal of providing 
the same competitive conditions for securities trading on the auction 
exchange floor as computer trading in his statement describing amend-
ments to the stock exchange laws necessary to promote the concept of 
Finanzplatz Deutschland.75 
more central position. See INDUSTRIE-UND HANDELSKAMMER ZU BERLIN, BERICHT 1993/9428 
(1994). 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 31. This building is located in a commercial district at a central point in the western 
part of the city. 
70 See id. at 37. Over this period, bond trading quadrupled while stock trading doubled. Id. 
71 See Berliner Borse findet Interesse, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 20, 1995, at 30. 
72 See id. 
73 See Waigel, f?inanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. 111(3), at 421-22. 
74 See id. art. IV(2)(a)(aa), at 422. 
75 See id. art. IV(3), at 423. 
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Although trading on the floor of an auction exchange has long been 
supported by computers, recent innovations have greatly improved 
floor trading. The "Stock-Exchange-Order-Service-System" ("BOSS") 
was introduced in November 1992.76 "BOSS assists the [broker] in 
finding a price by continuously calculating a price margin from the 
actual levels of all buy and sell orders .... Furthermore, with BOSS 
banks receive immediate confirmation of the execution of orders and 
can subsequently inform their clients without delay."77 
Recent years have also seen the development of an entirely elec-
tronic trading system. The first of these is the "Integrated Stock Ex-
change Trading and Information System" ("IBIS"), which has been in 
use since April 1991.78 
It offers all market operators, i.e. banks, Kursmaklers and 
Free Maklers in Frankfurt and elsewhere the possibility of 
concluding trades in 36 heavily traded shares, 30 bonds of 
public issuers, 15 bonds of foreign issuers, and 21 warrants 
from [8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.]. The minimum size of a trade 
is 500 shares, if they are actively traded, otherwise 100, and 
DM 1 million face value for bonds, so that IBIS is used above 
all by institutional investors like insurance companies, banks, 
or investment funds. 79 
Trading is entirely by quotation screens available to members, who can 
submit their own offer or accept one on the screen; the trade infor-
mation is entered directly into the settlement system.80 The early suc-
cess of this system may be seen in the trading volume which it has 
captured. The percentage of turnover in the thirty shares listed in the 
country's most widely watched DAX index (akin to the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average) "has risen from 17.8% in the first quarter of 1992"81 
to 29.02% in the fourth quarter of 1993 and to 36.71 % in the fourth 
quarter of 1994, representing a total of 5.47% of trading in all instru-
men ts for the course of 1994.82 
76 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION 35 (Mar. 1994). BOSS is short for 
"Biirsen-Order-Service-Systems. " 
77 Id. 
78 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION 33 (Mar. 1994). IBIS is short for 
"Integrierte Biirsenhandels-und Informations-System." 
79Id. at 33-34. 
8°Id. at 34. 
81Id. 
82 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, FRANKFURTER MONATSSTATISTIK FUR DEZEMBER 1994 4 (Jan. 1995). 
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Another innovation has been the development of a real time com-
puterized information system called pCKISS.83 This system transmits 
prices on the eight stock exchanges, on IBIS, on the futures exchange, 
as well as prices from foreign markets, of foreign currencies, and of 
news.84 
Beyond providing price information, pcKISS also allows par-
ticipation in securities trading. The [German Futures Ex-
change] and IBIS screens can be integrated into pcKISS with-
out problems and BOSS may also be assessed via the system. 
The participant also has with pcKISS a direct link to the 
settlement system ... Thus pcKISS provides the possibility of 
combining the required services for information, trade and 
settlement into one unified system.85 
3. Futures and Options 
Germany entered the world of futures and options trading only 
recently, but the markets have already achieved considerable success, 
with liquidity surpassing that on the stock exchanges. Of the sixty-two 
futures and options exchanges around the world, one-third of them 
are located in the United States, followed by eight in the United 
Kingdom.86 A dozen other European countries, such as Germany, have 
a single exchange.87 This market is relatively concentrated, with the two 
largest U.S. exchanges accounting for thirty-eight percent of all trad-
ing.88 
The German Futures Exchange is the Deutsche Terminborse ("DTB"), 
located in Frankfurt, which opened for trading in 1990. Trading on 
the DTB has grown rapidly, to the point where it may be called more 
successful than the other German exchanges dealing primarily in un-
derlying securities rather than in derivatives. While world growth in 
trading on derivatives exchanges grew twenty percent in 1993, trading 
on the DTB grew forty-four percent.89 Trading was strongest in options, 
83 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION 36 (Mar. 1994). 
84 See id. at 36. 
85 [d. at 36-38. 
86 HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND 
REGULATION 829 (1995). 
87 See id. Outside of Europe, the other countries with futures and options exchanges include 
Japan (5), Canada (5), Brazil (3), Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. [d. at 
829-30. 
88 See id. at 830. 
89DTB DEUTSCHE TERMINBORSE GMBH, 1993 GESCHAFTSBERICHT, ANNUAL REpORT 15 (1994). 
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with thirty-four million contracts traded in 1993, representing twenty-
six percent of the European options markets. Total volume in financial 
futures reached over sixteen million contracts in 1993.90 Products traded 
include options on the DAX Index, representing 42.7% of all trading 
in 1993, options on individual stocks at 24.4%, German government 
bond futures at 15.5%, other government bond futures at 9%, DAX 
Index Futures at 7.9%, and the remaining less than 1 % in options on 
futuresYI 
One of the provisions in the Second Financial Market Promotion 
Act seeks to make trading in derivatives even more attractive in Ger-
many, by adding a protection for traders in options and futures in cases 
of breach due to insolvencyY2 Another provision allows investment 
companies to invest in derivative products, which should increase de-
mand in these markets.93 
D. Insurance 
Like the German banking industry, the insurance industry is much 
more mature than the securities markets. The main thrust of change 
in the insurance industry has come from increased competition through-
out Europe as a result of harmonization measures and the removal of 
national barriers. Within the immediate past, however, there have been 
no German legislative reforms in the insurance industry to rival those 
affecting the banking and securities markets. In addition, the major 
participants in the latter two markets, the universal banks, are largely 
prohibited from offering insurance products, while the insurance in-
dustry also falls under the authority of different federal regulators. For 
these reasons, although a sound insurance industry is an essential part 
of the total concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland, this Article will focus 
largely on the recent reforms outside of the insurance industry. 
E. Finanzplatz Frankfurt 
Any discussion of Finanzplatz Deutschland will ultimately revolve around 
the financial capital, Frankfurt am Main.94 Although Berlin was once 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92 See infra notes 363-70 and accompanying text (discussing Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsge-
setz, supra note 3, art. 15 ("FinanztermingeschiiJte im Insolvenzverfahren")). 
93 See infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text (discussing Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsge-
setz, supra note 3, art. 3 ("Anderung des Gesetzes iiber KapitalanlagegesellschaJten")). 
94 The correct reference to Frankfurt as the city on the Main River has become more important 
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and is now again the political capital and is reasserting some aspects 
of its place as an economic capital, the number one position of Frank-
furt in terms of banking95 and securities remains unquestioned. Only 
in the third aspect of the Finanzplatz-insurance-is the industry more 
evenly distributed throughout the country leaving Frankfurt as a smaller 
player. 
Frankfurt's roots as a financial center stem from its location at the 
crossroads of major European trade routes, with its renowned trade 
fairs tracing back to the eleventh century.96 Currency exchange busi-
ness formed the basis for the establishment of the first recorded bank-
ing institution in Frankfurt, the "Wessil," founded in 1402.97 The estab-
lishment of Berlin as the capital of Germany in the late nineteenth 
century and the World Wars and intervening turmoil of the first half 
of this century had devastated Frankfurt's role as an international 
financial center.98 Its modern role as a financial center began with the 
establishment of a strong central bank, the German Bundesbank, in 
the postwar erayg 
Within the EU, it appears that the importance of Frankfurt as a 
financial center will continue to grow: 
Since the decision of the heads of state and government of 
the EC to award Frankfurt am Main the seat of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) and, with the completion of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the seat of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt am Main is more than 
ever before in the limelight as a financial centre. With the 
European Central Bank not only the Deutsche Bundesbank 
but also the supreme monetary instance of the European 
Union will shape monetary policy from Frankfurt am Main at 
the end of this century.IOO 
since the German unification and the reawakening of Frankfurt an der Oderon the Polish border. 
All references in this Article to Frankfllrt shall refer to Frankfurt am Main. 
9" About 70% of all foreign banks with a base in Germany have a presence in Frankfurt, and 
for half of all foreign banks, this is the only German presence. See FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, supra 
note 37, at 34. These banks represent 52 different countries from six continents. [d. at 35 
96 FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, supra note 37, at 6. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 To replace the Reichsbank after the war, the individual Lander had their own Land central 
banks, loosely united under the Bank deutscher Lander, established in 1948. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank succeeded this system in a union of these entities on August 1, 1957. See id. at 12. 
100 See id. at 3. The decision to award Frankfurt the seat of the European Monetary Institute 
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A large part of this decision reflected deference to the German Bun-
desbank as an engineer of strong monetary policy and economic growth 
in Germany. 101 The recognition of the European leaders of the strength 
of the Deutsche Mark, however, was only one step toward Finanzplatz 
Deutschland. The more difficult tasks lay in convincing financial insti-
tutions of the benefits of operating in Germany and convincing inves-
tors from both within and outside the country of the strength of the 
public markets in Germany. 
As far as banking institutions are concerned, Frankfurt am Main has 
truly emerged as an international financial center over the last few 
decades, with an increasing number of German and foreign banks 
operating there. As of June 1994, 422 domestic and foreign banks 
maintained a presence in Frankfurt.lo2 Of the 143 German institutions, 
67 had registered offices or central headquarters there. 103 In the post-
war era, American banks established the first foreign bank branches in 
Frankfurt, leading the way for a tremendous international presence 
today.104 "Of the 272 foreign banks in Frankfurt, 48 are autonomous 
banks, 108 are subsidiaries incorporated under German law and 116 
are representative offices. "105 Foreign banks account for over eleven 
percent of all banking business in Frankfurt. 106 Few of the leading 
international banks can afford not to operate in Frankfurt. 107 In addi-
tion to the concentration of the credit institutions, "Six of the ten 
("EMI") was made by the twelve EC Member States at the Community Summit in Brussels on 
October 29, 1993. See id. at 16. 
101 Note that the two basic objectives of the European Central Bank as head organ of the 
European System of Central Banks ("ESCB") stem directly from the law establishing the German 
Bundesbank: (1) to protect the currency, and (2) to further the general economic policies of the 
federal government. Compare GESETZ (JEER DIE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, BGBI. I p. 1782, §§ 3, 
12 (as amended as of Nov. 1, 1992) with TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 105(1) (1992) ("The 
primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Commu-
nity .... "). 
102 See FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, supra note 37, at 11. 
103 See id. The remaining German institutions had a total of 23 registered branches and 53 
places of business in Frankfurt. Id. 
104 Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank established the first modern foreign bank branches in 
Frankfurt in 1947 and 1952 respectively. The United States still has the most bank branches in 
Frankfurt (10). See id. at 34. 
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 39. 
107 "Of the ten largest credit institutions in the world-in terms of balance sheet total at the 
end of 1992-nine are represented in Frankfurt; taking the 50 largest, 45 of them are represented 
here." FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, supra note 37, at 39. 
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largest (German) securities investment fund companies have their 
registered offices in Frankfurt. "108 
The earliest stock exchanges trace their roots in Frankfurt back to 
the sixteenth century, once again based upon the trading routes that 
intersected there. 109 Despite the early lead in fixed interest rate debt 
securities, the Frankfurt markets never developed a strong basis in 
corporate equity stock. 110 To some extent, the current reforms in this 
Article are aimed at this reticence that has been slow to change. In the 
modern postwar era, the international markets did not pick up again 
until 1956 with the trading of U.S. shares. lll Only within the last 
decade, however, has the pace of reform in Frankfurt brought the 
German markets up to the speed of international standards. 
Although the importance of the insurance industry in Frankfurt is 
dwarfed in comparison to the banking and securities sectors, once 
again Frankfurt am Main is favored as a German foothold by foreign 
companies. A total of 171 national and international insurance com-
panies were registered in the greater Frankfurt area in June of 1994.112 
Nonetheless, only 11 of the 122 German companies had their head-
quarters there, while other larger German cities-Hamburg, Munich, 
and Cologne-surpassed Frankfurt in this category.ll3 The interna-
tional presence remains seated in Frankfurt, however, as shown by the 
fact that although Frankfurt ranks seventh in Germany in terms of total 
insurance contract premiums, it ranks first for premiums by foreign 
insurers in GermanyY4 
F. Oversight oj the Financial Markets in Germany 
Federal activity affecting the various financial institutions falls gen-
erally under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Below 
this ministry are three autonomous oversight agencies, the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Authority (BundesauJsichtsamt Jur das Kreditwe-
sen), the Federal Insurance Supervisory Authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt 
Jur Versicherung) , and the newly established Federal Securities Trading 
Supervisory Authority (BundesauJsichtsamt Jur den Wertpapierhandel). 
108 Id. at 23. 
109 See id. at 42. 
110 See id. at 43-44. 
III See id. at 45. 
112 See FINANZPLATZ FRANKFURT, supra note 37, at 61. 
113 See id. at 62-63. 
114 See id. at 63. 
26 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No.1 
The creation of the latter agency filled a void in the triumvirate of the 
financial sectors in Germany. Finance Minister Waigel had openly 
recognized that the type of securities oversight necessary to carry out 
the laws and remedy grievances outside the organized capital markets 
did not yet exist in Germany.1I5 Its creation was urgent because it was 
seen as an important component of an internationally reputable finan-
cial metropolis. As in the fields of banking and insurance, a federal 
agency meeting international standards would be needed to oversee 
the securities industry because the activities transcend the scope of the 
Lander. Germany faced outside pressure to establish a federal counter-
part for international cooperation among securities oversight agencies. ll6 
The changes discussed in this Article establish a three-tiered system 
of regulation within the securities industry and establish a second 
agency to oversee securities activities of credit institutions. The federal 
level of securities regulation and the establishment of the Securities 
Trading Supervisory Authority is discussed in part V.A.2. The regula-
tion within the stock exchanges themselves has been supplemented 
with the establishment of the Trading Control Board mandated by the 
amendments to the Stock Exchange Act discussed in Part V.B. The 
following discussion addresses the intermediate role of the Lander in 
securities regulation which served as the primary form of oversight 
prior to the Second Financial Market Promotion Act. Part VI.E will 
discuss the interrelationship between the three levels of securities 
oversight as well as the interaction with the Federal Banking Supervi-
sory Authority. 
Although the role of the Lander has changed they will continue to 
serve an important role in securities regulation. First of all, the estab-
lishment of an exchange requires the approval of the Stock Exchange 
Supervisory Authority (Borsenaufsichtsbehorde) of the Land in which the 
exchange will be located. ll7 The Land Stock Exchange Supervisory 
Authority shall have general oversight duties, in accordance with the 
Stock Exchange Act.IIS In order to implement this supervision, the 
Supervisory Authority may establish a State Commissioner's Office.ll9 
Although the Board of Directors of the exchange (Borsenrat) 120 shall 
115 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, art. 1(2), at 420. 
lifo See id. 
117 This provision comprises the first paragraph of the first section of the Stock Exchange Act. 
Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 1 (1). 
118 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 1 (2). 
119 "Staatskommissariat." See id. § I (3) . 
120 See infra notes 285-88 and accompanying text. 
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decree the rules and regulations of the stock exchange (Borsenord-
nung) ,121 which govern, among other things, the lines of business of 
the exchange, its organization, and the publication of prices, exchange 
rates, and turnover;122 the Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority 
must approve these rules and regulations for them to have effect. 123 
The Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority also has oversight 
responsibility for the official exchange brokers (Kursmakler) and the 
independent brokers (freie Makler), in their activities both on and off 
the exchange.124 The Stock Exchange Act further empowers the indi-
vidual Lander to establish a Sanctions Committee (Sanktionsausschuss) , 
which can punish trading participants for actions that violate the regu-
lations of the exchange, thereby disturbing trading, or whose actions 
damage commercial good faith or the honor of another trading par-
ticipant. 125 
III. OUTSIDE FORCES FOR REFORM IN GERMANY 
As explained earlier in this Article, although economic pressures 
from within Germany certainly must have affected these reforms, the 
121 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 3 (2). The Board of Directors has attained this responsibility 
through the new amendments to the Stock Exchange Act. See infra note 287 and accompanying 
text. 
122 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 4(2); see, e.g., DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, BORSENORDNUNG (July 
1994); DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE FRANKFURT STOCK EXCHANGE 
(May 1994) (English translation). 
123 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 4(4); see, e.g., DEUTscm: BORSE AG, BORSENORDNUNG 3 
(July 1994); DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, RULES ANI) REGULATIONS OF THE FRANKFURT STOCK EXCHANGE 
3 (May 1994) (English translation) ("The Hessian Minister of Economics and Technology has 
approved the amendment of the Stock Exchange Rules and Regulations in accordance with 
§ 4(4) of the Exchange Act by his letter dated August 24, 1993 (file no.: IIb 3-37 d 02.07.02).") 
Normally, the Land Supervisory Authority works very closely with the leadership of the ex-
change in drafting the rules and regulations; this process mitigates the risk to the exchange that 
the regulations would be rejected. As of January 1995, no new regulations had been approved to 
reflect the reforms of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act. In the case of Germany's 
largest stock exchange, the Frankfurter Wertpapierborse, the responsible Land Stock Exchange 
Supervisory Authority is the Hessisches Ministmum fur Wirtschaft, Verkehr; Technologie, und 
Europaangelegenheiten, in Wiesbaden, the capital of the Land Hessen, in which Frankfurt am Main 
is located. The regulations of Germany's second largest exchange, in Diisseldorf, closely mirror 
those in Frankfurt. Interview with Mr. Laun, Hessisches Ministmum fur Wirtscha/t, Verkehr; Tech-
nologie, und Europaangelegenheiten, Wiesbaden, Germany (Jan. 20, 1995). 
124 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 8a. These powers regarding the Kursmakler have been 
expanded through the latest amendments by the Second Financial Market Promotion Act; see, 
e.g., Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 30 (regarding the admission and dismissal of Kursmakler). 
125 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 9. The Land Authority shall determine its procedures and 
relationship to the Authority as well as provide advice and cover the costs of the committee. 
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pressures from outside Germany were much clearer. In a general sense, 
the growth of international competition in the financial markets pro-
vided pressure on Germany for reform. One event that served as a 
wakeup call for Germany that its securities markets in particular were 
falling farther behind world standards and that it could no longer rely 
on traditional practices of debt financing was the decision by one of 
Germany's oldest and most venerable corporations to list its shares 
directly on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 in order to raise more 
capital,126 As one of Germany's most liquid stockS,127 this step truly sug-
gested that the securities markets in Germany were a step below the top 
tier.128 Meanwhile, the more specific directives of the EU have estab-
lished concrete provisions which must be implemented into German law. 
A. Directives of the European Union 
An ongoing series of directives have been issued by the Council of 
the EU in furtherance of the harmonization of the capital markets 
within the Member States. Each of these directives must be imple-
mented by national legislation. The Second Financial Market Promo-
tion Act, and in particular the Securities Trading Act of Article 1 of 
the former Act, implement a number of these directives. The most 
important and most obvious of these directives in terms of the scope 
of this Article is the directive on insider trading ("Insider Directive"), 
adopted by the EU Council in 1989.129 Because of its central impor-
126 See generally,]. Michael Schell, Daimler-Benz Leads Germany to New York Stock Exchange, INT'L 
FIN. L. REv. 11 (Dec. 1993). 
127 In December of 1994, stock in Daimler-Benz had the second highest turnover in Germany 
of all German domestic stocks (close behind first) in terms of value, with a total of 26,625 trades 
representing 9,332,357 shares and a trading value of almost seven billion Deutsche Mark. DEUT-
SCHE BORSE AG, FRANKFURTER MONATSSTATISTIK FUR DEZEMBER 19945 (Jan. 1995) (Inliindische 
Aktien mit dem hiichsten Umsatz). This would be equal to a turnover of approximately $4.67 billion 
per month, assuming a constant exchange rate of DM 1.5 to $1. In comparison, for the single 
day of May 4, 1995, the second most active trading in terms of shares was for Ford Motor Co., 
with a total of 5,734,700 shares traded at prices around the closing value of $26 for a total of 
approximately $149 million dollars. See Market Indicators, N.Y. TIMES, May 5 1995, at D7 (New 
York Stock Exchange, Most Active). Assuming 22 trading days in the month, at this rate, trading 
in Ford stock would still only reach $3.28 billion-two-thirds of the value for that in Daimler-Benz 
in December of 1994. On May 4, 1995, trading in direct shares of Daimler-Benz stock on the 
NYSE consisted of 90,500 shares at a closing price of $47.25 for a total volume of approximately 
$4.25 million, or a monthly rate of $94 million (5% of the trading rate in Germany). See New 
York Stock Exchange Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 5 1995, at D7. 
128 Although the figures for trading in Daimler-Benz show a high level of turnover, beyond the 
top thirty stocks, the liquidity of the German markets declines precipitously. 
129 Council Directive 89/592 of November 13,1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Deal-
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tance, the Insider Directive is discussed in detail in Part III.B of this 
Article. 
The other directive specifically adopted in its entirety by the Securi-
ties Trading Act is the directive on disclosure of holdings in exchange-
listed companies ("Holdings Disclosure Directive").13o The reporting 
requirements from the Holdings Disclosure Directive are similar to 
those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") 
in the United States. One of the primary differences under the Ger-
man system that makes this directive interesting is that German uni-
versal banks can perform both commercial and investment banking 
activities under one roof. Financial institutions in the United States, 
with limited exceptions, must perform one or the other activity according 
to the Glass-Steagall Act. 131 Even within the exceptions to this division 
within the United States, the requirements for firewalls are strict.132 
The Rules of Conduct discussed infra in Part V.A.4 implement part 
of the Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field. 133 These 
Rules are designed to minimize potential conflicts of interest in the 
provision of securities services and to promote the interests of the 
customer, thereby increasing the attractiveness of private investment in 
the financial markets. 
Finally, the directive on the Coordination of Regulations for the 
Admission of Securities for Listing on a Securities Stock Exchange134 
promotes greater transparency in securities activities, in concert with 
the overall theme of the German reforms. The most important aspect 
of this directive as enacted into German law is the requirement for 
companies to disclose any facts that might materially affect the trading 
price of the security-"price-relevant circumstances."135 
ing, 1989 OJ. (L 334) [hereinafter Insider Directive). The text of this Article shall use the 
American term "insider trading" rather than the British equivalent-"insider dealing." 
130 Council Directive 88/627 of December 12, 1988 on the Information to be Published When 
a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or Disposed of, 1988 OJ. (L 334) [hereinafter 
Holdings Disclosure Directive). 
131 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1994). For the text of this provision, see infra note 564. 
132 Compare the regulation of § 20 subsidiaries of commercial banks in the United States. See 
infra note 564. 
133 Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1988 
OJ. (L 147). 
134Directive 79/279 of March 5, 1979. 
135 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 48 (explaining art. 1, § 15 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
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B. Regulation of Insider Trading 
Contrary to common misperceptions, Germany did not lack any 
form of oversight or regulation of insider activities and securities trad-
ing prior to the new Act. From the outside, however, one noted the 
peculiar absence of federal authority to mirror the SEC in the United 
States. Stemming from the federal nature of the German Republic, the 
competence to regulate securities trading was left to the individual 
Liinder.136 Existing provisions in federal laws address only a small por-
tion of the possible misuses of non public information.137 While fore-
seeing the impending regulation, the Frankfurt stock exchange, in 
conjunction with market participants, had developed rules prohibiting 
insider trading in 1992.138 These rules, however, were subject only to 
self-regulation by the market participants and exchanges. Because the 
German securities markets were relatively small by international stand-
ards, many feared that the costs of federal regulation and stricter 
insider trading prohibitions would outweigh the benefits. While theo-
retically possible, the small markets left little room for the manipula-
tion of stock prices and arbitrage based on tacit information that has 
been the hallmark of insider traders elsewhere. 
The notion that the markets were small and largely free from ma-
nipulation came into direct contrast with attempts to establish a finan-
cial metropolis with markets large enough to compete favorably on the 
world stage. Although not wishing to give up their universal banking 
system and self-regulation of the securities markets, most Germans in 
the financial markets have realized that Germany must adopt interna-
tional standards in order to gain international recognition and trust. 
In just a few years, the financial industry moved from harsh criticism 
of the Insider Directive to strong support for reform. 
The Insider Directive was adopted by the Council of the European 
Community under the authority of Article 100a of the EEC Treaty.139 
This provision directs the Council to "adopt the measures for the 
136 Under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in economic matters including 
commerce, banking, stock exchanges, and private insurance, the Liinder have legislative powers 
concurrent with those of the federal government. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND, BGBI. p. 1, Art. 74(11) (1949, as amended through Dec. 21, 1993). 
137 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 34-35 (citing Stock Act § 404, penal code §§ 203 ff., 
commercial code § 333, and the law against unfair competition § 17). 
138 Frankfurter Wertpapierborse AG, INSIDER-REGELN (Sept. 1992). The Frankfurter Wert-
papierborse (not an "AG") is now under the control of the Deutsche Borse AG. 
139 See Insider Directive, supra note 129, at L 334. 
'. 
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approximation of the provisions of laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishmen t and functioning of the internal market. "140 The directive 
recognizes the important role of the secondary market in transferable 
securities within the Member States and seeks to promote investor 
confidence, which in turn should help ensure that the markets operate 
smoothly.141 Because insider trading undermines investor confidence, 
such practices should be prohibited.142 
The directive applies to all nonpublic information which would 
affect the price of a transferable security, whether it represents debt or 
equity, and whether sold as a spot, option, or futures contract.143 The 
law prohibits trading by any person who has such nonpublic informa-
tion by virtue of their position as an employee, shareholder, manager, 
director or fiduciary of the issuer.144 These "insiders" are also prohib-
ited from disclosing such information to third parties;145 a person "who 
with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct 
or indirect source of which could not be other than" an insider, will 
also be liable for trading upon that information. 146 Each Member State 
must designate the administrative authorities competent to uphold the 
resulting statute. 147 Employees of such agencies shall be bound by the 
same prohibitions on the use of privileged information.148 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECOND FINANCIAL MARKET 
PROMOTION ACT 
The legislative history of the Second Financial Market Promotion 
Act is instructive, in that it reflects the struggles between different 
German interests that have shaped the ultimate product. The delays 
in implementing the Act stemmed not from any misunderstanding of 
the goals of Finanzplatz Deutschland or by any means lack of compe-
tence. Rather, the period of time reflected a clash of interests among 
a large number of actors attempting to establish a very complex set of 
140EEC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 100a(l). 
141 See Insider Directive, supra note 129, at L 334. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. art. 1. 
144 See id. art. 2. 
145 See id. art. 3. 
146 See Insider Directive, supra note 129, art. 4. 
147 See id. art. 8. 
148 See id. art. 9. 
32 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIX, No.1 
rules which needed to be implemented in a relatively short time after 
enactment. Since many of the provisions of the Act reflect the outside 
pressures for reform, the German participants have basically been 
trying to adapt German standards to meet international norms, while 
at the same time working to preserve the strengths of the German 
system. 
A. The German Legislative Process 
The following summary of the legislative process seeks to define the 
actors and provide a framework for understanding the development 
of the Act. The German federal legislative process is laid down in the 
Basic Law itself. The two houses of the legislature-the upper house 
which is composed of representatives of the individual Land govern-
ments ("Bundesrat")149 and the lower house which is composed of 
members directly elected by the people ("Bundestag")150-and the 
federal government itself151 each play an integral role in this process. 
Unlike in the U.S. government system, the German Federal President 
plays a minor role in the domestic legislative process.152 
Most regulatory laws are drafted by the responsible federal adminis-
trative agency, usually in conjunction with representatives of the af-
fected industry. Bills that originate in the federal government must be 
submitted to the Bundesrat, which then has six weeks to issue an 
149 See GRUNDGESETZ, BGBI. p. 1, art. 51. Unlike the U.S. Senate, the Bundesrat members are 
actual representatives of the Lander governments, rather than directly elected representatives of 
the citizens of each Land. As such, the Bundesrat representative will be the head of the ministry 
under whose jurisdiction the matter under consideration falls, and representatives can be recalled 
at any time. See id. art. 51 (1). Also, the multiple representatives from each Land (the number of 
representatives being a factor of population size) must cast all votes for a Land together as a bloc. 
See id. art. 51 (3). 
150 The deputies to the German Bundestag are elected in general, direct, free, equal, and secret 
elections. SeeGRuNDGESETZ, BGBI. p. 1, art. 38. They represent the entire people; separate federal 
election regulations prescribe a system whereby only parties that meet a fringe requirement of 
5% of total votes shall be represented, and parties are allotted seats according to their percentage 
of the total national vote as well as through direct regional elections. 
lSI The Federal Government consists of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. See 
GRUNDGESETZ, BGBI. p. 1, art. 61. The Federal Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag upon the 
proposal of the Federal President. See id. art. 63(1). The Federal Ministers are appointed and 
dismissed by the Federal President upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor. See id. art. 64(1). 
152The primary role of the President is to represent Germany in international affairs. See id. 
art. 59(1). Even those executive powers given the President, such as the power to execute orders 
and decrees, require the countersignature of the Federal Chancellor or the appropriate Federal 
Minister, see id. art. 58, while in the international realm, treaties may also require approval by 
another government entity. See id. art. 59(2). 
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opinion on the bill,153 but not a binding vote. Mter this period, the bill 
must also be introduced into the Bundestag, which must adopt the bill 
for it to become federal law. 154 Following adoption by the Bundestag, 
the Bundesrat reviews the bill once again and may demand the con-
vening of a joint committee of both houses to iron out differences in 
the bill. 155 The Bundestag shall then have final say on any resulting 
amendmen tS.156 
In summary, draft bills begin with the administrative experts and 
debate occurs in the directly elected parliament, the Bundestag. Its 
leader and Bundestag member, the Federal Chancellor, can introduce 
a bill, the representatives of the Lander shall offer their opinions, and 
the Bundestag shall make the final decision. 
The Second Financial Market Promotion Act followed such a proc-
ess: the federal government introduced a bill, which had been drafted 
by the Ministry of Finance in consultation with representatives of the 
banking and financial industries. Mter Bundesrat comment, a further 
draft was then introduced into the Bundestag for debate. Because of 
the general consensus of the need for the reforms and the care that 
had been taken in drafting the Act, there was no need for the bill to 
go into joint committee before final enactment by the Bundestag. 
B. The Legislative History oj the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
The German Federal Government introduced the first draft bill of 
what would become the Second Financial Market Promotion Act to the 
Bundesrat on November 5, 1993.157 The federal government derives 
concurrent competence with the Lander to initiate a bill dealing with 
the supervision of securities trading and the scope of stock exchange 
activity from the German Basic Law itself.158 In the more specific regu-
153 See GRUNDGESETZ, BGB!. p. 1, art. 76(2). 
154 See id. art. 77 (l). 
155 See id. art. 77 (2). The joint committee shall be composed of two-thirds of its members from 
the Bundestag and one-third from the Bundesrat. In this capacity, the Bundesrat members shall 
not be bound by the respective Land governments they represent. See id. art. 53a(l). 
156 See id. art. 77 (2). 
157 Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung b6rsenrechtlicher 
und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz), Bundesrat 
Drucksache 793/93 (Nov. 5, 1993). This draft is identical to that later submitted to the Bundestag. 
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur 
Anderung b6rsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finan-
zmarktf6rderungsgesetz), Bundestag Drucksache 12/6679 (Jan. 27, 1994). See infra note 161. All 
references to the draft bill in this Article shall cite the Bundestag printing of the draft. 
158 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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lation of the actual structure of the exchanges, the federal government 
preempts the competence of the Lander.159 The latter distinction reflects 
the inability of the individual Lander to effectively regulate and to 
maintain national uniformity.160 
In comparing the differences between the draft of the Second Fi-
nancial Market Promotion Act with the adopted version, the most 
striking point is how similar the two actually are. This suggests that an 
early consensus had emerged on the need for such changes, and 
perhaps also indicates the diligence of the Ministry of Finance in 
preparing the draft. The final adopted version contains a total of 
twenty articles (seven more than the draft), but most of the seven 
articles added later contain relatively minor amendments to existing 
laws. Perhaps more significantly, no substantial provisions in the draft 
have been stricken from the final bill. Of the most ground breaking 
changes in the first two articles of the Act, the greatest difference 
between the draft and the enacted version is that the draft contains no 
reference to the Rules of Conduct, discussed infra in Part V.A.4. 
Although a comparison of the draft with the enacted version illus-
trates the evolution of the Act, the value of the draft stems not so much 
from the text itself, but rather from the additional information that 
accompanies it. Following the text of the draft bill, one finds twice as 
many pages devoted to the official explanation (Begriindung) of the 
provisions of the bill by the German federal government. 161 This expla-
nation provides a general overview of the Act in terms of its goals, 
followed by a discussion of the individual provisions of the bill. 
A month after the submission of the draft bill by the government to 
the Bundesrat, the responsible committee of the Bundesrat issued a 
set of recommendations (including explanations thereof) to the Bun-
desrat in preparation for discussion of the bill. 162 Additionally, the Land 
159The draft bill cites the above reasons as its basis. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 38. 
160The federal preemption right also stems from the Grundgesetz. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, BGBI. p. 1, art. 72(2)(1, 3} (1949, as amended through Dec. 
21, 1993). 
161 Begriindung to the Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung 
b6rsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsge-
setz), Bundesrat Drucksache 793/93, 100-284 (Nov. 5, 1993) (99 page draft and 185 page 
explanation); Bundestag Drucksache 12/6679 (Jan. 27, 1994) 33-93 (29 page draft and 61 page 
explanation). The texts are identical; the pagination differs only due to the printing format. 
162 Empfehlungen der Ausschiisse zu Punkt der 664. Sitzung des Bundesrates am 17. Dezember 
1993 [Recommendations of the Committees for the 664th Session of the Bundesrat on Dec. 17, 
1993], Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung b6rsenrechtlicher 
und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz), Bundesrat 
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Nordrhein-Westfalen submitted two amendments to the bill,163 reflect-
ing some of the conflicting interests between the federal government 
in creating more of an internationally competitive marketplace for 
Germany as a whole and the desire of the Lander to protect the 
regional exchanges.164 The Bundesrat addressed the bill on December 
17, 1993, and issued a favorable opinion, recommending few changes 
to the bill. 165 
Mter receiving the Bundesrat opinion, the federal government in-
troduced an identical copy of the draft bill including the identical 
explanation into the Bundestag on January 27, 1994, with the opinion 
of the Bundesrat and the government's answer to that opinion ap-
pended.166 The core debate over the draft bill occurred during the 
following four and a half months. Most of the significant changes to 
the original draft were made during this phase. The finance committee 
of the Bundestag issued its final recommendations and report on June 
15, 1994.167 Two days later, on June 17, 1994, the full session of the 
Bundestag enacted the draft bill as the Act on Securities Trading and 
Drucksache 793/1/93, (Dec. 6, 1993). The four committees responsible for the recommendations 
were the finance committee as coordinator, the committee for internal affairs, the legal commit-
tee, and the economic committee. Id. at 1. 
163 Antrag des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes tiber den Wertpapier-
handel und zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), Bundesrat Drucksache 793/2/93, (Dec. 15, 1993); Bundesrat 
Drucksache 793/3/93, (Dec. 15, 1993). 
164 See infra note 309. 
165 Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, Entwurf eines Gesetzes tiber den Wertpapierhandel und 
zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz), Bundesrat Drucksache 793/93 (BeschluB) (Dec. 17, 1993), reprinted in 
Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 94-100 (Anlage 2) [hereinafter Stellungnahme des Bundesrates]. 
For a discussion of Bundesrat opinion in the German legislative process, see supra note 153 and 
accompanying text. 
166 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes tiber den Wertpapierhandel 
und zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz), Bundestag Drucksache 12/6679 (Jan. 27, 1994). A copy of the opinion 
of the Bundesrat (see supra note 162) and the government answer to this opinion (GegeniiujJerung 
der Bundesregierung) may be found at pages 94-100, and 101-04, respectively. All citation in this 
Article to the draft bill shall refer to this version published in the Bundestag documents, since 
this version essentially became the working draft. Recall that the Bundestag must adopt the bill 
for it to become federal law. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
167 BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, Bundestag Drucksache 12/7918 
(June 15, 1994). In addition to addressing the draft bill of the federal government this report 
also addresses a petition from members of the Bundestag from the German Social Democrat 
Party regarding the struggle against insider trading on the German exchanges (An trag der 
Abgeordneten Dr. Hans de With, Hermann Bachmaier, Angelika Barbe u.a. under der Fraktion 
der SPD, "Bekampfung des Insider-Handels an deutschen Borsen," Bundestag Drucksache 
12/5437). See Bundestag Drucksache 12/7918, at 1. 
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for the Modification of Stock Exchange and Securities Regulation 
(Second Financial Market Promotion Act) and sent it to the Bundesrat 
for final review. 168 Although the Bundesrat has the authority to demand 
the convening of a joint committee of both houses to iron out differ-
ences in the bill, a broad consensus made such a committee unneces-
sary.169 The Act as codified was entered into the German Federal Law 
Gazette on July 26, 1994.170 Certain provisions went into effect on 
August 1, 1994, with the remainder of the Act coming into force on 
January 1, 1995.171 
This summary oversimplifies the actual forces involved in the evolu-
tion of this Act, because it only discusses the official aspects of the 
legislative process. While this discussion began with the draft bill intro-
duced into the German parliament by the federal government, the 
history of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act reaches back 
much further, to the background for the statement of Finance Minister 
Waigel on Finanzplatz Deutschland, discussed supra in Part II.A. A 
public discussion of an actual draft began as early as July of 1993, when 
the Federal Ministry of Finance submitted a proposal.172 "In August 
1993 Germany's exchanges presented in detail their common view on 
the proposal."173 Some of these were adopted into the draft bill.174 
This glimpse into the pre-parliamentary stages of the legislative 
process reveals a very important point: when enacting new regulations, 
the government works very closely with the industries affected. This is 
extremely important in such complicated areas as the securities mar-
kets, compounded by the fact that the previous competence to regulate 
168 GesetzesbeschluB des Deutschen Bundestages, Gesetz tiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur 
Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz), Bundesrat Drucksache 585/94 (June 17, 1994). The draft bill states 
that the Act requires the approval of the Bundesrat, referring to the Grundgesetz provision 
regarding the execution of federal laws by the Lander. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 38 
(citing GRUNDGESETZ art. 84(1)). 
169 For a discussion of the joint committee, see supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
170Gesetz tiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung borsenrechtlicher und wertpapier-
rechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), BUNDESGESETZBLATT Teil I 
[BGB!. IJ 1749-85 (July 26, 1994). Although the law was entered on July 26th, 1994, the 
publication date of the addition of the Federal Law Gazette (the German equivalent to the United 
States Code for federal law) was July 30, 1994. The Act bears the signatures of the Federal 
President, Roman Herzog; the Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl; the Federal Finance Minister, 
Theo Waigel; and the Federal Justice Minister, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger. Id. at 1785. 
17l See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 20. 
172 See DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, DEUTSCHE BORSEN: 1993 ANNUAL REpORT 74 (1994). 
173Id. 
174Id. 
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these markets was held by the Lander, rather than by any federal 
authority. The best example of the ongoing effort to involve the market 
participants is the codification of this relationship in the Rules of 
Conduct under the Securities Trading Act, discussed infra in Part 
V.A.4, which gives the central associations of the concerned industry 
the right to review the guidelines promulgated by the new Federal 
Securities Trading Supervisory Authority according to the Securities 
Trading Act.175 Two of the associations most actively involved in the 
legislative and lobbying processes were the Federal Association of Ger-
man Banks (Bundesverband deutscher Banken) and the Association of 
German Savings and Loan Institutions (Deutscher Sparkassen-und Giro-
verband). 
C. The Government Explanation of the Act (Begrundung) 
While the official government explanation accompanying the draft 
bill submitted into the two houses of parliament details each and every 
provision of the Act, this Part of this Article contains a brief overview 
that focuses on the goals of the Act. The rest of this Article seeks to 
incorporate this detailed explanation. Part V delineates the provisions 
of the final Act, while Part VI analyzes its effects. 
The draft states as its overall goal an improvement in the attractiveness 
and international competitiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland through 
broadening investor protections, safeguarding the ability of the Ger-
man securities stock exchanges to function, international cooperation 
in securities supervision, broadening the capabilities of investment 
companies, and removing limitations in the Securities Deposit Act 
and Stock Corporation Act. 176 Aside from this, the draft law served to 
implement the EU Insider Directive and Transparency Directive. 177 The 
means of implementation are the amendment of existing laws and the 
enactment of the new Securities Trading Act. 178 
The government's explanation of the purpose of the Act echos the 
speech by Minister Waigel, whose own Finance Ministry drafted the 
bill. 1 79 The federal government has set a high priority on the maintenance 
175 See infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
176 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at l. 
I771d. 
I781d. at 1-2. 
179 See supra Part II.A. The government explanation actually states that the draft substantially 
follows the concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland laid down by Waigel. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 
7, at 1. 
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and improvement of the attractiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland; this 
Act serves to continue past initiatives with a renewed offensive for the 
further positive development of the financial markets.180 The German 
government believes that the financial markets must be able to opti-
mally serve the financial needs of market participants and to allow 
room for creative innovation. 181 National markets can no longer be 
considered in isolation; worldwide competition has intensified in Ger-
many through European integration.182 The state's role shall be to 
establish the framework of rules for the markets to fulfill their func-
tions; in particular, the state must care for the protection of investors. 183 
The German government wishes to pursue the following general 
goals with the Act: trust building measures, adaptation of the regula-
tory framework for the stock exchanges, and deregulatory measures.184 
In terms of the first concept, the government refers to the trust of 
investors, which is of decisive importance for the financial markets to 
function. 185 One aspect of this trust stems from the assurance of equal 
treatment and protection against improper usage of information.186 
Since insider trading runs directly counter to this trust, the Act shall 
bring international standards prohibiting insider trading to Germany.187 
The Act also seeks to raise investor protection both by requiring greater 
disclosure and making public information more available to inves-
tors.188 Greater transparency in both understanding the market proc-
esses and the ownership structure of exchange listed companies also 
aids in investment calculations.189 From the regulatory perspective, the 
Lander have agreed with the Federal Ministry of Finance that the 
previous decentralized system of stock exchange regulation must evolve 
into a cooperative arrangement between the federal and Lander gov-
ernmen tS.190 
180 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 33-34. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 33. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 33-34. 
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The reform of the regulatory framework reflects the dynamic changes 
in the German stock exchanges due to the internationalization of 
securities activities as well as pressure from electronic information and 
trading systems which opens the possibility for superregional concen-
tration of securities activities.191 This Act seeks to secure the international 
competitiveness of the German exchanges and trading systems. 192 Mter 
the successful steps to allow a financial futures exchange in 1989, the 
next step for furthering trading possibilities shall be to establish a 
commodities futures exchange. 193 Provisions throughout the Act fur-
ther deregulatory measures, often through amendments that liberalize 
existing laws. 194 Other such measures put into effect the Insider Direc-
tive and Holdings Disclosure Directive of the European Union. 195 
Although the Insider Directive called for enactment by the Member 
States by June 1, 1992,196 Germany was far behind the trend. This could 
be attributed in part to the differences between the traditional and 
required regimes. As stated above, however, the need for change was 
generally accepted. The more difficult problems stemmed from the forms 
in which these changes should materialize. A primary concern was the 
maintenance of the federal structure and the struggle of the Lander to 
maintain both the regional exchanges and their direct supervision. 
V. THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND FINANCIAL MARKET 
PROMOTION ACT 
The Second Financial Market Promotion Act consists of twenty arti-
cles covering thirty-seven pages in the German Federal Law Gazette 
(Bundesgesetzblaft). The vast majority of these articles consists of amend-
ments to a broad range of financial laws, designed to harmonize the 
provisions of this Act. The bulk of the reform, however, is contained 
in the first two articles of the Act. Article One contains the entirely new 
Securities Trading Act. Article Two implements broad changes to the 
Stock Exchange Act. The remaining articles promote broad reform 
throughout existing German financial regulations. 
191 See id. at 34. 
192 See id. 
193 See id; see also discussion infra notes 328-30 and accompanying text. 
194 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 34. 
195 See id. 
196 Insider Directive, supra note 129, art. 14. 
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A. The Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) 
The most important new provisions of the Second Financial Market 
Promotions Act can be found in its first Article, the Securities Trading 
Act. 197 The Securities Trading Act applies to trading both on and off 
of the exchangesl9S in instruments including199 securities200 and deriva-
tives. 201 This article directly implements the directive on Insider Deal-
ing202 and the Holdings Disclosure Directive203 as well as limited aspects 
of the Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field204 and 
the directive on the Coordination of Regulations for the Admission of 
Securities for Listing on a Securities Stock Exchange.205 The Securities 
Trading Act makes insider trading criminally punishable for the first 
time in Germany and establishes the Federal Securities Trading Super-
visory Authority206 to enforce its provisions. In addition, this Act fur-
thers the goal of market transparency by requiring both institutions 
engaged in securities activities and large shareholders to report certain 
information to the new Supervisory Authority and the public. 
The prohibition of insider trading became effective as of August 1, 
1994, with the majority of the rest of the Act, including the duties 
197 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5. 
198 See id. § 1. 
199 Although the following two footnotes detail financial instruments to which this Act shall 
apply, the list is not meant to be exclusive; the term securities represents instruments which can 
be traded on an organized market such as a stock exchange. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 
39 (explaining art. 1, § 2 (1) of the Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz). 
200 The securities (Wertpapiere) covered include: stock shares (Aktien), certificates which repre-
sent shares, debt instruments (Schuldverschreibungen), participation certificates (GenujJscheine), 
warrants (optionsscheine), and other comparable securities. See id. § 2 (l). 
201 The Act defines derivatives (Derivate) to include rights traded on a domestic or foreign 
market, whose exchange or market price depends directly or indirectly upon changes in the 
exchange or market price of securities or foreign currencies or upon changes in interest rates. 
See id. § 2 (2). This includes options and futures contracts. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 39 
(explaining art. 1, § 2(2) of the Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz). In addition, the Act 
applies to changes in voting right participations of shareholders of exchange listed companies 
(Veriinderungen der Stimmrechtsanteile von Aktioniiren an biirsennotierten Gesellschaften). See id. § 1. 
202 Provisions implementing this directive may be found in §§ 12-14, 19, and 20 of the Securities 
Trading Act. 
203 See Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, supra note 3, note * (This footnote is located at 
the title of the Act and states that the Act shall implement these two directives.). Provisions 
implementing the Holdings Disclosure Directive may be found in §§ 21-26, 28-30, and 41 of the 
Securities Trading Act. 
204 Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1988 
OJ. (L 147). 
205 Provisions implementing this directive may be found in § 15 of the Securities Trading Act. 
206 Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den WertpapierhandeL See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 3. 
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of the Securities Trading Supervisory Authority, effective January 1, 
1995.207 Disclosure of holdings of exchange-listed companies shall be 
made no later than the first shareholders' meeting after April I, 1995, 
and the first reporting of trading in securities to the Authority shall be 
required no later than January 1, 1996.208 
1. The Prohibition of Insider Trading 
The Securities Trading Act embodied the recognition that the ear-
lier private prohibitions against insider trading were inadequate and 
that existing provisions in federal laws address only a small portion of 
the possible misuses of nonpublic information.209 The insider trading 
prohibitions closely follow the format laid down in the directive, espe-
cially in terms of the securities covered and persons falling under the 
definition of insider.210 Insider securities shall include securities, op-
tions, and futures contracts traded over the counter at a German 
exchange or listed for trading on an exchange within the EU or 
European Free Trade Area.211 The definition of insiders includes per-
sons having non public information by virtue of their status as manager, 
director, or employee of the corporation or a controlling company; as 
shareholder; or by virtue of a professional relationship with the corpo-
ration.212 Insiders cannot buy or sell securities based on nonpublic 
information, cannot convey this information to another person, and 
cannot recommend that others trade in securities based upon such 
information.213 A third person who becomes aware of inside informa-
tion is also prohibited from such actions.214 Violators of these provisions 
are subject either to a fine or to imprisonment for up to five years,215 
reflecting the severity of the offense and in recognition of the negative 
effects of insider trading on Finanzplatz Deutschland.216 
207 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 20. 
208 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 41(1), (2). 
209 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 34-35; see also supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
210 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, §§ 12, 13. 
211 See id. § 12(1), (2). 
212 See id. § 13. Among those belonging to the latter group are the following: accountants, tax 
advisors, business consultants, notaries, attorneys, and their coworkers as well as employees of the 
corporation and others who have access to non public information because of a contractual 
relationship with the corporation. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 46 (explaining art. 1, 
§ 13(1) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
213 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, § 14(1). 
214 See id. § 14(2). 
215 See id. § 38. 
216 See id. § 35. 
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2. The Federal Securities Trading Oversight Authority 
The duty to carry out these provisions rests upon the Federal Secu-
rities Trading Supervisory Authority. This entity is an independent 
federal superior agency within the competence of the Federal Ministry 
of Finance.217 The President of the Authority shall be appointed by the 
German President upon the nomination of the federal government. 218 
The duties of the Authority stem from the Securities Trading Act and 
are to be exercised exclusively in the public interest; the Authority shall 
work to mitigate and counteract circumstances that would adversely 
affect the accomplishment of securities trading or have significant 
adverse effects upon the securities markets.219 At the start of business 
after January 1, 1995, the Authority had forty-one employees and 
should grow to ninety-seven by the end of 1995.220 Although the Authority 
is an entirely new federal entity, its employees have collectively a large 
amount of experience in the field of securities oversight; their previous 
experience includes positions in the Federal Ministry of Finance, the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Authority, the Lander authorities respon-
sible for oversight of securities, and from within the stock exchanges 
and securities firms themselves.221 Additionally, a Securities Council 
(Wertpapierrat), composed of representatives of the Lander and other 
federal agencies, shall assist the Securities Trading Supervisory Author-
ity in its supervision.222 
217 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 3(1). This Authority is established under the 
authority of the Grundgesetz, which provides for the establishment of federal superior agencies 
(BundesoberbehOrde) by federal legislation for areas within the competence of the federal govern-
ment. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 39 (citing GRUNDGESETZ art. 87(3». 
218 See id. § 3(2). 
219 See id. § 4. 
220 See Deutschland: Wittich-Lebhafte Ad-Hoc-Publizitat im Januar, REUTER GERMAN NEWS SERV-
ICE, Feb. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Zeitng File [hereinafter Wittich] (citing an 
interview with George Wittich, President of the Supervisory Authority). The draft bill foresaw the 
creation of a total of 97 new positions. Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at page 3 of the executive 
summary. 
221 See Wittich, supra note 220. President George Wittich had formerly served in the department 
of the Federal Ministry of Finance that helped draft the Securities Trading Act. Interview with 
Dr. Andreas Moller, Attorney, Division of Money and Credit, German Federal Ministry of Finance, 
Bonn, Germany (Jan. 25, 1995). 
222 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 5. This Securities Council shall assist the new 
federal agency with the collective experience of the Landerin regulating the exchanges. Although 
only eight Lander have exchanges, each Land is represented, since the federal Authority's area 
of competence includes all of Germany in trading both on and off the exchanges. See Ge-
setzentwurf, supra note 7, at 40 (explaining art. 1, § 5(1) of the Zweites Finanzmarkt-
forderungsgesetz) . 
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The Authority shall work together with other German regulatory 
agencies responsible for banking and insurance regulation, the Ger-
man Bundesbank, and the stock exchange supervisory authorities of 
the Liinder.223 The new Authority shall also represent Germany in 
dealing with agencies of other countries responsible for the oversight 
of securities trading and stock exchanges.224 It shall cooperate with its 
foreign counterparts in exchanging information225 and in overseeing 
the prohibition on insider trading and the disclosure of ownership of 
exchange-listed companies.226 
The costs of the Authority shall be recovered through levies imposed 
upon the credit institutions and brokers based upon their transaction 
volume, and upon issuers, according to the turnover in their securi-
ties. 227 The market participants shall bear the costs since they directly 
benefit from the changes; the activities of the Authority should make 
Finanzplatz Deutschland more attractive for both German and foreign 
investors.228 For 1995, the projected budget is just under DM 20 million.229 
In order to carry out its mandate to deter insider trading, the Federal 
Securities Trading Supervisory Authority will need to receive and di-
gest a great deal of information. This will include a knowledge of the 
traders in the market and their actual turnover of securities. From the 
companies themselves, the Authority will need to know who the insid-
Aside from the Lander, representatives of the following agencies may participate: the German 
Federal Ministries of Finance, of Justice, and of Economics; the German Bundesbank; and the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Authority. Id. § 5(1). Although the Securities Council must be 
summoned by the President of the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority at least once 
a year, see id. § 5(3), the first meeting shall not occur until at least September of 1995. Interview 
with George Dreyling, Vice President, Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority, Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany (Jan. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Dreyling Interview]. 
223 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 6. 
224 See id. § 7(1); see also Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 35, 42. In recognition of the need to 
represent all of Germany in such discussions, the Federal Ministry of Finance had assumed the 
German position in the International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") in 
1990. See id. at 42. 
225 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 7. Such cooperation shall implement the 
Memoranda of Understanding of IOSCO. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 42 (explaining 
art. 1, § 7(1) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
226 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 35. 
227 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 11 (1). The credit institutions shall be assessed 
75% of the costs; the Kursmakler, Freimakler, and other traders, a total of 5%; with another 10% 
to be borne by the issuers. Id. The government burden reaches beyond the remaining 10%; the 
federal government will be assessed additional costs as the largest issuer. 
228 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 44 (explaining art. 1, § 11(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
229 Dreyling Interview, supra note 222. 
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ers are. And perhaps most importantly, the Authority will need to know 
of material facts, i.e., those which insiders could use to their advantage. 
3. Reporting Requirements 
In theory, insider trading can be minimized by limiting the amount 
of information available for exploitation. The insider trading prohibi-
tion only applies to non public information. Therefore, a mitigation of 
the time period before material information is made public will serve 
to limit insider trading opportunities. The Act pursues this approach 
to preventing insider trading by imposing reporting requirements upon 
public corporations. The disclosure will improve transparency, which 
should improve the ability of the financial markets to function. 230 The 
new provision replaces a prior public disclosure obligation imposed by 
the Stock Exchange ACt.231 
Under section fifteen of the Securities Trading Act, all issuers of 
securities that are traded on a German stock exchange must disclose 
any facts that might materially affect the trading price of the security-
"price-relevant circumstances" ("kursbeeinflussende Tatsachen") .232 In ad-
dition to disclosure to the Supervisory Authority and to the heads of 
the stock exchanges where traded,233 the information must be disclosed 
to the public by means of a national official exchange newspaper234 or 
an electronic information dissemination service.235 Violations of these 
provisions shall be subject to a fine. 236 
230 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 48 (explaining art. 1, § 15 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
231 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 48 (explaining art. 1, § 15(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz). With the enactment of the Securities Trading Act, this other provision 
has been repealed. See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 2, § 23 (repealing 
§ 44a of the Borsengesetz). 
232 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15 ("Veroffentlichung und Mitteilung kursbee-
injlussender Tatsachen"). 
233 See id. § 15(2). 
234 See id. § 15(3)(1) (Borsenpflichtblatt). This category includes not only the stock exchange 
specific newspaper, BORSEN-ZEITUNG, but also large national newspapers like the FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG and SUD DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. 
235 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15 (3) (2). 
236 See id. § 39. The following examples illustrate the range of maximum fines for selected 
violations: from maximums of DM 100,000 for not providing information requested by the 
Supervisory Authority as requested according to § 15(5), sentence 1; to DM 500,000 for not 
providing the information to the oversight agencies prior to public dissemination according to 
§ 15(2), sentence 1; or for providing incorrect information or not publishing within the proper 
time periods; and up to DM 3,000,000 for simply not publishing or publishing first by a means 
other than that prescribed. See id. 
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Once the material information has been disclosed to the public, the 
Supervisory Authority must be able to compare this information with 
actual turnover in the markets to evaluate suspicious trading. By the 
end of 1995, all institutions engaged in the business of securities and 
derivatives trading must report their trades and identifYing informa-
tion in electronic form by the following business day.237 This reporting 
obligation applies to domestic credit institutions, domestic branches of 
foreign institutions, other approved foreign institutions, and domestic 
businesses admitted to trading on a domestic stock exchange for every 
transaction in securities or derivatives admitted for trading on an 
exchange of a Member State of the EU or the European Free Trade 
Area or traded in the German over-the-counter markets.238 The obliga-
tion applies both to orders for customers and trading for the credit 
institution's own account. 239 Violations are subject to a fine. 240 
The final form of disclosure required by the Act implements the 
Holdings Disclosure Directive.241 These requirements further the goal 
of promoting transparency in the securities markets which facilitates 
investment decisions and serves the company itself by providing infor-
mation about its ownership structure.242 Any person controlling voting 
rights above five percent243 and at intervals of ten, twenty-five, fifty, and 
237 See id. §§ 9. 41 (1). Information subject to disclosure includes the name of the security or 
derivative and its code number; date and time of the transaction; the price. number, and nominal 
amount traded; the institutions involved in the trade; the relevant exchange or electronic trading 
system; and information to identify the trade. See id. § 9. The sheer volume of information 
necessitates electronic reporting. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 43 (explaining art. 1, § 9(2) 
of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
238 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 9(1). 
239 See id. § 9(2); see also Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 43 (explaining art. 1, § 9(1) of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
240 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 39. 
241 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 52 (explaining art. 1, § 21 (1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz); see also Holdings Disclosure Directive, supra note 130. 
242 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 35, 52-53 (explaining art. 1, § 21 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
243The 5% limit is lower than the 10% first step required by the EU directive, but has been 
adopted by other countries, including the United States, Japan, France, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Belgium, and Switzerland, while the United Kingdom requires reporting at 3% and Italy at 2%. 
(The United States requires reporting for holdings greater than 10% of any class of equity security 
under section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994)) and 5% 
under § 13(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1994)). Beyond the international standards are more 
practical reasons for the 5% reporting requirement: 10% of the voting rights of the large 
corporation is a high marginal value; 5% can have a significant influence especially in terms of 
block trading; certain domestic stock corporations have voting rights restrictions at 5%; the 
smaller the free trading stock volume of a company is, the more important that information is 
for the markets, if the amount of freely traded shares will be lessened by more block trading; and 
the lower reporting margin will aid in the battle against the misuse of insider information. see 
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seventy-five percent, of the outstanding stock of an exchange-listed 
company must report that information to the company and the Super-
visory Authority within seven calendar days of any change in threshold 
holdings.244 The company must then within nine calendar days further 
disclose that information to the public.245 The Act contains additional 
provisions for specific issues of indirect holdings, including those of 
holding companies or affiliated companies.246 Violations are subject to 
a fine. 247 These transparency measures support the other reforms of 
the Act that prohibit insider transactions.248 
4. The "Rules of Conduct"249 
The final major area of the Securities Trading Act encompasses 
those provisions relating to "Rules of Conduct" ("Verhaltensregeln") for 
businesses providing investment services in securities (Wertpapierdien-
stleistungsunternehmen) .250 The activities covered include the purchase 
Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 52 (explaining art. 1, § 21(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz). Although a matter of debate, the lower limit prevailed in the name of 
increased transperancy in the German markets. See GegeniiujJerung der Bundesregierung, supra 
note 166, reprinted in, Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at lOl (response to Bundesrat Comment no. 
5, art. 1, § 23 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz.). 
244 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 21. Stockholders must make their first reports 
pursuant to these provisions by the date of the first stockholders meeting after April 1, 1995. [d. 
§ 41(2). The Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority is empowered to obtain informa-
tion from exchange-listed companies and their shareholders in the pursuance of these provisions. 
[d. § 29. 
245 See id. § 25. This disclosure duty extends to foreign firms whose shares are admitted to 
trading on a German exchange. See id. § 26. 
246 See id. §§ 22-24. 
247 See id. § 39. 
248 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 52 (explaining art. 1, § 21 (1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
249 The Rules of Conduct for firms providing investment services in securities may be found in 
Part Five of the Securities Trading Act. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, §§ 31-37. These 
rules have been implemented into German law according to the EU Council Directive 93/22 of 
lO May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1988 OJ. (L 147) (Wertpapierdien-
stleistungsrichtlinie). The draft bill of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act contained no 
provisions implementing the directive; in explaining the functions of the new Federal Securities 
Trading Supervisory Authority under the draft bill, however, the federal government did mention 
that it foresaw a broadening of the duties of the new authority through the implementation of 
the directive. The English term "Rules of Conduct" has been widely adopted into German usage, 
as shown by the use of the English term in this explanation in the draft bill. See Gesetzentwurf, 
supra note 7, at 34. 
The exact provisions implementing this directive and codified in the Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act were added by the finance committee of the Bundestag. BeschluBempfehlungen 
und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 49-56 (adding art. 1, §§ 30a-30g to the 
draft bill, codified at art. 1, §§ 31-37 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
250 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, §§ 31-37. Note that these requirements stem 
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and sale of securities or derivatives for others, including through the 
institution's own account, as well as brokerage activities involved in 
such transactions. 251 In order for businesses to serve the best interests 
of their customers and provide all necessary and useful information to 
the customers, the investment services companies must inquire about 
the customers' experience in investing, their goals, and their financial 
circumstances.252 The companies are specifically forbidden from rec-
ommending transactions in securities or derivatives that are not in the 
customers' interest,253 or from entering into transactions for its own 
account254 or for third parties which the company knows would be 
detrimental to a customer.255 
from yet another EU Council Directive. The Securities Trading Act defines these businesses to 
include domestic credit institutions (Kreditinstitute), domestic branches of foreign institutions, 
other approved foreign institutions, and domestic businesses admitted to trading on a domestic 
stock exchange. See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 2 (4). 
The definition of these institutions was inserted by the finance committee of the Bundestag 
when the Rules of Conduct were added to the draft bill. See Beschlul3empfehlungen und Bericht 
des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 14 (adding art. 1, § 2(4) to the draft bill of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). The significance of the definition is that although it encompasses 
credit institutions and brokers, it does not include investment companies, since the investment 
in the name of the company of money entrusted to them is not considered an investment service 
in securities. See id. at 190 (explanation). 
251 SeeWertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 2(3). The Securities Trading Act provides for 
exceptions to these Rules for transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, public 
entities administering their debt obligations, or the actions of central banks. See id. § 37(1). Aside 
from the organization obligations and recordkeeping for transactions on an exchange, the 
provisions of these Rules shall also not apply to transactions between investment service compa-
nies. See id. § 37(1). 
252 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 31 (2). If these rules are followed, a customer 
of the investment services company should be in a position to assess the implications and risks 
of the investment decision. Therefore, a customer must not merely be informed of the risks of 
an individual derivative instrument, but also of how this investment fits into the customer's overall 
portfolio. Nonetheless, the company should take the sophistication of the investor into account 
in determining the proper information to provide. See Beschlul3empfehlungen und Bericht des 
Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 204-05 (explaining art. 1, § 30a(2) of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 1, § 31 (2) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
253 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 32 (1). This includes transactions which would 
tend to move the prices of securities held by the company in a direction desirable for the 
company. See id. § 32(1) (2). This prohibits the practice known as "scalping." Beschlul3empfehlun-
gen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 206 (explaining art. 1, § 30b(1) (2) of 
the draft bill, codified at art. 1, § 32(1) (2) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
254 SeeWertpapierhandeisgesetz, supra note 5, § 32(1) (3). This prohibits the practice known as 
"front running." Beschlul3empfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 
206-07 (explaining art. 1, § 30b(1) (3) of the draft bill, codified at art. 1, § 32(1) (3) of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). The prohibition against front-running applies equally to a com-
pany acting in its own interest or on behalf of another. Id. at 208 (explaining art. 1, § 30b(2) of 
the draft bill). 
255 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 32 (2) (2). 
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Investment services companies shall also attempt to avoid conflicts 
of interest with customers.256 This shall include an organizational struc-
ture that minimizes conflicts of interest between the investment service 
company and its customers, as well as among customers.257 The companies 
must also implement internal control measures to monitor and prevent 
violations of these provisions.258 For oversight purposes, the investment 
service companies must keep records of client orders.259 The compa-
nies shall be subject to a yearly audit that will also examine compli-
ance with other reporting obligations under the Securities Trading 
Act.260 
The Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority may require 
investment service companies to provide information or documenta-
tion for the purpose of furthering oversight of these companies.261 
More importantly, the Authority may draft guidelines for the fulfill-
ment of the obligations imposed by these provisions.262 These guide-
lines are meant not so much to provide administrative orders tied 
to punishments for violations; rather, the guidelines should give the 
providers of investment services some information as to how the Su-
pervisory Authority expects the Rules of Conduct to be followed in 
practice.263 The guidelines will incorporate the experiences of the admin-
istrative practice built up over a period of time, and may be changed 
when necessary.264 Nonetheless, a breach of these guidelines shall be 
256 See id. §§ 31(1)(2), 33(2). 
257 See id. § 33(2). Although such conflicts cannot be entirely removed, they can be minimized. 
In order to do this, the company must take certain organizational measures in terms of both the 
structure and operations of the business. See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzauss-
chusses, supra note 167, at 209 (explaining art. 1, § 30c of the draft bill, codified at art. 1, § 33 
of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
258 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 33 (3). 
259 See id. § 34(1). Additionally, the Federal Ministry of Finance may draft additional record-
keeping requirements or may delegate this authority to the Federal Securities Trading Supervi-
sory Authority. See id. § 34(2). The records must be kept for six years. See id. § 34(3). German 
credit institutions already keep these type of records pursuant to announcements of the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Authority. See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, 
supra note 167, at 210 (explaining art. 1, § 30d of the draft bill, codified at art. 1, § 34 of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
260 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 36 (including reports on turnover in securities 
pursuant to § 9). This audit would most probably be conducted in conjunction with the existing 
audit of safe deposit holdings under the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority. Id. 
261 See id. § 35(1). 
262 See id. § 35(2). 
263 See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 212 
(explaining art. 1, § 30e(2) of the draft bill, codified at art. 1, § 35(2) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
264 See id. 
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considered a violation of the underlying Rules of Conduct.265 The 
German Bundesbank, the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority, and 
the central associations of the concerned industry may comment on 
these guidelines before their adoption.266 In the case of the organiza-
tional structure, which affects both investor protection and the internal 
operations of the business, the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority shall promulgate these guidelines in conjunction with the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Authority,267 which among other things, 
is responsible for the chartering and soundness of credit institutions. 
Although these requirements clearly impose burdens on securities 
companies, the actual standards are rather vague. The impact of the 
guidelines to be established by the Federal Securities Trading Supervi-
sory Authority for compliance with these standards remains to be seen. 
B. The Stock Exchange Act (Borsengesetz) 
The amendments to the Stock Exchange Act enact a number of 
reforms,268 addressing the internal and external oversight of the ex-
changes, the institutional leadership structure of the exchanges them-
selves, the roles of market participants, and more general reforms to 
promote the German securities markets. The new provisions expand 
the powers of the Land level Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority in 
the course of its supervision to collect information and require the 
submission of documentation from the exchanges themselves as well 
as dealers, brokers, and traders.269 The Supervisory Authority can also 
now establish regulations to prevent the breach of exchange rules 
or regulations, that would impair the orderly implementation of ex-
change activities or their oversight. 270 Persons working for a Land Stock 
Exchange Supervisory Authority or other agencies, as well as for the 
exchanges themselves, may not make public or use any nonpublic 
information gained in the course of their professional capacities, or 
after their employment.271 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 35 (2); BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des 
Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 212 (explaining art. 1, § 30e(2) of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 1, § 35(2) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
268 Borsengesetz of June 22, 1896, as amended by the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, 
supra note 3, art. 2. All references to the Stock Exchange Act include the most recent amend-
ments and cite simply to "Borsengesetz." See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 1. 
269 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § la(l). 
270 See id. § la(2). 
271 See id. § 2b(1). 
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The most significant changes in the supervisory structure involve the 
creation of an entirely new, independent entity within the exchange itself. 
This "Trading Control Board" ("Handelsilberwachungsstellr!') ('TCB") 
shall be established according to standards of the Land Stock Ex-
change Supervisory Authority and shall be responsible for overseeing 
the trading on the exchange and the settlement of exchange transac-
tions; the Control Board shall collect data and conduct investigations 
to these ends.272 The TCB shall concern itself with the daily business 
of the exchange, such as actual trading floor practices.273 The Land 
Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority can give instructions to the 
TCB and take over investigations begun by the latter.274 The manage-
ment of the exchange itself can also commission the TCB with inquir-
ies.275 
The head of the TCB shall be selected upon nomination by the 
management of the exchange board of directors with the consent of 
the Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority.276 In order to ensure 
their independence, those persons employed by the TCB and en-
trusted with oversight duties may only be discharged of their duties 
against their will with the consent of the Land Stock Exchange Super-
visory Authority.277 The TCB shall have competences similar to those 
of the Supervisory Authority in the collection of information and the 
ability to require submission of documentation by market participants.278 
If the TCB finds evidence of a violation of the stock exchange rules or 
regulations, that could impair the orderly implementation of exchange 
activities, it must instruct the management of the exchange and the 
Land Supervisory Authority.279 
The amendments also alter the control structure of the stock ex-
changes, making the management independent from the representatives 
of market participants, and the exchanges, in general, more responsi-
ble for stock exchange business.28o In conformity with the other re-
272 See id. § lb(l). 
273For a more detailed discussion of the duties of the TCB, see infra notes 550-60 and 
accompanying text. 
274 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § lb(l). 
275 See id. 
276 See id. § Ib(2). This measure serves to ensure the Board's status as an independent organ 
within the stock exchange, i.e., absent undue influence from the management of the exchange 
or exchange participants. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining art. 2, no. I of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § Ib(2) of the Borsengesetz). 
277 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § I b(2). 
278 See id. § Ib(3) (referring to § la(l)); see supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. 
279 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § Ib(5). 
280 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 36. 
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forms, these changes are driven by international standards, which 
require a standing professional exchange management to meet the 
ever more complex needs of running the exchange.281 Prior to the 
Second Financial Market Promotion Act, the exchanges were control-
led by a Board of Governors (Borsenvorstand) , comprised of repre-
sentatives of the market participants.282 The Board of Governors was 
responsible for the management of the exchange, and appointed a 
managemen t committee. 283 
The new provisions establish a model for control of the exchange 
based upon the modern stock corporation.284 The highest exchange 
authority is the Board of Directors (Borsenrat) , which consists of up to 
twenty-four persons, who represent the different interests involved in 
securities trading, including, issuers, investors, and credit institutions.285 
A more independent management shall care for the daily operation 
of the exchange.286 The responsibilities of the newly created Board of 
281 See id. at 62 (explaining art. 2, no. 2 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending 
§ 3 of the Borsengesetz). 
282 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 3, BGBI. III, Gliederungsnummer 4110- 11 (revised version 
prior to amendment by the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
283 See id. § 3(1). 
284 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 62 (explaining art. 2, no. 2 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 3 of the Borsengesetz). 
285 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 3 (1). The following groups must be represented: financial 
institutions admitted to trade on the exchange, including the investment companies; inde-
pendent brokers (jreie Makler) and other admitted businesses; official exchange brokers (Kurs-
makler); the insurance companies that have issued securities traded on the exchange; other issuers 
of traded securities; and investors. [d. No more than half the members of the board may represent 
the financial institutions, investment companies, and companies under common control with 
these. [d. Within itself, the Board of Directors must elect its own chairman and deputies. [d. 
§ 3(3). Under the prior system, the Board of Governors had been most often dominated by the 
credit institutions; these reforms should strengthen the interests of issuers, private investors, and 
institutional investors. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 62 (explaining art. 2, no. 2 of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 3 of the Borsengesetz). 
The specific inclusion of investment companies within the concept of credit institutions was 
added by the Bundestag according to the recommendations of its finance committee. See 
BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 69 (amending 
art. 2, no. 2 of the draft bill of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 3 of the 
Borsengesetz). The reason for this is that while the amendments purport to strengthen the 
representation of issuers, private investors, and institutional investors economically speaking, 
investment companies fall within the same general realm as the banks. Therefore, the credit 
institutions and investment companies, as a whole, should not represent more than half of the 
Board of Directors. See id. at 222-23 (explanation). 
The final amendment to the Stock Exchange Act provides that upon the effective date of the 
Second Financial Market Promotion Act, the Board of Governors shall assume the duties of the 
Board of Directors. Their duties shall last until the elections of a new Board of Directors, not 
later than twelve months after the effectiveness of the Act. SeeBorsengesetz, supra note 6, § 97(1). 
286Under the old regime, the management of the exchange had an insufficiently defined 
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Directors include the decree of exchange regulations and fee regula-
tions; the appointment of the management of the exchange upon 
nomination by the Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority; over-
sight of the management and decree of management regulations; and 
the decree of stipulations for exchange activities.287 Important deci-
sions, including the introduction of technical systems for trading or 
the settlement of exchange trades, require Board approval,288 In gen-
eral, however, under the new laws, the management shall be responsi-
ble for the leadership of the exchange.289 
This has important consequences for the stock exchanges. For in-
stance, one of the activities formerly controlled by the Board of Gov-
ernors and now within the competences of the management of the 
exchange is the admission of parties to trading on the exchange.29o 
Under the prior regime in which the trading parties controlled the 
admissions process, current members could have denied admission to 
potential competitors. The independence of the management might 
be even more important in the opposite situation of ousting a partici-
pant from the exchange; close working relationships might have made 
the market participants reticent to chastise a fellow exchange member. 
Under the amended law, however, the management is obligated to 
remove those who disturb the order or business of the exchange.291 
The effect of granting admission to the exchange has been broadened 
in recognition of the increase in computerized trading. An entirely 
new section of the Stock Exchange Act addresses the requirements for 
participation in electronic trading at a securities exchange; the admis-
sion of a business to trading on the auction floor shall suffice, so long 
as the business observes the regulations of the electronic trading system. 292 
support function to the Board of Governors. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 62 (explaining 
art. 2, no. 2 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 3 of the Borsengesetz). 
287 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 3(2). 
288 See id. § 3(2). 
289 See id. § 3c(1). 
290 See id. § 7(1). Similarly, transactions in futures contracts on the exchanges must be admitted 
by the management, whereas previously this required the approval of the Board of Governors. 
See id. § 50(1) (as amended by the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 2, 
§ 25). 
291 See id. § 8 (2). 
292 See id. § 7a. The reason for this is that the requirements for admission for trading are the 
same on all German stock exchanges. Therefore, no additional admissions procedures should be 
necessary for participation in an electronic trading system. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 67 
(explaining art. 2, no. 7 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 7a of the 
Borsengesetz) . 
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The amendments also expand the regulation of brokers. While pre-
viously the management of the exchange had been responsible for 
overseeing the continual solvency ofbrokers,293 the new TCB shall now 
be responsible for ensuring that brokers provide security to meet their 
outstanding obligations.294 If the TCB is convinced that the broker has 
exceeded these limits, the management of the exchange shall see that 
more security is provided or open positions are resolved; otherwise, 
the broker may be excluded from trading.295 In addition, the amend-
ments to the Stock Exchange Act have increased the punishment for 
actions by trading participants that violate the regulations of the ex-
change or that damage commercial good faith or the honor of another 
trading participant. The maximum sanctions imposable by the Land 
Sanctions Committee (Sanktionsausschuss) 296 have been increased from 
a fine of DM 2000 to DM 50,000 and an exclusion from the exchange 
of ten to now thirty trading days.297 
Other amendments to the Stock Exchange Act address the issues of 
competition among exchanges and trading systems within Germany. 
The Bundesrat characterized the changes as a balanced compromise 
solution between regional and national interests; without guaranteeing 
the positions of the regional exchanges, the new regulations nonethe-
less provide economic opportunity for further development. 298 An in-
dividual Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority may assign some 
of its duties to a counterpart in another Land;299 this is designed to 
help the smaller regional exchanges.300 These Lander authorities are 
293 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 68 (explaining art. 2, no. 10 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 8c of the Borsengesetz). 
294 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 8c(2). The security can be in the form ofa bank guarantee, 
guarantee insurance, or a deposit with the exchange, not to exceed DM 500,000. See id. § 7(4a). 
295 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 8c (3) . 
296 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
297 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 9 (2). Prior to these changes, the Sanctions Committee was 
known as the Committee of Honor (EhrenausschujI). The changes in both the level of sanctions 
and the name reflect the fact that the focus of the former system was too narrow. With an increase 
in the number of persons admitted to trading on the exchange (due to amendments to § 7 of 
the Borsengesetz), violations of stock exchange regulations threaten not only the honor of 
another trader, but may also injure a business admitted to trading on the exchange. See Ge-
setzentwurf, supra note 7, at 68 (explaining art. 2, no. II of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 9 of the Borsengesetz). 
298Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, supra note 165, (general comments on the draft bill), 
reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 100. 
299 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 2 (l). 
300 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining art. 2, no. I of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 2 of the Borsengesetz). 
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also empowered to prevent anticompetitive limitations in trading, in-
formation, settlement, and securities services.30! 
The amendments implement Finance Minister Waigel's wish to pro-
vide the same competitive conditions for securities trading on the 
auction exchange floor as for computerized trading, while letting the 
markets decide the relative success of the systems.302 Beyond the mere 
issue of admission to trading,303 the Act foresees a role for the stock 
exchange supervisory authorities in removing obstacles to competition 
between trading forms and systems through the opening of the mar-
kets and to the establishment of more trading, information, and set-
tlemen t systems.304 The Act purports to place electronic trading systems 
on an equal footing with their predecessors.305 The statement that the 
state shall not provide a guarantee that all stock exchanges and trading 
systems will survive, evidences further proof of the government's sin-
cerity in its attempts to establish fair competition.306 
In order to put this policy into practice, the amendments to the 
Stock Exchange Act empower investors to make decisions over the 
venue for their orders.307 The customer for a purchase or sales order 
for securities on an exchange must designate the place of execution, 
including whether the transaction should be concluded on the auction 
exchange or through electronic trading.308 In the absence of such a 
. 301 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 2a; see also Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining 
art. 2, no. 1 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 2a of the Borsengesetz) (A 
weakening of the market position of the stock exchange brokers, the regional exchanges and 
smaller companies in the securities markets would not be in the interests of preserving compe-
tition and, therefore, the attractiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland as a whole.). 
302 See Waigel, Finanzplatz Deutschland, supra note 10, at 422. 
303 See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
304 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 36. 
305 See id. 
306 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 36. 
307 See id. at 36-37. 
308 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 10 (l). An earlier version of §§ 10-27 had been repealed 
sometime prior to the passage of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, so that at the time 
of the amendment, the section 10 provisions regarding the determination of placement of the 
trade were entirely new. 
The only exception to this designation rule applies to fixed-interest bonds with a total face 
value of under DM 2,000,000. [d. § 10(3); see BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzauss-
chusses, supra note 167, at 224-25. Whether or not to have an exception at all was a subject of 
intense debate throughout the history of the Act. The draft bill had proposed excepting all 
fixed-interest bonds. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 20 (art. 2, no. 10 of the draft bill of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 10(3) of the Borsengesetz). The reason for this 
was that most trading in the bond market was between institutional investors, while other such 
instruments had little turnover on the markets. See id. at 69 (explaining the draft of § 10(3». 
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designation by the customer, the order shall be presumed to be for 
trading on an auction exchange;309 the party with whom the order has 
been placed shall determine the place of execution, taking into con-
Upon the first review, the Bundesrat committees recommended that this exception be struck in 
its entirety from the bill. Empfehlungen der Ausschusse, supra note 162, no. 18, at 17. The 
economic committee was concerned that the exception was contrary to the Act's goals of trans-
parency and controlled price determination; the protection of investors and improvement of the 
acceptance of Finanzplatz Deutschland would in this case contradict the interests of the banking 
industry. The exception would shield a great deal of trading in securities from supervision. 
Instead of accepting the government's explanation that the markets would be too illiquid to 
require bond trading at the exchanges, the committee believed the illiquid situation could be 
improved by requiring more trading on the exchange. See id. (explanation). When meeting as a 
whole, the Bundesrat did not address the concerns of its committees at all. 
The exception was limited to the DM 2,000,000 exclusion by the finance committee of the 
Bundestag during the next stage of the review process. Beschlu13empfehlungen und Bericht des 
Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, Bundestag Drucksache 12/7918, at 85 (amending art. 2, 
no. 10 of the draft bill of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). The change was based upon 
the belief that encouraging trading in these instruments and settlement of customer orders over 
the exchanges would help to build liquidity. This figure represents the minimum issue volume 
for fixed-interest bonds admitted for trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and through the 
IBIS trading system. The finance committee believed that this compromise would both promote 
investor protection and strengthen the stock exchange as an institution. See Beschlu13empfehlun-
gen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 224-25 (explanation). 
309 Id. § 10(2). The reason for this presumption is that trading on the auction exchange offers 
the private investor a guarantee of a fair price determination. If this were not the case, such as 
if a particular instrument were trading almost entirely through electronic trading, then the broker 
could execute the order elsewhere, in the interest of the customer. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 
7, at 69 (explaining art. 2, no. 10 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 10(2) 
of the Borsengesetz). 
The legislative history of this provision reveals the concern of the individual Lander to preserve 
their regional exchanges. Mter the federal government had presented the draft bill to the 
Bundesrat, the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen recommended the following change to this provision: 
In the absence of a designation of place of exchange by the customer, the order shall be presumed 
to be for trading on an auction exchange; the place of execution shall be the stock exchange in the 
federal Land in which the party with whom the order has been placed received the order. If that would 
be contrary to the interests of the customer, or if the person receiving the order is in a Land 
without an exchange, then the receiver shall choose the place of execution. Antrag des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, supra note 163, Bundesrat Drucksache 793/2/93, at 1. Apparently, the 
credit institutions had argued against this "home exchange principle" ("Heimatbiirsenprinzips"), 
stating that this would raise their costs by DM 15 to DM 25 per order. But Nordrhein-Westfalen 
responds that the implementation of the BOSS-Cube system has made additional costs insig-
nificant. Moreover, this amendment would strengthen the regional exchanges, a movement 
necessary to further the overall interests of fair competition between electronic trading systems 
and the auction exchanges. See id. at 2-3 (explanation). Nordrhein-Westfalen had a vested interest 
in such a clause, because the Rheinisch-Westfiilische Borse located in the Land capital, Dusseldorf, 
is the second largest stock exchange in the country, next to Frankfurt, but lies only a little over 
200 km to the northeast. Unfortunately for Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Bundesrat as a whole 
declined to include this suggestion in its comments on the draft, and the home exchange 
principle has not been codified into the final Act. 
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side ration the interests of the customer.310 A given security may be 
traded over electronic systems, so long as an exchange in which that 
security is admitted for trading has consented and the electronic sys-
tems are regulated by that exchange.311 Electronic systems nonetheless 
have one advantage in that they may trade securities assigned to the 
over-the-counter market.312 
The government realized that the central obligations of stock ex-
change supervision include a guarantee of the establishment of ex-
change prices free from manipulation-investors must be able to trust 
in this.313 A supervised, orderly price determination is an essential 
measure of quality for any stock exchange wishing to compete on an 
internationallevel,314 The marketing of financial instruments based on 
German stock indexes, as well as the ability to establish German com-
puter trading screens abroad, depend entirely upon the trust in market 
prices.315 In furtherance of the general goal of increased transparency, 
the amendments to the Stock Exchange Act strengthen the inde-
pendence of the market in determining prices.316 The trading partici-
pants must promptly make known the exchange prices and the under-
lying turnover.317 While under the previous regulations the Board of 
310 See Biirsengesetz, supra note 6, § 10(2). 
311 See id. § 12(1). 
312 See id. § 12(2). 
313 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 69 (explaining art. 2, no. 11 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktfiirderungsgesetz, creating § 11 of the Biirsengesetz). 
314 See id. 
315 See id. at 69-70. 
316 One amended provision states that before they can establish an exchange price, the trading 
participants must be aware of the price differential due to supply and demand. See Biirsengesetz, 
supra note 6, § 11(2). The Bundesrat recommended a requirement that the price differential 
should be disclosed upon its review of the draft bill. See Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, supra 
note 165, (comment no. 15, art. 2, no. 12 of the Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, amending 
§ 11 (2) of the Biirsengesetz), reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 98. If traders from 
outside the exchange must place an order without knowing the market price of the opposite 
position, then their sale or purchase order is less likely to be fulfilled. See id. (explanation). The 
federal government responded that it would consider the issue. See GegenauJ3erung der Bundes-
regierung, supra note 166, reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 103 (response to Bundesrat 
comment no. 15). The finance committee of the Bundestag implemented this recommendation 
in its own words. See GesetzesbeschluB, supra note 168, at 86 (art. 2, no. 12, amending § 11 (2) 
of the Biirsengesetz). The change should serve the goal of limiting the possibility of selling 
brokers to use their information edge to manipulate the determination of the stock exchange 
price of a security. See id. at 225 (explanation). 
317 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 69. Stock exchange prices (BOrsenpreise) are defined as 
prices for securities which are traded during operating hours on a securities stock exchange in 
official trading or in the regulated market; or prices established on a commodities exchange; as 
well as prices established through an approved, regulated electronic trading system. See id. 
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Governors of the exchange had a say in the official determination of 
the exchange price,318 under the new amendments, the official exchange 
brokers (Kursmakler) shall officially determine exchange prices.319 
Although some of the amendments expand the regulation of the 
Kursmakler, in general, the amendments to the Stock Exchange Act 
expand their range of allowable activities for the purpose of increasing 
market liquidity.320 In order to meet growing capital demands for man-
aging risk and to compete with other European brokers newly allowed 
to operate in Germany,321 the law shall allow Kursmakler to organize 
their business in limited liability form. 322 In the same way electronic 
trading allows dealers to pass along orders, the amendments now allow 
inter-locking trading between brokers who deal in the same stock on 
different exchanges.323 Brokers, who during the trading day in official 
trading or in the regulated market cannot carry out a trading order 
within a reasonable time period, may transfer the order to another 
broker on another exchange during the same trading day.324 This will 
serve the interests of investors in having their orders placed, and will 
raise the liquidity of the German trading systems as a whole.325 
Most of these provisions seek to improve upon the existing securities 
markets in Germany. But a series of more subtle amendments to the 
Stock Exchange Act open up the possibility of introducing an entirely 
new range of securities trading in Germany-the removal of the obsta-
cle to establishing a commodity futures exchange (Warenterminborse). 
German agriculture has pushed for such steps as the agriculture policy 
of the EU retreats from price supports and farmers could increasingly 
§ 11 (1). Prices for securities traded on an exchange in the unofficial over-the-counter market 
(Freiverkehr) are also considered exchange prices. See id. § 78(2). 
318 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 29(1), BGBI. III, Gliederungsnummer 4110- 11 (revised 
version prior to amendment by the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
319 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 29(1). By the official determination of the exchange price 
for securities, only representatives of the Land Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority and of the 
exchange's TCB may be present. See id. § 29(2). 
320 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 37. 
321 See id. at 73 (explaining art. 2, no. 18 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating 
§ 34a of the Borsengesetz). 
322 Previously, Kursmakler could only operate under the business form of the sole trader (Ein-
zelkaufmann). ld. Under the new law, if certain conditions are met, the Kursmaklermay organize 
in the form of a private limited liability company (Gesellschafl mit beschrankter Haflung ("GmbH'» 
or a public stock corporation (Aktiengesellschafl ("AG"». See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 34a(1). 
323 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 37. 
324 See id. § 13. 
325 See id. at 71 (explaining art. 2, no. 12 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, creating 
§ 12 of the Borsengesetz). 
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benefit from other means of safeguarding their expected income.326 To 
this end, existing sections in the Stock Exchange Act prohibiting fu-
tures contracts in grain and mill products have been repealed.327 Based 
upon the successful example of the new German Futures Exchange in 
Frankfurt, an essential element for the commodity futures exchange 
shall be the ability of private investors to participate in the trading. 328 
In order to protect private investors against more sophisticated coun-
terparties,329 the amended statute requires the seller of a commodity 
futures contract to inform the other side in writing before the conclu-
sion of the contract of the special risks in commodity futures activi-
ties.330 The amendments also expand the punishments for the manipu-
lation of market or exchange prices of securities to include fraudulent 
actions regarding derivatives.331 
C. Other Provisions of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
The other articles of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
address a range of issues designed to promote the concept of Finan-
zplatz Deutschland. Many of the provisions amend preexisting financial 
laws to further German market reform. Other provisions harmonize 
regulations to account for the new Securities Trading Act and the 
duties of the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority. The 
final category includes independent reforms to promote the German 
markets. This Part mentions some of the more important articles. 
Beyond the abovementioned amendments to the Stock Exchange 
Act, the next most significant changes appear in Article Three, which 
amends the German Investment Company Act to broaden the range 
326 See id. at 37. 
327 Borsengesetz, supra note 6, §§ 65-68 (repealed by the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, 
supra note 3, art. 2, § 28). 
328 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 74 (referring to art. 2, no. 26 of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 2, no. 27 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, repealing § 53(3) of the Borsenge-
setz which previously prohibited private participation). 
329 See id. at 74 (explaining art. 2, no. 26 of the draft bill, codified at art. 2, no. 27 of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 53(2) of the Borsengesetz). 
330 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 53(2). This requirement goes beyond the disclosure for 
other financial futures contracts due to the special risks involved. Many factors influence future 
price developments of commodities, including natural catastrophes, which make it difficult to 
predict future supply. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 74 (explaining art. 2, no. 26 of the draft 
bill, codified at art. 2, no. 27 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 53(2) of 
the Borsengesetz). Additionally, the statute requires the contract writer to repeat the information 
about the risks one year later and at certain time intervals. See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 53 (2). 
331 See Borsengesetz, supra note 6, § 88. 
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of investment opportunities available to certain money market or mu-
tual funds. 332 These changes should lead to improved portfolios and 
yields, and improved risk management operations.333 The changes also 
repeal prior restrictions on investment company activities in the de-
rivative markets.334 For the first time, investment companies may invest 
up to ten percent of the value of assets in stock purchase warrants. 335 
Other derivative products now available for investment include options 
on foreign exchanges and options on securities indexes.336 Among the 
restrictions on investment on the latter two types of options are, in 
some cases, the condition that these foreign exchange options and 
securities index options be traded on a German domestic or a foreign 
exchange.337 Another liberalization allows investment companies for 
the first time to assign securities to third parties in return for remu-
neration for a short time period.338 In order to protect investors, invest-
ment companies can only transfer the securities against a pledge or 
assignment of a Deutsche Mark account, bonds, or other securities 
held at a securities depository bank.339 
The significance of these reforms reaches beyond merely increasing 
the scope of investment company activity and the opportunities for 
investors. These reforms specifically serve to support the German mar-
kets for derivative products. This holds true especially due to the fact 
that institutional investors play such a large role in Germany. The 
332 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 3 ("Anderung des Gesetzes iiber 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften"). The Investment Company Act may be found as follows: Gesetz tiber 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, BGBI. I, 127 (Jan. 14, 1970), last amended in BGBI. I, 2378 (Dec. 
27,1993). 
333 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 37. 
334 See id. 
335 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 3(5) (c) (amending § 8a of the 
Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften to add subparagraph 4). 
336 See id. art. 3, no. 5(c) (amending § 8a of the Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften to add 
paragraph (5)). Investment companies will also be allowed to sell foreign exchange futures 
contracts and options contracts if they hold certain offsetting contracts. See id. art. 3, no. 8 
(creating § 8e). 
337 See id. art. 3 (8) (amending § 8e (2) of the Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften regarding 
foreign exchange options and futures), art. 3(9) (b) (amending § 8f(2) (2) regarding securities 
index options (" Wertpapierindex-optionen")). 
338 See id. art. 3(12) (amending the Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften to add subpara-
graph § 9a(l)). The contract stipulations for the fund must provide for such activity; the person 
borrowing the securities must reimburse the investment company with securities of the same type, 
grade, and amount at the end of the contract term. See id. 
339 See id. art. 3(12) (amending the Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften to add subpara-
graph § 9b(I)). 
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increased activity in these markets, specifically on the Deutsche Termin-
bOrse, should increase their liquidity and overall attractiveness. 
Article Five addresses the attractiveness of stock ownership for indi-
vidual investors. In comparison with other countries, the nominal 
prices for German stocks are relatively high, with trading values of 
DM 500 or even DM 1000 not out of the ordinary.340 This article amends 
the Stock Law to lower the minimum par value of shares offered by 
stock corporations from fifty Deutsche Mark to five. 341 Decreasing the 
denomination of shares allows individuals to invest smaller amounts of 
money, and promotes trading of small holdings, thereby enhancing 
liquidity.342 The small investor would also benefit from the ability to 
340 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 37. Because of this, German stocks could appear very 
expensive to foreign investors. The government explanation of the draft bill stated that the 
trading price of a weighted average of common shares was nine times the nominal value, leading 
to the 500-1000 figures. Industry had been calling for a long time for a lowering of the nominal 
value, and the Lander, led by Hessen (in which Frankfurt am Main is located) have also spoken 
out in favor of such a change. The amendments will bring the German nominal share value into 
line with international standards. See id. at 82-83 (explaining art. 4, no. 1 of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 5, no. 1 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 8 of the Aktiengesetz). 
341 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 5 (1) (a) ("Anderung des Aktienge-
setzes"). The Stock Act may be found as follows: Aktiengesetz, BGBI. I, 1089 (Sept. 6, 1965), last 
amended in BGBI. I, 1377 (June 24, 1994). 
3421t is unclear why companies themselves would not have already addressed this problem 
through a "stock split," in which each stockholder would receive a multiple of the number of 
shares each one had previously, without changing either the gross or relative value of the holdings 
of the individual stockholder. For example, if shares in Daimler-Benz were trading at around 
DM 700 each, as they were in early 1995, the corporation could declare its intention to "split" 
each existing share into five new shares. The immediate trading value of these "new" shares would 
be DM 140 each (approximately $100 in early 1995), since the company has created no new 
wealth, just a different representation of the existing ownership shares. (Note that this assumes 
away any other price changes such as a rise in the value of the stock if traders thought this would 
make Daimler-Benz trading more liquid.) 
Under United States law, the stock split serves as a common form for lowering the trading price 
ofa stock. 
The motivation for a split would typically be a desire to make trading in the stock easier; 
since shares are most cheaply and easily traded in multiples of 100, the price per share 
may reach such a point that the price per 100 shares and accordingly of the typical trade 
may be out of reach for the small investor. A split can remedy such a situation, also 
making it easier for holders to realize part of their gains by selling off some of their 
investments. 
DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAw: MATERIALS-CASES-TExT 673 (3rd ed. 1989). 
According to the government explanation of the draft of this amendment, § 8(3) of the 
German Stock Corporation Act would allow a stock split. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 83 
(explaining art. 4, no. 1 of the draft bill, codified at art. 5, no. 1 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 8 (1) of the Aktiengesetz). But it remains unclear what effect 
the amendment would have on trading in existing stock, since a stock split in the above example 
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diversify the same monetary investment across a broader, and, there-
fore, less risky, portfolio of shares. Although some new issuers have 
already taken advantage of this lower par value, other factors limit the 
effectiveness of this legal change. The most formidable obstacle stems 
from the fees charged by the credit institutions for securities trades-
these are most often charged on a per piece basis,343 effectively raising 
transactions costs for stocks with lower par values. 
Article Seven alters the Securities Deposit Act.344 This Act provides 
for the central holding of securities, promoting securities trading and 
settlement by eliminating the need to transfer the actual paper cer-
tificates representing the securities from the buyer to the seller. In-
stead, the certificates are entrusted to a bank known as a securities 
collection bank345 that holds the certificates in safekeeping, while an 
account represents the customer's (or broker's) interest. In the case 
of a sale of the securities, the certificates remain in place, but the 
account of the seller is debited and that of the buyer is credited. 
Through these changes, the amendments simplify the clearing system 
for settling transactions in securities and derivatives.346 
The second type of changes addressed by the latter articles in the 
Second Financial Market Promotion Act work to implement and to 
harmonize other regulations with the Securities Trading Act. 347 For 
example, in addition to the changes in Article Three that expand 
allowable investment company activity,348 a further provision serves the 
more mundane task of harmonizing existing rules. Taking the new 
Securities Trading Act literally, the investors in a mutual fund would 
have voting rights in a company imputed to them indirectly-as "own-
ers" of the fund that holds stock in the company.349 Such an interpre-
would have been allowed under the prior regime as well, since even after the split, the nominal 
value of the stock was greater than DM 50. 
343 See "Publizitiitspjlicht ist ungenugend", SUD DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1995, at 26. 
Due to these concerns, the German Association for the Protection of Security Holders has 
proposed allowing the issuance of stock with no par value. See id. The head of the Association 
also criticized the disclosure requirements under the Act as favoring sophisticated investors with 
access to computerized data services over private investors who relied upon the printed media 
with its subsequent delay in publication. See id. 
344 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 7 ("Anderung des Depotgesetzes"). 
The Securities Deposit Act may be found as follows: Depotgesetz, BGBI. III, Gliederungsnummer 
4130-31, last amended in BGBI. 1,1507 (July 17,1985). 
345 Wertpapiersammelbank. 
346 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
347 See supra Part V.A. for discussion of the Securities Trading Act. 
348 See supra notes 332-39 and accompanying text. 
349 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 22 (1) (2). 
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tation would subject the investors to all the reporting requirements for 
those holding certain threshold percentages of stock in exchange-
listed corporations.350 In order to avoid this result, the amendment 
clarifies that, for the purposes of those provisions, all voting rights 
accompanying stocks held by the fund shall be treated as belonging to 
the investment company itself.351 
Other articles amend existing statutes to account for the new Federal 
Authority. Article Eight amends the Sales Prospectus Act to require 
that, prior to public dissemination, a copy of any prospectus for the 
sale of securities must be provided to the Securities Trading Supervi-
sory Authority.352 Previously, an issuer would have to send this to the 
proper authority in every Land in which the securities were to be 
traded.353 Article Eleven contains the more mundane purpose of merely 
amending the list of federal superior agencies to include the new 
Federal Authority.354 
A few provisions contain other minor changes to existing law. Article 
Four amends provisions of the Foreign Investment Act regarding secu-
rities.355 Article Fourteen amends the Income Tax law regarding the 
sale of securities.356 Article Sixteen changes not a law, but the regula-
tions regarding listing on a stock exchange. 357 The changes expand the 
category of underlying instruments upon which conversion and sub-
scription rights may be based from the previous standard of instru-
ments traded in OECD countries to the new standard of all instru-
350 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
351 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 3(13) (amending § 1O(1a) of 
the Gesetz tiber Kapitalanlagegesellschaften). 
352 See id. art. 8(2) ("Anderung des Verkaufsprospektgesetzes"). The Sales Prospectus Act may be 
found as follows: Verkaufsprospektgesetz, BGB!. I, 2749 (Dec. 13, 1990), last amended in BGB!. 
1,512,2436 (Apr. 27, 1993). The Authority will collect a fee for the deposit of the prospectus. 
See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 8, no. 6. 
353 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 89-90 (explaining art. 7, no. 2 of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 8, no. 2 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 8 of the Verkauf-
sprospektgesetz) . 
354 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 11. 
355 See id. art. 4 ("Anderung des Auslandinvestment-Gesetzes"). The Foreign Investment Act may 
be found as follows: Auslandinvestment-Gesetz, BGB!. I, 986 (July 29, 1969), last amended in 
BGB!. I, 2310 (Dec. 21, 1993). 
356 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 14 ("Anderung des Einkommen-
steuergesetzes"). The Income Tax Act may be found as follows: Einkommensteuergesetz, BGB!. I, 
1898 (Sept. 7, 1990), amended in BGB!. I, 1630 (July 24, 1994). 
357 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 16 ("Anderung des Biirsenzulas-
sungs-Verordnung'). The Stock Exchange Admission Regulation may be found as follows: Borsen-
zulassungs-Verordnung, BGB!. I, 1234 (Apr. 15, 1987), amended in BGB!. I, 512, 2346 (Apr. 27, 
1993). 
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ments about which the German public can regularly obtain informa-
tion.358 
The final type of changes in the Second Financial Market Promotion 
Act establishes new law, as in the Securities Trading Act of the first 
article. Article Fifteen attempts to remove some of the uncertainty 
regarding financial futures contracts in insolvency proceedings by es-
tablishing netting regulations.359 This article applies to the following 
types of financial futures obligations whose prices are determined on 
a market or a stock exchange: the delivery of precious metals or 
securities; monetary obligations determined in a foreign currency; 
obligations dependent on an exchange rate, interest rate, or price of 
other goods or services; or options on any of the above.36o The article 
addresses the status of claims regarding any of these financial obliga-
tions that come due after the opening of bankruptcy proceedings and, 
therefore, cannot be fulfilled. 361 Under the new rules, the non-breach-
ing party may only pursue the underlying claim as a general creditor 
in bankruptcy.362 The nature of these obligations, however, suggests 
that the non-breaching party will often receive less than full compen-
sation for the unfulfilled contract, even if the consideration paid were 
reimbursed, if damages for lost profits were not recoverable. 
358 See Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 16, no. 1 (amending § 11 (2) of 
the Biirsenzulassungs-Verordnung). The changes increase the number of securities available, 
including those from the rapidly expanding markets of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
which are not OECD members. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 91 (explaining art. 9, no. 1 
of the draft bill, codified at art. 16, no. 1 of the Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, amending 
§ 11 (2) of the Biirsenzulassungs-Verordnung). 
359 See Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 15 ("FinanztermingeschiiJte im 
InsolvenzverJahren"). Actually, this article duplicates a provision of another Act under considera-
tion at the same time as the Second Financial Market Promotion Act, Article 105 of the Intro-
ductory Act for Insolvency Proceedings (EinJiihrungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung). In that other 
law, this provision would go into effect the day after promulgation. The finance committee of the 
Bundestag, however, feared a delay in the other act, and so added this provision to the Second 
Financial Market Promotion Act. See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, 
supra note 167, at 273-74 (explanation of art. 8d of the draft bill, codified at art. 15 of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz) . 
360 See Zweites Finanzmarktfiirderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 15(1). 
361 See id. 
362 See id. art. 15(2). The article recognizes, however, that individual contracts of this type may 
constitute individual provisions of a larger agreement or ongoing transaction. If a contract for 
multiple transactions contains a provision that contract damages can only be resolved jointly, then 
the entirety of the transactions shall be treated as if they were a single reciprocal contract. See id. 
art. 15(1). These provisions shall also apply in the case of consolidated proceedings. See id. 
art. 15(3). 
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Article Fifteen accounts for this discrepancy in lost profits derived 
from futures contracts.363 In addition to the underlying contract claim, 
the non-breaching party may file an additional claim for the lost profits 
resulting from the breach, which shall be calculated as the difference 
between the agreed upon price and that of the respective market or 
exchange, available on the second workday after the opening of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.364 This type of protection for expected profits 
clearly makes the German markets more attractive for those transact-
ing and trading in futures and options.365 
Finally, Article Twenty lists the effective dates. 366 Most of the provi-
sions of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act discussed in this 
Part of this Article became effective on August 1, 1994.367 The other 
provisions became effective on January 1, 1995, including the provi-
sions of Article Eight, requiring that a securities sales prospectus must 
be submitted to the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Author-
ity.368 Recall that the Authority opened for business onJanuary 1, 1995. 
363 The following example illustrates this point. Assume that Broker had entered into a futures 
contract to sell to Investor 1000 shares of stock in Daimler-Benz at DM 700 each, deliverable on 
Monday, July 3, 1995 in Frankfurt. The parties signed the contract and Investor paid the 
DM 700,000 on May 8, 1995. This is a contract for future delivery of securities. On July 3, Investor 
sees that Daimler-Benz is trading at DM 750 and calls his broker to see that the securities have 
been transferred only to learn that the Broker had filed for bankruptcy the previous Friday,June 
30. As a general creditor in bankruptcy, Investor could only file a claim to have the payment 
returned. Investor would receive his pro rata share of the Broker's estate at the end of the 
proceeding; if the Broker's assets only equalled half his liabilities, then Investor would receive 
only 50 Pfennig per Mark, or a total of DM 350,000. But Investor is worse off as a result of the 
failure, because this was a futures contract. Investor had contracted not for DM 700,000 worth of 
Daimler-Benz stock, but for 1000 share at that price. In order to buy the equivalent shares now, 
Investor would have to pay DM 750,000. Although an investor might also suffer a loss, such as if 
the Daimler-Benz stock in this case had fallen to DM 650 per share, that scenario does not affect 
this analysis, since the non-breaching party would only bring a claim for lost profits otherwise 
due under the contract. 
364 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 15 (2). In the above example, if 
the price of the stock were to climb to DM 752 on Tuesday, July 4, 1995, two days after the 
bankruptcy filing (Friday to Tuesday, since the U.S. independence day is not a holiday in 
Frankfurt), Investor could file an additional claim for his lost profit of DM 52,000. This figure is 
calculated as the difference in the stock's trading price on the second day after the advent of 
bankruptcy proceedings (DM 752) minus the contract price (DM 700), times the number of 
shares (1000): 
(752-700) X 1000 = DM 52,000. 
365 Although the above example dealt with a single transaction in a reciprocal contract, no 
provisions of Article 15 suggest that if such a contract were traded on the exchange that it would 
be treated any differently in the case of a bankruptcy-related default. 
366 See Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 20 ("Inkrafttreten"). 
367 Id. 
368 See id. 
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Similarly, Article Sixteen followed the later date.369 Finance Minister 
Waigel may have underestimated the scope of the reforms which took 
two years longer than he proposed for enactment.370 
VI. ANALYSIS 
As discussed throughout this Article, the series of reforms in Ger-
many aim to increase efficiency in the financial markets, lowering 
overall costs, increasing allocative efficiency, and increasing investor 
information, opportunity, and protections. The purported overall goal 
is the increased attractiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland. 
Although broad consensus supported the need for change-exem-
plified in areas like the regulation of insider trading where Germany 
had fallen behind the worldwide trend-this consensus has not spread 
across all areas of reform, nor across the scope of individual reforms. 
In this context, the title of this Article, An Outsider's Look Into the 
Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany . . . takes on a meaning be-
yond the notion that the Article has been written by an American 
regarding German reforms. Beyond this is the vital understanding that 
although many of the reforms delineated in this Article represent an 
evolution of the German financial sectors and the inevitable march of 
progress, a significant number of these reforms have responded to 
pressures from outside Germany.371 Some pressures have been iden-
tified as directives of the EU designed to promote common practices 
in the process of harmonization of the Common Market. Other pres-
sures stem from the recognition of the development of worldwide 
standards among the leading industrialized countries resulting from 
the globalization and internationalization of international finance, 
often mirroring developments pioneered in the United States. This 
Article details some difficult steps Germans have already taken towards 
the implementation of these reforms. The next most important step 
shall be to convince the world, and the Americans in particular, that 
the changes have been embraced.372 
369 [d. 
370 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
371 Although the fact that some of the German reforms stem from outside pressures is apparent 
from a cursory examination of the subject, for an understanding of the breadth and significance 
of these pressures, the author of this Article is indebted to Dr. Kotz. Interview with Dr. Hans-
Helmut Kotz, Chief Economist, Deutsche Girozentrale-Deutsche Kommunalbank, Frankfurt am 
Main, Germany Oan. 19, 1995). 
372Although the concept that pressure for reform has come from outside Germany is not 
particularly novel, it is essential that the American reader grasp this point. Germany can only 
draw a greater share of foreign investment if it convinces investors that these reforms are in place. 
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Arguments for the apparent benevolence of such pressures are that 
they indeed represent world standards, stemming from open econo-
mies where market forces have led to the survival of only the most 
efficient financial structures, markets, and instruments. They have 
stood the test of time and proven their superiority. To attain a "global" 
standard or even one acceptable by the twelve, and now fifteen, Mem-
ber States of the EU, the standard cannot be too radical or represent 
any gross deviation from the current practices of the more advanced 
countries. In the United States in particular, the New York Stock Ex-
change is generally considered the most efficient capital market in the 
world.373 So why shouldn't other countries want to follow this lead? 
Put simply, other countries are not the United States. This Article 
meticulously details the structure of the German financial system in 
Part II, showing that the German financial markets are different from 
their U.S. counterparts-in the most basic sense. The traditional Ger-
man reliance on debt and internal financing rather than equity, with 
a correspondingly larger role played by more powerful universal banking 
institutions at the expense of the stock markets,374 highlights these differ-
ences. Surely, most Germans have realized that Finanzplalz Deutschland 
cannot develop as one of the world's leading financial metropolises, 
while continuing to rely primarily upon its banking sector, without 
further developing its securities markets. Even with this recognition, 
the Germans remain adamant in not sacrificing their universal banking 
system to this end. 
A more thorough theoretical discussion of the comparative merits 
of the universal banking system and other factors characteristic of the 
German financial system is beyond the scope of this Article. Beyond a 
cursory level, this Article does not wish to call into question the fun-
damentals of the worldwide accepted standards, such as the policy that 
insider trading in a developed marketplace should be prohibited. The 
question posed by this Article is much more difficult and fact specific. 
In light of the differences between the underlying financial system in 
Germany and other countries, including the United States in particu-
373 "The success of the functioning of possibly the most efficient market known, the New York 
Stock Exchange, has been in part due to the careful formalization of the rules of the game by 
its board of governors and the Securities and Exchange Commission." Allen D. Boyer, Free Speech, 
Free Markets, and Foolish Consistency: Corporate First Amendment Rights and the SEC, 92 COLUM. 
L. REv. 474, 496 (1992) (book review) (citing Martin Shubik, Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, 
and the Public Good, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
31,33 Oohn C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988)). 
374 See Roe, supra note 44, at 1936-38. 
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lar, this Article poses the question of whether the market reforms that 
have been so successful in other countries can and should be imposed 
upon Germany. The German economy has developed as one of the 
world's strongest and most stable, with its own model of universal 
banking in particular. Can the extremely detailed securities regulations 
of the United States simply be translated into the German language 
and enacted by the German Bundestag, and should one then expect 
immediately to see as dynamic and deep a securities market as in the 
United States? 
Clearly, the answer to the latter question is no. But this Article 
purports to prove that the reasons for this result stem from more than 
a mere transition period to digest the changes and for the capitaliza-
tion of the markets to grow. This Article has repeatedly addressed the 
issue of reform from three different viewpoints: that of the governmental 
agents and regulators, the market participants and private infrastructure, 
and the investors and customers. The period of time required to imple-
ment the reforms varies widely across these major groupings. 
From the regulatory viewpoint, the government is doing its part in 
enacting the reforms, but this process takes time, as exemplified by the 
fact that the Second Financial Market Promotion Act was enacted two 
years beyond the deadline in the EU directive. Although the Federal 
Securities Trading Oversight Authority is already up and running, it is 
still in the process of digesting its duties and implementing its man-
date, as discussed infra in Part VI.B. This last point is the best example 
of the inability merely to translate and to impose a regulatory frame-
work upon Germany. Even accounting for the benefit of an example, 
should we expect the new German counterpart to the SEC within a 
matter of months or even years to establish the type of impact that the 
SEC has cultivated through over sixty years of rules, regulations, inves-
tigations, and no-action letter experience? 
On the second level are the market participants themselves who will 
need to adapt to the new regulations and structures. Surely they will 
benefit from the increased attractiveness of Germany as a place for 
investment. But this progress does not come without costs. In particu-
lar, the market participants (i.e., predominantly the large universal 
banks) will bear both the direct costs of increased fees to pay for the 
infrastructure reforms and the indirect costs of adapting their own 
practices to comply with the new rules. 
Sophisticated investors cannot fully benefit from the reforms until 
the government has established the regulatory framework and the 
market participants have adapted and expanded their services accord-
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ing to the new regulations. Investors evaluate the bottom line in the 
form of the return on their investment, which comes only from the 
workings of the financial markets in practice, not in theory. All invest-
ment is at some point a gamble, dependent upon individual expecta-
tions which meet at the market, determining everything from interest 
rates to stock prices to foreign exchange spot prices, and all the 
derivatives thereof. The government and market participants can help 
to lower the transactions costs and increase the information available 
to investors. Ultimately, however, the investors must place their trust, 
and their money, in the German markets to consider these reforms a 
success. In essence, the success of these reform measures will parallel 
a change in the financial culture of Germany. 
A. Adaptation to the New Rules by the Market Participants 
The United States is critical of the universal banking system in 
Germany because the traditional regulatory structure had no deterrent 
to prevent the intermingling of information between the bank's own 
securities accounts and those of its customers-hence, creating the 
potential for insider trading. The primary argument in favor of univer-
sal banking is that it is a much more stable structure to hedge against 
risks and market fluctuations. The classic retort to U.S.-based criticism 
on the German banking system in recent years is that Germany has 
never had a savings and loan crisis as in the United States, which 
required billions of dollars in taxpayer money for a bailout. 
Of significant concern for credit institutions and other securities 
market participants are the costs of the new requirements of the Sec-
ond Financial Market Promotion Act. The new laws designed to pro-
hibit insider trading, and the Rules of Conduct for dealing with custom-
ers, impose additional disclosure and compliance burdens. It remains 
to be seen if and how the credit institutions and even the stock ex-
changes themselves can pass on these costs to investors.375 
The most visible direct costs will come in the form of an account 
payable to the new Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority 
pursuant to its power to recoup its costs from companies involved in 
securities activities.376 The vast majority of securities investment serv-
ices are performed by credit institutions.377 These institutions are sub-
375 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 38. 
376 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 11 (1) (1). 
377 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 40 (explaining art. 1, § 5(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz which includes the German Bundesbank and the Federal Banking Su-
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sequently assessed seventy-five percent of the Supervisory Authority's 
costS.378 
Other less readily quantifiable costs stem from the requirement of 
section 15 of the Securities Trading Act for the reporting of informa-
tion that will substantially influence the trading price of a security.379 
Although the scope of exactly what must be disclosed remains unclear, 
as discussed infra Part VI.D, the requirement does not intend to place 
an undue burden on corporations. Upon application by an issuer of 
securities, the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority can 
release that corporation from the disclosure obligation for specific 
facts if such disclosure would be contrary to legitimate interests of the 
issuer.38o In addition, while the draft bill required publication in a 
national newspaper,381 a subsequent amendment allows the issuer the 
option of choosing disclosure by means of an electronic information 
dissemination system.382 Not only will electronic disclosure further trans-
parency by increasing the speed of public dissemination of the infor-
mation, but competition among the new providers of this service 
should keep costs down.383 
The most important and least quantifiable changes will stem from 
the efforts of the credit institutions to comply with the Rules of Con-
duct. This Article will not address the issue of compliance in great 
detail, because the issue remains one of speculation while the Federal 
Securities Trading Supervisory Authority is drafting the guidelines to 
implement these Rules. At a minimum, however, the traditional credit 
institutions of Germany will have to take one step further away from a 
pure notion of a universal banking system. As in the United States, 
credit institutions will have to establish "Chinese Walls"384 to divide 
pervisory Authority on the Securities Council to the new Federal Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority because of potential issues of banking oversight). 
378 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 11 (1) (1); see also Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, 
at 44 (explaining art. I, § 11 (1) ) . 
379 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15. 
380 SeeWertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15(1); see also Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 
49 (explaining art. I, § 15(2) of the draft bill of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz, 
codified within § 15(1». This provision stems directly from the EO directive. SeeInsider Directive, 
supra note 129, art. 1; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
381 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 9 (draft bill art. I, § 15(3) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
382 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15(3). 
383 By January of 1995, before the reporting requirement had even gone into effect, the Reuters 
electronic information dissemination service was already advertising its new services to meet these 
disclosure requirements. 
384The internal policies and procedures developed by investment service businesses, such as 
invesUnent banks and retail brokerage houses, for the purpose of restricting the flow of material 
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their personnel dealing directly with the trading of securities for their 
own accounts and those providing direct services to customers. The 
lack of such divisions in the past has led to widespread suspicion 
outside Germany of insider trading, since there were no formal legal 
barriers to the dissemination of otherwise nonpublic information within 
an institution. The new control structures for both the organization 
and functioning of the credit institutions will both serve to enforce the 
prohibition of insider trading in Germany and increase the protection 
of the investors by helping to ensure that the investment service com-
panies are acting in the interests of their customers. 
While the prohibition on insider trading based on nonpublic infor-
mation seeks to prevent individuals from using information about a 
corporation for personal gain in the markets, a corporation might be 
concerned about additional abuses of information disclosed publicly 
as well as that required solely by supervisory authorities. Additionally, 
individuals may have concerns about their own privacy. The Securities 
Trading Act has implemented safeguards to prevent these other forms 
of informational abuse. Due to the nature of its work, the Act extends 
an obligation over all persons employed by the Authority to maintain 
confidentially, in particular with business secrets and personal infor-
mation.385 Information shared between the German and foreign super-
visory authorities may only be used in the oversight of insider prohibi-
tions or in administrative or judicial proceedings.386 Another provision 
of the Act limits the storage and use of personal information to inves-
tigations of potential insider violations and provides for the deletion 
of such information once no longer needed.387 
non public information from the division of the business in which it originates are colloquially 
referred to as "Chinese Walls." See HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION 407 (2nd ed., 
1990). For a discussion of the development of Chinese Walls in the United States and an 
acceptance of the use of such procedures reflected in caselaw and SEC rules, see id. at 406-12. 
385 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 8. The exceptions include passing this infor-
mation to prosecutors in criminal proceedings. See id. Section 18(1) allows the Authority to 
provide personal information regarding defendants and witnesses to the public prosecutor's 
office for the purpose of criminal prosecutions and to other regulatory authorities. See id. §§ 6, 
7, § 8(1) (cooperation with other domestic and foreign authorities). [d. 
386 See id. § 19(2) (usage by foreign authorities), (3) (usage by the German Federal Securities 
Trading Supervisory Authority). This provision implements article 10 of the Insider Directive. See 
Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 51 (explaining art. 1, § 19 of the Zweites Finanzmarkt-
forderungsgesetz) . 
387 See id. § 17. 
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B. Scope of Activity of the Securities Trading Supervisory Authority 
Although the Securities Trading Act appears to have addressed the 
major concerns of the Insider Directive and the Holdings Disclosure 
Directive, the adaption of such regulations can prove more difficult in 
practice. Many concerns remain about the implementation of these 
rules and of the abilities of the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority to carry out its mandate. 
The very establishment of the Authority evidences progress, how-
ever, in terms of a strong signal on both national and international 
levels.388 The Supervisory Authority has quickly made progress in world 
recognition. It has already concluded an agreement with its French 
counterpart to cooperate in the oversight of the futures exchange 
markets.389 The greatest sign that the German oversight system has 
reached international standards was the decision by the United States 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") to issue a no-ac-
tion letter, effectively allowing futures contracts from the German 
Futures Exchange based upon the DAX market index to be offered 
and sold in the United States.390 The following pages will examine the 
jurisdiction of the new German regulatory authority in contrast to its 
American counterparts. 
1. Jurisdiction and Defining "Security" 
The Securities Trading Act applies to trading both on and off of the 
exchanges of securities and derivatives.391 The Act mandates author-
ity over these transactions to the German Federal Securities Trading 
Authority. A comparison with the United States reveals the breadth of 
388 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 36. 
389 See Deutschland: Deutsche und Panser BOrsenaufsicht Kooperieren, REUTER GERMAN NEWS 
SERVICE, Mar. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Zeitng File. This movement by the 
regulators parallels the cooperation of the Deutsche TerminbOrse ("DTB") with the French futures 
exchange, Marche a Terme International de France ("MATIF"), which have been working to link 
their trading using DTB screens. See Tracy Corrigan, Quirky Offshoots Gain Respect, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 1993. 
390 See Deutsche Terminbi:irse futures contract based on the Deutscher Aktienindex, CITC 
No-Action Letter, 1994 CITC Ltr. LEXIS 107 (Dec. 20, 1994). The no-action letter conditioned 
its approval on the Second Financial Markets Promotion Law taking effect, the establishment of 
the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority, and confirmation that the Authority would 
share information with the CITC; all such conditions have since been met. See DAX Index Futures 
Availablefor U.S. Sale, 27 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. No.2, (BNA) 139 (Jan. 20, 1995). 
391 Recall that this Act applies to securities, options, futures, and a range of other financial 
instruments. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
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this mandate in terms of the types of transactions covered. In the 
United States, securities transactions fall under the jurisdiction of the 
SEC.392 Options on securities also fall under SEC oversight.393 On the 
other hand, the regulation of other derivatives, including futures trans-
actions, falls under the guise of the CITC.394 This division of oversight 
responsibility was a subject of bitter debate shortly after the estab-
lishment of the CITC in 1974.395 The division of competence was 
392The Securities and Exchange Commission is composed of five Commissioners, appointed 
by the President upon the advice and consent of the Senate. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78d (1994). Various divisions of the SEC have responsibility for the securities laws' 
disclosure requirements; oversight of secondary trading markets, including the activities of ex-
changes and broker-dealers; and for enforcement actions for violations of the securities laws. See 
JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (1991) [hereinafter 
Cox, SECURITIES REGULATION]. 
393 See Cox, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 392, at 1294 ("[O]ptions trading is now (and 
arguably has always been) the province of the securities markets and hence the securities regu-
lators .... "). "At least since 1982, the authority of the SEC to regulate options trading and the 
options markets has been clear: The option contract itself is deemed a separate security." ld. at 
1293. 
The German law reflects a similar reasoning in the Securities Trading Act by classitying warrants 
(Optionsscheine) under securities. See supra note 200. Stock warrants are defined under U.S. law 
as follows: 
Certificates entitling the owner to buy a specified amount of stock at a specified time(s) 
for a specified price. Such differ from stock options only in that options are generally 
granted to employees and warrants are sold to the public. Warrants are typically long 
period options, are freely transferable, and if the underlying shares are listed on a 
securities exchange, are also publicly traded. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (6th ed. 1990). 
394 See Cox, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 392, at 1294 ("[T]rading in any form offuture 
is exclusively within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission."). 
The CFTC is an independent agency of the United States Government, composed of five Com-
missioners, appointed by the President upon the advice and consent of the Senate. Commodity 
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2) (A) (1994). The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to 
"contracts of sale of a commodity forfuture delivery .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l) (A) (i)(1994). In the 
case of a sale for future delivery, the Commission also has jurisdiction over transactions on a board 
of trade "in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan con-
tracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commit-
ments .... " ld. § 2(a)(I)(A)(ii). The Commission also has authority over futures and options 
on futures on an index of securities. See id. § 2(a) (1)(B) (ii). A futures contract may be defined 
as follows: "[A] present right to receive at a future date a specific quantity of a given commodity 
for a fixed price." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 676 (6th ed. 1990). 
395 See Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion: Scene II, 39 Bus. LAw. 67, 72 (1983) [hereinafter Horwitz, Sunset]. The CFTC was established 
by the 1974 amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act: the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). See Horwitz, Sunset, supra at 
72 n.36. 
1996] INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY 73 
resolved in the Shad:Johnson accords,396 later adopted by Congress,397 
which established the following resolution: SEC jurisdiction would 
include options on securities, "options on groups or indexes of securities 
and options on foreign currency traded on securities exchanges ... ";398 
the CITC would have ')urisdiction over futures contracts on exempted 
securities (other than municipal securities) and on groups of securities 
or indexes as well as options on futures contracts for such indexes. "399 
"It was further agreed that futures contracts (or options on futures) 
for individual corporations and municipal securities would not be 
permitted, but that the CITC would have jurisdiction over options 
on foreign currency traded on commodity exchanges."4oo Unlike the 
American system, the new German Authority will be responsible for 
trading in all of the aforementioned contracts.401 
To some extent, the division in the American system may reflect 
different priorities of the two U.S. agencies. In large part, the SEC has 
generally considered its primary mission as one of investor protection, 
with the assumption that a strong, healthy securities marketplace would 
follow therefrom. Conversely, the mission of the CITC has often been 
seen in terms of maintaining a strong, liquid marketplace, with investor 
protection largely a means (albeit an important one) to that end.402 
The German law has approached the question of priorities in a 
different fashion. Under the German Securities Trading Act, the duties 
of the German Securities Trading Supervisory Authority are to be 
exercised exclusively in the public interest.403 The Authority shall work 
396 At the time, John Shad and Philip Johnson were the chairmen of the SEC and CITC, 
respectively. See Horwitz, Sunset, supra note 395, at 70. 
397 See id. at 76. 
3981d. at 73 (emphasis added). SEC jurisdiction also included securities generally exempted 
from the securities laws, such as Government National Mortgage Association certificates and 
certificates of deposit. ld. 
3991d. 
4oOld. 
401 In the context of defining transactions subject to the prohibition on insider trading, the 
Securities Trading Act describes contracts equivalent to securities (§ 12 (l) (1, 2)), options 
(§ 12(2)(1,2)), futures contracts including those based on market indices (§ 12(2)(3)), and 
options on futures (§ 12 (2) (4)). 
402 Cox, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 392, at 1294. 
403 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 4. This provision was missing from the draft 
bill. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 5 (art. 1, § 4 of the draft bill of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz). The provision was suggested upon review by the finance committee of 
the Bundestag. BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 15 
(adding art. 1, § 4(2) to the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). Their reasoning was that the 
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to mitigate and counteract circumstances that would adversely affect 
the accomplishment of securities trading or have significant adverse 
effects upon the securities markets.404 
This broad jurisdiction would appear to place an impossible burden 
on the new German Authority, but the amount of oversight necessary 
is proportional to the size of the markets. Recall that, although grow-
ing, the German securities markets are currently less developed than 
their U.S. counterparts.405 More importantly, however, the actual finan-
cial instruments which are considered "securities" for the purposes of 
the respective German and U.S. agencies differ dramatically.406 The 
German Securities Trading Act defines "securities" to include stock 
shares, certificates which represent shares, debt instruments, participa-
tion certificates, warrants, and other comparable securities and, in 
general, is meant to include all instruments which can be traded on 
an organized market such as a stock exchange.407 In general, this list 
appears to cover the major financial instruments in the general public 
conception of securities and the financial markets. The authority of 
the German Securities Trading Authority and the obligations of mar-
ket participants under the Act all relate to this definition of secu-
rity. For instance, the insider trading prohibitions apply to all such 
defined securities that are listed on a stock exchange or traded in the 
over-the-counter markets.408 The various disclosure requirements im-
posed by the Act likewise revolve around publicly traded securities of 
these types.409 
The U.S. securities acts contain a much broader definition of "security. "410 
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of in-
terest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collat-
trust of the public investor is necessary for the functional ability of the securities markets, and 
that this amendment would promote this trust. See id. at 190-91 (explanation of amendment). 
404 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 4; see also supra note 219 and accompanying 
text. 
405 See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
406 Since "derivatives" merely reflect the values and expectations of their underlying securities, 
the differences in definitional form between the two countries is much more important for the 
term "securities." 
407 See supra Part V.A. and accompanying notes. 
408 This provision covers not only German markets, but those throughout the EU and the 
European Free Trade Association, and applies equally to instruments bearing a broad range of 
rights to the abovementioned securities. See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 12. 
409 See supra Part V.A.3. and accompanying notes. 
410The definition of "security" in the Securities Act ofl933 (12 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994)) differs 
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eral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, 
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest 
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, 
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on 
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to for-
eign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, 
any of the foregoing. 411 
75 
Note that this definition includes options, but not futures. Common 
law has further expanded this definition, most importantly in broadly 
interpreting the term "investment contract."412 This contrast reveals 
that the same statutory reporting obligations for dealing in "German 
securities" encompass a great deal fewer transactions than those in 
"U.S. securities." The burdens on the German Authority are thus 
proportionately lighter than those on their American counterparts. 
One might try to explain part of the difference between the scope 
of instruments covered in that the German Securities Trading Act is 
drawn more narrowly than its U.S. counterparts. The German Act deals 
only with the creation of the new Authority, insider trading prohibi-
tions, various reporting requirements and the Rules of Conduct.413 The 
broader U.S. securities acts, for example, also contain requirements for 
registration statements and prospectuses414 as well as regulations for 
brokers and dealers,415 which in Germany are regulated under separate 
acts.416 A closer examination, however, reveals the opposite to be the 
slightly from that in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (12 V.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1994)). 
The Supreme Court has held these differences to be immaterial-the two provisions should be 
treated as virtually identical. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 V.S. 332, 335 (1967). 
41112 V.S.c. § 77(b) (1) (1994). 
412 "An investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person: (1) invests his money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) is led to 
expect profits; (4) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." S.E.C. v. W J. Howey 
Co., 328 V.S. 293,298-99 (1946). 
413 See supra Part v.A.4 and accompanying notes. 
414 See 15 V.S.c. §§ 77f-77h, 77j-77l (1994). 
415 See, e.g., 15 V.S.c. § 780 (1994). 
416These functions are regulated respectively under the German Sales Prospectus Act and the 
Stock Exchange Act. See supra Part V.B and accompanying notes. 
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case: the U.S. definition of "security" is broader in the areas ofpreven-
tion of deceptive trading practices than in the more specialized areas 
of registration requirements.417 
The fact that the German Securities Trading Oversight Authority 
shall address a smaller range of securities instruments than the SEC 
need not be construed as a sign of weakness. For the newly created 
German agency, the tasks ahead are already somewhat daunting-the 
activities to be supervised include the entire range of registered and 
over-the-counter securities and derivatives. The ability to accomplish 
its goals in these areas is much more important at this early stage than 
an attempt to address trading at the fringes of the markets, particularly 
in the context of the German desire to raise its capital markets to the 
highest world standards.418 
2. Mandate: Protecting Investors or the Marketplace? 
Now that the scope of activity of the new German Authority has been 
analyzed, the more important questions of the ability to act within this 
scope remain. A comparison between the German Authority and its 
U.S. counterparts in terms of their respective mandates sheds light 
upon the prospects for enforcement. 
Outside of the reference to acting in the public interest,419 the German 
Act contains no general reference to the goal of investor protection 
aside from the provisions regarding the Rules of Conduct, which ad-
dress the more narrow issue of relations between institutions engaged 
in securities activities and their customers.420 This absence is particu-
larly peculiar in that the first draft of the law cited the broadening of 
investor protection first among its goals.421 Although increased liquidity 
and market transparency will strengthen the trust of investors in the 
German markets, the furthering of these goals are an indirect rather 
417 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1994) (securities and transactions exempted from registra-
tion) with § 77q (3) (prohibiting fraudulent transactions in securities, including those otherwise 
exempted from registration under § 77c) and § 78j(b) (prohibiting use of deceptive devices in 
the purchase or sale of registered or unregistered securities). 
418 See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
419 See supra note 403 and accompanying text. 
420For a discussion of the Rules of Conduct, see supra Part Y.A.4. These sections of the Act 
apply only to services provided by securities service business-the services must be in the interest 
of their customers (im Interesse seiner Kunden). See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, 
§ 31(1)(1). 
421 See supra notes 176 (citing investor protection first in a list of the goals of the Act) and 183 
(referring to investor protection as an important part of the state's duties in establishing a 
favorable framework for the financial markets) and accompanying texts. 
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than direct means of protecting the investor. A comparison of the 
following new changes resulting from the Second Financial Market 
Promotion Act illustrates this point. One amendment to the German 
Stock Exchange Act has as its exclusive purpose the direct protection 
of less sophisticated investors: the seller of a commodity futures con-
tract must inform the other side in writing of the special risks in 
commodity futures activities.422 A second change promotes transpar-
ency, which indirectly protects investors. An amendment to the Stock 
Exchange Admission Regulation requires that information about the 
underlying securities must be readily available to the German public 
for securities bearing subscription rights to these underlying instru-
ments to be admitted for trading on an exchange.423 In other words, if 
the German public cannot determine the price of the underlying 
security, then no trading based on this non-transparent instrument 
shall be allowed. Nonetheless, an unsophisticated investor might still 
be harmed by buying allowable subscription rights if the investor did 
not know the risks involved in buying subscription rights in the first 
place. 
The mandate of the German Authority as adopted in the Act sounds 
more like the marketplace promotion goal of the CFTC424 than the 
investor protection goal of the SEC.425 In light of the circumstances 
422 See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
423 See supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
424References to both the public interest and investor protection are absent from the Com-
modity Exchange Act. As suggested above, this Act refers largely to the protection of the markets. 
E.g., 
Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of such commodity for 
future delivery made on or subject to the rules of contract markets causing sudden or 
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity, is 
an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce in such commodity. For the purpose 
of diminishing, eliminating, or preventing such burden, the Commission shall . ... 
7 U.S.C. § 4a(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
425 Compare the following references in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: "[The trading of 
securities on unregistered exchanges shall be unlawful unless] in the opinion of the Commission, 
by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected on such exchange, it is not practicable 
and not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to require 
such registration." 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1994) (emphasis added). "[A]n exchange may be registered 
as a national securities exchange under the terms and conditions ... [which the Commission] 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. " 15 
U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1994) (emphasis added). "[T]he Commission, by rule, consistent with the public 
interest, the protection of investors, and the other purposes of this title, may relieve any self-regula-
tory organization of any responsibility under this title to enforce compliance ... " 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s(g) (2) (1994) (emphasis added). "[T] he appropriate regulatory agency for a self-regulatory 
organization is authorized, by order, if in its opinion such action is necessary or appropriate in the 
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surrounding the establishment of the German Federal Securities Trad-
ing Supervisory Authority-outside pressure for change and a desire 
to create a Finanzplatz Deutschland, the mission of promoting a strong 
marketplace appears to more accurately describe the mandate of the 
new German authority. For example, in the context of the prohibition 
of insider trading, the government explanation of the draft bill justifies 
the extension of competence beyond the stock exchanges to include 
the over-the-counter markets, because the public would not distinguish 
where the offense occurs.426 But rather than protecting investors or 
their expectations, the explanation states that this insider trading pro-
hibition shall help the ability of the securities markets to function. 427 
This in turn reflects the purposes of the EU Insider Trading Directive, 
"promoting investor confidence to the end of smoothly functioning 
markets. "428 
The SEC was established in 1934 in response to, and was greatly 
affected by, the stock market crash ofl929 and the Great Depression.429 
The German reforms, on the other hand, have grown not out of 
failure, but out of national economic success and a subsequent desire 
to move further onto the world economic stage. Similarly, the CITC 
was established in 1974 in recognition of the growing importance and 
value of trading in commodity futures contracts. Whether or not the 
background of the German agency will be reflected in its interpreta-
tion of its mandate remains to be seen, but this could have repercus-
sions in the agency's activities designed for investor protection. One 
type of fringe question that would balance the two missions would be 
the proper balance that the Supervisory Authority should insist upon 
between allowing the introduction of innovative market instruments 
and providing the proper disclosure for other than the most sophisti-
cated investors to adequately evaluate the new instruments. A further 
public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this 
title, to suspend ... or revoke the registration of such [SROj ... " 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(l) (1994) 
(emphasis added); or to expel a member of an SRO, any person associated with a member, or 
any officer or director of an SRO if "necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection 
of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (2), 
(3), (4) (1994) (emphasis added) (same provision for each situation). 
426 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 45 (explaining art. 1, § 12(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
427 See id. 
428 See Insider Directive, supra note 129, at L 334. 
429 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) ("Necessity for Regu-
lation"). 
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balancing would be required in determining when to prosecute other-
wise innovative market participants for violating the Rules of Conduct. 
3. Rights of Action and Theories of Liability 
Intimately tied to this issue of the relative mandates of the different 
agencies are the rights of action proscribed by the authorizing legisla-
tion. The German Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority is 
the competent administrative authority to bring civil actions for viola-
tions of the disclosure, reporting, or recordkeeping obligations im-
posed by the Securities Trading Act.430 Criminal proceedings for insider 
trading violations shall be brought by a public prosecutor upon infor-
mation presented by the Authority.431 Missing from the trio oflitigation 
possibilities is the right of an independent third party to bring a private 
claim for Securities Trading Act violations. In fact, the only mention 
of private rights of action in the Act specifically excludes them for any 
violation of the duties of disclosure and reporting of price-relevant 
circumstances.432 This example reflects a general absence of private 
rights of action under German law. The U.S. securities laws provide 
injured parties with multiple individual rights of action, such as for 
violation of requirements for proper filing and disclosure of informa-
tion in a sales prospectus.433 The German Sales Prospectus Act434 con-
430 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 40 (referring to the penalties imposed under 
§ 39). 
431 See id. § 18 (referring to the penalties imposed under § 38 for violations of § 14); see also 
infra Part VI.C. for a more detailed discussion of the criminal enforcement procedure. 
432 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 15(6). For a discussion of these requirements, 
see supra Part VI.A.3. 
Interestingly, the provision excluding private rights of action was not included in the draft bill. 
See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 9 (art. 1, § 15 of the draft bill of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz). This provision was added by the finance committee of the Bundestag 
during the review process. BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 
167, Bundestag Drucksache 12/7918, at 32 (adding art. 1, § 15(6) to the draft bill of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). The final version makes clear that this exclusion does not pre-
clude or limit any rights of action based upon existing legal grounds. See Wertpapierhandelsge-
setz, supra note 5, § 15(6). The finance committee's explanation for the amendment makes clear 
that other legal bases for liability of the company remain undisturbed; the alternative would lead 
to the undesirable effect of singling out companies issuing securities for protection of liability. 
See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra at 199. This leaves unclear 
what, if any, cause of action might be available for a private party for violation of any of the 
provisions of the Securities Trading Act. 
433 See section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994). 
434Verkaufsprospektgesetz, BGBI. I, 2749 (Dec. 13, 1990), last amended in BGB!. I, 512, 2436 
(Apr. 27, 1993). For a discussion of the amendments to this Act in the Second Financial Market 
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tains no analogous provisions. Likewise, the German Stock Exchange 
Act435 provides no private means of redress for investors injured through 
illegal conduct. 
Nonetheless, since the insider trading prohibitions are an entirely 
new addition to German law, one would expect any private rights of 
action under these laws to be delineated in the German Securities 
Trading Act. A comparison with United States law illustrates this point. 
Under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, officers, 
directors, or large shareholders of a corporation shall be liable to 
return to the corporation any "short-swing" profits from trading in its 
securities in a suit brought by the corporation itself or derivatively by 
its shareholders.436 Additionally under section 21A, the SEC may bring 
a civil suit against any person trading in a security based upon non-
public information.437 Section 14(e) makes trading on the basis of 
nonpublic information illegal in the context of a tender offer.438 The 
SEC may refer violations of the securities acts to the Justice Department 
for criminal prosecution.439 Under these provisions, the corporation 
may recover from insiders who traded illegally, the SEC may pursue 
civil actions, and the Justice Department may bring a criminal action 
against the insider. 
Despite these possible actions, most insider trading suits in the 
United States arise under a less clear standard. U.S. courts have read 
an implied private right of action for insider trading into Rule 10b-5,440 
implemented under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.441 In a civil law country such as Germany, a court would not allow 
a private right of action absent an express statutory provision. Absent 
Promotion Act, see supra note 352 and accompanying text. A discussion of the liability of issuers 
for violation of the provisions of the Sales Prospectus Act is beyond the scope of this Article. 
435 See supra Part V.B. 
436 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) (the time period is defined as "less than six months"). 
Violation of this provision is subject to strict liability; no abuse of non public information need 
be shown. See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 627 ("in light of its broad remedial purpose, section 
16(b) will require disgorgement of insider short-swing profits even in the absence of any wrong-
doing.") 
437 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1) (§ 21A(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1994); 
§ 21A is entitled "Civil Penalties for Insider Trading"). "The amount of the penalty which may 
be imposed on the person who committed such violation shall be determined by the court in 
light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss 
avoided as a result of such unlawful purpose, sale, or communication." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l (a)(2) 
(1994). 
438 See 15 U.S.C. 78n(e) (1994); see also Rule 14e-3, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994). 
439 See Cox, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 392, at 858. 
440 See Rule 10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1994). 
441 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW, supra note 342, at 563. 
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this implied right, a U.S. investor might still have a private right of 
action under section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
provides: 
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules 
or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security 
while in possession of material, non public information shall 
be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction 
to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or 
sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has 
purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of securi-
ties) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase of 
securities) securities of the same class.442 
Over the past six decades since the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933443 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,444 the U.S. common 
law system has expanded the prohibitions against insider trading in 
other areas beyond the implied right of action. The most important 
has been the development of different "theories"445 of liability when 
the potential violation does not fit clearly under a category proscribed 
by statute. A current example of common law evolution and the po-
tential breadth of judge-made law can be seen in recent decisions 
involving the "misappropriation theory" of liability.446 This theory has 
been adopted by the Second,447 Seventh,448 and Ninth449 Circuit Courts 
of Appeals and defined as follows: "Under this theory, a person violates 
Rule 1Ob-5 when he misappropriates material nonpublic information in 
breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence 
and uses that information in a securities transaction."450 
44215 U.S.C. § 78t·l (a) (1994) ("Private Rights of Action Based on Contemporaneous Trad· 
ing"). 
443 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1994). 
44415 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll (1994). 
445 In addition to the misappropriation theory, discussed infra, consider the "fraud on the 
market theory" which imposes liability on persons who attempt to influence market prices 
through disclosures of misleading information and benefit from the price changes by concur-
rently trading. See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 733-35. 
446 Background on the common law developmen t of insider trading provisions and a discussion 
of the misappropriation theory may be found in HAZEN, supra note 384, at 735-48. 
447 United States v. Chestrnan, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 
(1992). 
448 SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). 
449 SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
450 United States v. Chestrnan, 947 F.2d 551, 556, cited in United States v. Rebrook, 58 F.3d 961, 
965 (1995), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 7525 (1995). 
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The new German insider trading prohibitions appear to encompass 
the misappropriation theory of liability. Persons in "a fiduciary duty or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence" would fall under the 
German definition of "insider. "451 The new German Securities Trading 
Act then places a blanket prohibition on trading by insiders based 
upon nonpublic information.452 In the Unites States, however, this 
notion of misappropriation establishes a crucial link for the enforce-
ment of insider trading prohibitions. U.S. legislation has not defined 
the terms "insider"453 or "insider trading"454 and common law has not 
completely filled the gap-the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided 
the issue of who is an insider.455 Therefore, the misappropriation the-
ory acts as a functional definition of who shall be subject to insider 
trading prohibitions, based upon common law fiduciary notions rather 
than a more narrow delineation of categories of persons.456 
Nonetheless, the misappropriation theory has still only been ac-
cepted by some of the Circuit Courts. Although the Supreme Court 
has skirted the issue, it has not decided the validity of this theory;457 as 
such, the misappropriation theory remains good law in those Circuits 
which have adopted it.458 The lack of Supreme Court guidance, how-
ever, also leaves other Circuit Courts free to reject the misappropria-
tion theory. This is exactly what happened in the last major disposition 
of this issue. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected in its 
entirety the misappropriation theory adopted by its sister circuits.459 
451 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
452 See supra Part V.A.I. 
453Consider § 16 of the '34 Act: rather than defining the term insider to be applicable 
throughout the Securities Exchange Act, this section prohibits certain persons, "beneficial owner, 
director, or officer" from retaining short swing profits. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). Even this group 
is much smaller than that defined as insiders under the German Act. 
454 Congress has considered the possibility of defining improper trading on inside information 
as trading while in possession of material, nonpublic information. See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 
748. This would have been very close to the current German definition. See supra Part V.A.I. 
Congress apparently decided not to narrow the definition legislatively in favor of leaving the 
guidelines to the courts; the legislative history of this discussion also suggests an endorsement of 
the misappropriation theory. See HAZEN, supra, at 748. 
455 See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 744. Case law has established, however, that insider status shall 
extend to persons with fiduciary duties, such as attorneys, accountants, and financial advisors. [d. 
456 Once again, compare the categories of persons delineated under § 16. See supra note 453. 
457United States v. Rebrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965 n.3 (1995), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 7525 
(1995); HAZEN, supra note 384, at 742. 
458 See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 742. 
459 United States v. Rebrook, 58 F.3d 961, 966 (1995), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 7525 (1995) 
(reiterating its decision in a recent prior slip opinion). 
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The court interpreted section lO(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act460 to require an essential element of deception beyond the breach 
of fiduciary duty punishable under the misappropriation theory.461 The 
Fourth Circuit could find no authority for the misappropriation theory 
and concluded that the theory was irreconcilable with Supreme Court 
precedent.462 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.463 
Since there is a clear division among the Circuit Courts on this issue, 
it is likely that the Supreme Court will decide whether or not to adopt 
the misappropriation theory in a future case. If it were to reject the 
theory, this would weaken the ability of the SEC to prosecute persons 
for trading based upon non public information, since this theory does 
serve as an expansion of liability based on fiduciary or confidential 
relationships. Nonetheless, this is only one small aspect of the many 
enforcement mechanisms available to the SEC and private persons 
discussed throughout this Article which allow for the prosecution of 
insider trading violations in the United States. 
In the context of the German reforms, however, a rejection of the 
misappropriation theory by the United States Supreme Court would 
affect the relative powers of the German Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority in comparison with the United States counterparts which 
have served as a model for the German Authority. Within its jurisdic-
tion, the German authority would have more direct authority than the 
U.S. authorities to prosecute primary insiders464 for trading violations. 
The rationale behind this analysis is that the German system imposes 
strict liability for illegal trading, as does section 16(b) of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Act.465 If Rule lOb-5 always requires a showing 
of scienter or deception as formulated by the Fourth Circuit, rather 
than implying false motives to all trading by persons with a fiduciary 
relationship, the standard for punishing insider trading in the United 
States under this provision would be stricter than the new standards in 
effect in Germany. Prosecutors would be forced to prove the additional 
element of deceit as well as the trading and non public information 
elements common to both systems. Although somewhat speculative, 
this last point shows the benefits of a clear definition of "insider" and 
46°15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
461 Relrrook, 58 F.3d at 966. 
462 !d. 
463 United States v. Rebrook, 58 F.3d 961 (1995), cerf. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 7525 (1995). 
464 Ambiguity in the ability of the German Authority to prosecute third persons in possession 
of non public information is discussed infra Part VI.C. 
465 See supra note 436. 
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a clear delineation of the duties imposed upon such persons. In this 
respect, Germany has succeeded in establishing a clear and visible sign 
of its commitment to combatting insider trading. 
A comparison of the German and U.S. regimes for the prohibition 
of insider trading reveals two primary differences. There is no German 
counterpart to section 16(b), which allows the corporation to recover 
profits from its insiders, whether or not they traded on non public 
information. This law serves as a prophylactic against abuse of infor-
mation by insiders. The more important distinction, however, is the 
absence of any private right of action for victims of insider trading to 
sue for the pecuniary damages they suffered. This difference makes 
the German Authority appear more interested in the protection of the 
markets than in the investors themselves. The German prohibition on 
insider trading clearly promotes the interests of investors as a whole 
by discouraging illegal trading practices. Although this reduces the 
chances of an investor getting hurt, once an individual investor has 
been hurt by such illegal insider trading the Securities Trading Act 
provides no mechanism for the innocent investor to recover dam-
ages.466 Since the effectiveness of the prohibition of insider trading in 
Germany will depend upon civil and criminal enforcement proceed-
ings, the following Part of this Article delves more deeply into that 
process. 
C. Enforcing the Insider Trading Prohibition; Third Parties and the 
Knowledge Requirement 
Although the German Securities Trading Act has implemented the 
EU Insider Directive in its entirety, the key to enforcement is ongoing 
supervision.467 The new Authority has the competence and power to 
pursue investigations and require market participants and issuers to 
submit documentation of their actions.468 Nonetheless, the effectiveness 
of the German prohibitions will depend upon the exercise of these 
enforcement powers. While the most egregious forms of abuse of 
insider information will presumably be caught and punished-e.g., the 
president of a company selling stock the day before the announcement 
of poor earnings-intuition suggests that the largest part of the abuse 
466 Once again, this Article does not intend to say that other legal means for recovery, such as 
a possible fraud claim, are unavailable, but merely that the very existence of any private right of 
action for damages caused by insider trading remains unclear at best. 
467 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 16(1). 
468 See id. § 16. 
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of nonpublic information is much more subtle. The deeper issue of 
the liability of "tippees" remains (a tippee is a person who has received 
a "tip" about nonpublic information). As stated earlier, the Insider 
Directive and the implementing German Act impose liability on a 
comprehensive range of persons defined as insiders, as well as upon 
third parties who trade based upon knowledge of inside information.469 
1. Third Parties 
The prohibition of trading by third parties who have knowledge of 
non public information was not altered from the draft bill through the 
final codification of the Securities Trading Act.470 The text of the 
Securities Trading Act makes no distinction as to the direct source of 
the information-for instance, whether someone defined as an "in-
sider" had informed the third person directly, or if the information 
had been passed along through a number of persons before it reached 
the third person at issue. Therefore, the text appears to impose liability 
upon persons trading upon knowledge of nonpublic information, re-
gardless of their tippee "generation. "471 
Nonetheless, during the legislative review process, the Bundesrat 
expressed concern over whether or not this same provision of the 
Securities Trading Act also prohibits third persons from passing on the 
nonpublic information with a recommendation to purchase or sell. 
Neither an insider nor a third party may trade on behalf of another 
person,472 but, in addition, the Act specifically prohibits insiders from 
passing on such information473 or recommending that others buy or 
sell.474 The Bundesrat could find no apparent reason to tolerate a third 
469 See supra notes 146-48, 214 and accompanying texts (discussing the relevant provisions in 
the Insider Directive and the German Act, respectively). 
470 Compare Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 8-9 (art. 1, § 14(2) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) with Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 14(2) ("Einem Dritten, 
der Kenntnis von einer Insidertatsache hat, ist es verboten, unter Ausnutzung dieser Kenntnis Insider-
papiere fur eigene oder fremde Rechnung oder for einen anderen zu erwerben oder zu veraujJern.") This 
may be translated as follows: A third person, who has knowledge of inside information, is 
forbidden to take advantage of this knowledge to acquire or dispose of insider securities for one's 
own account, on behalf of another, or for another person. 
471 "The way the S.E.C. counts such generations is that anyone told by an insider who had 
legitimate access to the information of a pending takeover is a first-generation tippee. Anyone 
that person tells is a second-generation tippee. And so on." Floyd Norris, The Lalryrinth of 2 Insider 
Cases, N.V. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Dl. 
472 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 14(1) (insider), 14(2) (third person). 
473 Id. § 14(2). 
474 Id. § 14(3). 
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person's passing of inside information; the Bundesrat characterized 
this discrepancy as a significant loophole.475 Upon consideration of this 
comment, the federal government merely answered that it would in 
further legislative proceedings determine whether in balancing all 
points of view it is important to also forbid third persons from passing 
on inside information and a buy or sell recommendation.476 The legis-
lative history makes no further mention of this issue, which has been 
left unresolved, as no changes were made to this section in the final 
version of the Securities Trading Act. 
One could assume from the context of the insider trading prohibi-
tion that third persons in possession of inside information should be 
prohibited from passing this information to others. Otherwise, it would 
seem odd that outsiders could be held liable for trading upon infor-
mation that it is neither illegal for them to pass on nor for them to 
have received from another outsider. 
Even if successive generations of tippees were liable under German 
law, as generations of tippees pass along the non public information, 
the chain becomes much more difficult to trace, and these persons 
ultimately become more difficult to prosecute based upon these con-
nections. Moreover, while the German Federal Securities Trading Super-
visory Authority has broad powers to obtain information from credit 
institutions and other securities trading institutions already subject to 
reporting obligations,477 the Authority has less ability to request infor-
mation from issuers and persons in possession of non public informa-
tion,478 and perhaps even less control over third persons and sub-
sequent generations of tippees.479 
Since insider trading prohibitions rely on the threat of punishment 
to deter such practices, the amount of insider trading should be in-
475 Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, supra note 165, (explanation (Begriindung) accompanying 
comment no. 2, to art. 1, § 14(2) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), reprinted in 
Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 94. 
476 Gegeniiujerung der Bundesregierung, supra note 166, reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 
7, at 101 (response to Bundesrat comment no. 2, to art. 1, § 14(2) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) ("Die Bundesregierung wird im weiteren Gesetzgebungsverfahren priifen, ob 
es unter Abwiigung aller Gesiehtspunkte notwendig ist, aueh Dritten die Weitergabe einer Insidertatsa-
ehe und die Veriiujerungs- oder Erwerbsempfehlung zu verbieten."). 
477 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 16(2), (3). For a discussion of the transactions 
reporting requirements, see supra notes 232-48 and accompanying text. 
478 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 50 (explaining art. 1, § 16(4) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
479 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 16(5). For example, individuals must be in-
formed of their right to refuse to provide incriminating information. Id. § 16(6). 
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versely proportional to the product of the severity of the punishment 
and the threat of being caught. For example, if the punishment were 
merely to return any illegal profits and the chance of getting caught 
were only one out of ten, then the expected return based upon the 
illegal trading would be ninety percent of any change in the value of 
the securities when the information becomes public.480 When the de-
terrence measures include possible imprisonment,48! the attractiveness 
of insider trading falls precipitously.482 While statutes detail maximum 
punishments for insider trading in Germany, the actual punishments 
imposed within these limits remain to be seen. Assuming a significant 
punishment, deterrence still depends upon the probability of getting 
caught, which in turn, depends upon both the ability and desire of the 
Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority to pursue investiga-
tions of suspected violators. Only time will reveal the success of the new 
authority, but the following example from the United States shows the 
size of the tasks ahead. 
A recent investigation by the SEC illustrates how seriously authorities 
in the United States consider the mandate to prosecute third parties 
knowingly trading on non public information. The events that created 
480 Consider the following basic statistical formula: 
Expected value of insider trading = (change in value ofstock)-(the probability of getting 
caught) X (fine for insider trading). 
Adapting this formula to the above scenario, and assuming that the change in the value of the 
stock purchased by the insider between the time of the trading and the public dissemination of 
the stock equals $1000, yields the following result: 
E[insider trading] = $1000-(0.10) X ($1000) = $900. 
Therefore, the insider can expect to reap $900 from such a trade. The individual insider may 
subjectively value this benefit at less than $900, because the "costs" of getting caught may exceed 
the mere fine. These costs may include the expenses of defending a lawsuit, the possibility of 
losing one's job, emotional distress, or even future losses resulting from social or professional 
ostracization. The values of these additional variables depend upon the individual's risk aversion. 
Note also that the potential gain (i.e., in this case, the $1000) reflects the accuracy and 
relevance of the non public information, which the insider can normally assess. 
481 Recall that punishment under the German law may include up to five years in prison. See 
supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
482In terms of the formula mentioned, at supra note 480, once again the potential "cost" of 
imprisonment depends upon an individual's risk aversion beyond more quantifiable measures 
such as lost income. For example, someone might abhor the notion of going to prison so much 
that he would theoretically pay $10,000,000 to avoid that fate. Assuming the other factors of the 
above example with a punishment of repaying the gain and a certain prison term, the illegal 
trade would have a value of negative $999,000 to that individual, calculated as follows: 
E[insider trading] = $1000-(0.10) X ($10,000,000) = $-999,000. 
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the nonpublic information were two entirely unrelated takeover at-
tempts of two entirely unrelated companies, back in 1990. The SEC 
eventually uncovered the passage of nonpublic information through 
chains of friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers and filed both 
criminal and civil charges.483 
In the Norton Company takeover, ten individuals have been charged 
in insider trading along nine generations of tippees. In the other case, 
which involved the takeover of Motel 6, a total of twenty-nine people 
were accused of insider trading, comprising seven generations of tip-
pees.484 A remarkable factor links the two cases: "Although there is no 
evidence that [the original insiders] had ever heard of each other, or 
even that they had common friends, the information eventually came 
to some of the same people. And in the process it traveled across the 
country and to Europe quite rapidly."485 Of those involved in the illegal 
trading in both cases, persons as far down the chain as fifth generation 
in one case and sixth or seventh generation in the other have pleaded 
guilty to criminal charges. On the civil side, no complaints have been 
settled beyond a third generation tippee in one of the cases.486 
The insider who leaked the non public information on the Norton 
takeover was Christopher M. Garvey, then a paralegal for the law firm 
of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, which represented an un-
successful bidder in the takeover battle.487 "He is said to have gotten a 
total of $7,000 out of tips on a series of deals. He was sentenced to 
three years' probation and community service."488 Although not an 
"insider" in the sense of an employee of Norton, German law would 
nevertheless deem Garvey liable as an insider, by virtue of the fact that 
he gained knowledge of non public information through duties of his 
occupation.489 If convicted in a German criminal trial, he would be 
punished either by up to five years imprisonment and/or by the impo-
sition of a fine. 490 
483 See Norris, Labyrinth, supra note 471, at Dl, D8. 
484 See id. at D 1. 
485 See id. at D8. 
486 See Patrick]. Lyons, Winding Trails of Insider Tips, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Dl (diagram 
accompanying Norris, Labyrinth, supra note 471, at Dl). 
487Norris, Labyrinth, supra note 471, at D8. 
488Id. 
489 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 13(1)(3); see also supra notes 146--48, 214 and 
accompanying texts (discussing the relevant provisions in the Insider Directive and the German 
Act, respectively). 
490 SeeWertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 38(1); see also supra note 215 and accompany-
ing text. 
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The Motel 6 case poses a more difficult situation for regulators. The 
SEC claims that the insider was Hugh Thrasher, a former vice president 
of Motel 6.491 The difficulty stems from the fact that Thrasher did not 
trade on this information himself, but allegedly passed the nonpublic 
information to a friend.492 Moreover, the friend and alleged "first link" 
in the seven tippee generation chain, passed away before a resolution 
of Thrasher's disclosure.493 If Thrasher had conveyed this information, 
or had recommended that his friend trade in the securities, or had 
traded on behalf of his friend, these actions would violate both German 
and U.S. laws.494 While primary and secondary insiders or third person 
tippees may be subject to the same maximum punishments for viola-
tions,495 the standards for successful prosecution of the tippees of some-
one such as Thrasher are less clear under German law. 
2. The Knowledge and Execution Requirements 
In addition to ambiguities in the liability and prosecution of third 
persons, a further unknown factor in the German prohibition of in-
sider trading is the existence of a requirement that the trader have 
actual knowledge that the information was nonpublic. In the United 
States, "the courts have indicated that to violate the law a trader must 
not only have inside information, he or she must also know it came 
from someone who was violating a duty not to disclose it."496 The 
German law, in contrast, prohibits trading by a third party upon insider 
information, but contains no analogous requirement that the third 
party know of the illegality of the disclosure.497 But if one were unaware 
of the source of the information, how could one assess its value? 
Although a third party might seek to avoid liability by not asking for 
the original source of the information, a lack of verification would 
491 Norris, LalTyrinth, supra note 471, at D8. 
492 See id. ("His lawyer maintains that he did not intentionally release the information, but might 
have let something out inadvertently."). 
493 See id. 
494 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 14(1); see also supra notes 146-48, 214 and 
accompanying texts (discussing the relevant provisions in the Insider Directive and the German 
act, respectively). 
495 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 52 (explaining art. 1, § 31 (1) of the draft bill, codified 
at art. 1, § 38(1) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
496Norris, LalTyrinth, supra note 471, at Dl. 
497 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 14(2) ("Einem Dritten, der Kenntnis von einer 
Insidertatsache hat, ist es verboten, unter Ausnutzung dieser Kenntnis Insiderpapiere fur eigene oder 
fremde Rechnung . .. zu erwerben .... "). 
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undermine the value of the information, leaving the third party with 
little more than a market rumor. 498 
One would expect early investigations of the German Federal Secu-
rities Trading Supervisory Authority to focus upon trading by actual 
insiders, whose identities are more readily verifiable. As the Motel 6 
case shows, the links among generations of tippees may move farther 
and farther away from the source. Especially in the case where the 
insiders themselves have been cleared of any wrongdoing in trading, 
it may not prove to be worth the costs to follow leads that involve 
possible information leaks to third parties. Although enforcement agen-
cies must show their commitments to enforce the laws,499 they also must 
make choices in the allocation of scarce resources. The reliance upon 
other agencies further complicates the matter-once the Supervisory 
Authority has garnered evidence to support its suspicions of insider 
trading, it notifies the responsible public prosecutor's office.50o Neces-
sarily, the prosecutor's office must then independently weigh the mer-
its of pursuing criminal charges; a willingness to prosecute will affect 
the overall deterrence of the insider trading prohibitions. 
The experience and reputation of the new German agency will only 
be built over time, but the decision over the status of generations of 
tippees under the Securities Trading Act is extremely important in 
terms of the overall effectiveness of the prohibition on insider trading. 
Even without trading by the insider, the sums of money involved can 
be substantial: "All told, the S.E.C. says total insider trading profits 
of $7 million were realized from information that came from Mr. 
Thrasher."501 This discussion has shown the problems of enforcing the 
498 "It would seem that a tippee of the third or fourth generation ought to simply not ask where 
the information came from. But that flies against the desire to know just how solid the information 
is before investing on it." Norris, Lalryrinth, supra note 471, at Dl. 
499 See, e.g., Norris, Lalryrinth, supra note 471, at Dl (Robert Blackburn, the deputy director of 
the SEC commission's New York regional office stated in reference to the nine generations of 
tippees charged in the two cases, "It is indicative of the commitment the agency has to see it 
through." Id.). 
500 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § IS(1). The Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority monitors trading for suspicious activities. Upon suspicion, the Authority begins its own 
internal investigation up until there is broad evidence or knowledge of wrongdoing. At that point, 
the competence of the Authority has ended. The department of public prosecution will then 
investigate. When the department of Public Prosecution is also confident of the merits of the 
action, it will bring a charge in the courts. From that point the Authority shall only function as 
an information provider, although the Authority must be informed of any criminal indictments 
and the outcomes of all proceedings, under § IS(2) of the Act. Ultimately, only independent 
courts can impose criminal punishment. Dreyling Interview, supra note 222. 
501 See Norris, Lalryrinth, supra note 471, at DS. 
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prohibition of insider trading against those who traded on the non-
public information, and against insiders such as Thrasher who passed 
on such information; the possibility of punishment of third persons for 
passing on the non public information remains unclear. 
The final issue concerns attempted insider trading-should some-
one be punished if their efforts to use non public information to their 
benefit were unsuccessful. This issue was raised by the Bundesrat in its 
review of the draft bill. In fact, the Bundesrat suggested amending the 
section detailing the criminal punishments for insider trading to say 
that in the case of an attempt by an insider or a third person to trade 
on nonpublic information, such attempt shall be punishable.502 The 
federal government rejected this amendment as unnecessary in light 
of the other prohibitions against an insider on passing on the inside 
information or recommending trading to others.503 Once again the 
legislative history makes no further mention of this issue, which has 
been left unresolved since no changes have been made to this section 
in the final version of the Securities Trading Act. Even if one were to 
agree with the federal government that the prohibition against an 
insider passing on non public information acts as an inchoate prohibi-
tion, the issue discussed earlier of the legality of a third person passing 
on information remains unresolved. 
D. What ''Price Relevant Circumstances" Must Be Disclosed?-Defining 
Materiality in Practice 
In attempting to define non public information in terms of who is an 
insider, the government explanation of the draft bill says that when made 
public, the information should "materially influence" ("erheblich bee-
injlussen") the value of the security.504 As examples of material influence, 
the government lists a reduction of capital, conclusion of a controlling 
agreement or profit transfer agreement, as well as important discover-
ies or contractual agreements.505 To answer the question of whether 
information might materially influence the value of the security, the 
502Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, supra note 165, (explanation (Begrilndunlt! proposing 
comment no. 6, to art. 1, § 31(la) of the draft bill, codification rejected for art. 1, § 38(la) of 
the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz), reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 95. 
503 GegeniiujJerung der Bundesregierung, supra note 166, reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 
7, at 102 (response to Bundesrat comment no. 6, to art. 1, § 31(la) of the draft bill of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). 
504See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 46 (explaining art. 1, § 13(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
505 See id. 
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issuer must draw upon previous experience, and possibly the advice of 
the underwriting credit institution or other experts on the capital 
markets.506 Knowledge of what need not be disclosed helps a little; since 
the provision requires only the disclosure of nonpublic information, 
reports by the business press or news agencies release the corporation 
from a disclosure requirement.507 
Fortunately for the Germans, the learning process has already begun. 
The first test for the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority 
occurred in only its second week of existence. On January 8, 1995, the 
London Sunday Times reported speculation about an impending joint 
venture between the German firm VIAG and British Telecom.50s The 
VIAG stock price on the German exchanges rose two percent the 
following day, following an upwards drift in previous trading sessions.509 
That night, Monday, the directors of both companies approved the 
joint venture. Pursuant to section 15 of the Securities Trading Act,510 
on Tuesday morning at seven a.m., VIAG reported this agreement as 
a "price-relevant circumstance" to the Federal Securities Trading Su-
pervisory Authority and the stock exchanges, followed by a public 
announcement through a Reuters electronic information dissemina-
tion service.511 The Supervisory Authority began an immediate investi-
gation to see whether the disclosure met the new standards.512 
This example shows that a relatively simple concept-encouraging 
early disclosure of circumstances with the potential for abuse by insid-
ers-yields geometrically growing ambiguities and questions when trans-
lating the concept into practice. For example, although prima facie 
VIAG followed the correct procedures for disclosure, what about the 
company's timing? Should disclosure only be made after final approval 
of a project? It would be nonsensical and overly burdensome for 
companies to reply to each and every rumor. This example of ambigu-
ity in the proper timing for disclosure is just one small aspect of the 
506 See id. at 48 (explaining art. 1, § 15(1». 
507 See id. The only caveat is that these reports have to set forth actual happenstances rather 
than mere presumptions or rumors. [d. 
508 See British Telecom und VIAG an einem Strang, SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Jan. 10, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Zeitng File. 
509 See id. 
510 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
511 Das Aufsichtsamt pruft VIAG-Verojjentlichung, SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG,Jan. 13, 1995, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Zeitng File. The actual public report by VIAG may also be found in this 
LEXIS file. Deutschland: Ad Hoc-Mitteilung der VIAG AG, REUTER GERMAN NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 
10, 1995. 
512 See Das Aufsichtsamt pmft VIAG-VerOffentlichung, supra note 511. 
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central problem of defining a price-relevant circumstance. While an 
infinite number of facts can influence the valuation of a stock by an 
individual investor, each company must choose the most relevant non-
public facts to disclose. 
The one thing that appears clear is that the company will only be 
responsible to disclose circumstances about the company itself. For 
example, a company will not be required to disclose the fact that 
political unrest in major oil producing countries may raise world en-
ergy prices, thereby lowering profit projections. In contrast, the signing 
of an exclusive contract to receive inputs from a country in political 
turmoil may merit disclosure. 
The supporting body of the Frankfurt stock exchange513 has at-
tempted to resolve some of the statutory ambiguity for public compa-
nies in a publication addressing the disclosure requirements.514 This 
guide discusses the Securities Trading Act and the legal consequences 
of the Act.515 Although the exchange specifically notes that listing all 
circumstances requiring disclosure would be impossible, the publica-
tion does provide a few examples, such as a change in the rate of 
dividends or an unfavorable decision in a product liability suit.516 Yet 
even these examples are too general to be of much help: the former 
circumstance would most likely be disclosed under prior custom, while 
the latter raises questions about contingent liabilities. Neither of these 
examples resolve the question in VIAG of the proper moment in time 
for disclosure. 
513 See supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, 1993 DEUTSCHE 
BORSEN: ANNUAL REpORT 28 (1994). "Shareholders are those banks and [brokers] who are trading 
on the stock exchange. A stake of 10% is owned by the regional stock exchanges. Ownership is 
evidenced by registered shares which are transferable only with the company's consent." DEUT-
SCHE BORSE AG, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION 9 (Mar. 1994). 
514 DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, INSIDERHANDELSVERBOTE UND An HOC-PUBLIZITAT NACH DEM WERT-
PAPIERHANDELSGESETZ (Oct. 1994). Although this guide does not have any official status in the 
sense of a government law or regulation, it has been agreed upon by all eight German stock 
exchanges, see supra Part II.C.l, and the respective national associations for all the major banking 
groups as well as the national associations of German industry, of retailers, of wholesalers and 
foreign traders, and of insurers. See INSIDERHANDELSVERBOTE UND An HOC-PUBLIZITAT at 4 
("Forward" to the guide). Since the membership of these organizations would appear to encom-
pass all of the major market players affected by the new laws, one would expect industry-wide 
compliance with this guide. 
SIS Compare the "New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual," which sets forth guide-
lines for public corporations, including examples of proper timing for allowable insider transac-
tions in relation to public disclosure of material information. See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 
750-51. 
516 See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 26-27. 
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As a test case, the VIAG situation gave the Supervisory Authority a 
chance to flex its muscles and show that it was serious about its man-
date, while the case also provided a test run for the reporting and 
investigation process. More importantly, the public announcements of 
the Supervisory Authority regarding its investigation, now contribute 
precedent useful in interpreting the disclosure requirements. A little 
over a month after the investigation began, President Wittich of the 
Supervisory Authority reported that VIAG had not breached the re-
porting requirements.517 
Public corporations and persons dealing in securities in the United 
States must also determine which non public facts are price-relevant 
and, therefore, subject to disclosure under the U.S. securities laws.5ls 
In the United States, this discussion falls under the issue of "material-
ity. "519 U.S. courts have partially resolved the ambiguity in this term 
through decades of caselaw.520 Although a common law system of this 
type is largely foreign to a civil law country such as Germany, the 
Germans have properly recognized that relevancy or materiality are 
questions of experience. For now, the question of whether an individ-
ual circumstance is subject to disclosure is a matter for independent 
inquiry by the management of the company. The question of whether 
to disclose falls to management based on the rationale that a com-
pany's management can best estimate the probable market reaction to 
such disclosure.521 
Other, more specific, examples of how the managements of individ-
ual companies have interpreted the reporting requirement have al-
ready come in a deluge. By January of 1995, just four weeks into its 
517 See Wertpapieraufsichtsamt: VIAG verstiess nicht gegen Bestimmungen, SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 
Feb, 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Zeitng File. 
518 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(b) (1)(1) (disclosure of "material contracts" in registration state-
ments); § 78m(d) (2) (1994) (requiring amendments for any "material change" in earlier state-
ments filed with the SEC). 
519The SEC has defined material in Rule 12b-2: "The term 'material,' when used to qualify a 
requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required 
to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach 
importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 
(1995). Unfortunately, this definition is not much more illuminating than the German request 
for "price-relevant circumstances." Something that an investor would attach importance to in 
determining a buy or sell price is necessarily price relevant. The big difference in the American 
definition is the "reasonable investor" standard: this is an invitation to the courts to define what 
is material through common law in general and through a trial in a specific case. 
520 For a general discussion of the issue of materiality under the U.S. securities laws as addressed 
by the courts, see HAZEN, supra note 384, at 487-93. 
521 See Wittich, supra note 220. 
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existence, the Supervisory Authority had already received over 100 
reports of material information.522 For the first eleven months of 1995 
over 1300 such reports have been made.523 Public discussion of the 
reporting requirements is a positive sign, but further refinements will 
come only through the collective experience of the Supervisory Authority 
and market participants.524 Although the Supervisory Authority has 
found that public companies have in general been observing the duty 
to disclose material non public information, the greatest criticism from 
the agency is that the reports have been overly detailed and cumber-
some.525 In addition, the Supervisory Authority has freed ten compa-
nies from the disclosure obligations.526 
Including the VIAG case discussed above, the German Federal Se-
curities Trading Supervisory Authority had publicly disclosed a total of 
fifteen cases in the first nine months of 1995 in which it had investi-
gated suspected insider trading violations.527 There has been only one 
case in which someone has been prosecuted and found guilty of insider 
trading. That case involved a sixty-two year old official exchange broker 
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange named Heinz Schwake.528 He was 
accused of having made illegal trades in the name of his daughter, 
buying stock and then selling the same minutes later at a higher 
price.529 This was a riskless transaction, because he only entered the 
trades into his order book later on, when executing a series of orders 
placed before him at the exchange.53o He was suspended from his 
position on October 16, 1995, by the Ministry of Economics of the 
Land Hessen, under whose jurisdiction the Frankfurt exchange falls. 53! 
522 See id. 
523 See Deutsche BOrsenaufseher mit ihrer Zusammenarbeit zufrieden, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 1, 1995, at 32. 
524 See id. 
525 See Wertpapieraufsiehts meldet 15 Insider-Verdachtsfiille, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 
Oct. 14, 1995, at 23 (statement by Vice President George Dreyling) [hereinafter Insider-Ver-
dachtsfiille]. The Vice President stated that the transmission of whole reports is in no way necessary 
to conform to the law. See id. 
526 See id. The majority of these cases involved corporate reorganizations. Vice President 
Dreyling stated that keeping a corporate reorganization secret may be in the best interest of 
investors if the purpose of the reorganization is to keep the company in business. See id. 
527 See id. 
528 See Kursmakler bleiben im Visier der Aufsieht, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 2, 
1995, at 16 [hereinafter Kursmakler Aufsieht]. 
529 See Der Frankfurter Borse draht ein Insiderskandal, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 
27, 1995, at 19. 
530 See id. 
531 See id. 
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The Frankfurt public prosecutor began an investigation into suspected 
counts of insider trading, fraud, and false trading declarations.532 The 
investigation was broadened by the public prosecutor to include five 
banks as well as multiple exchange brokers and traders.533 Mter a 
criminal trial, Schwake was found guilty of twelve forbidden trades 
carried on for a third person over the period of January to July 1995, 
with profits ranging between 1,300 and 13,000 DM per trade.534 The 
court established a one year probation period and required him to 
immediately pay 150,000 DM to a charitable organization, while reserv-
ing the right to impose a total criminal fine of 540,000 DM.535 The 
whole process from his suspension from work through the criminal 
decision took only six weeks.536 The Supervisory Authority viewed this 
decision as having set the wheels into motion and is currently examin-
ing trades by exchange brokers more closely.537 
E. The Changing Nature of Oversight 
Part II.F of this Article provided a basic sketch of the oversight of 
financial markets in Germany. The Second Financial Market Promo-
tion Act has significantly reformed this oversight system.538 Since many 
of these reforms bestow government agencies with additional supervi-
sory jurisdiction, concern has been expressed over whether this in-
creased oversight may lead to redundant or overlapping functions. 
This concern is especially poignant in Germany due to the universal 
banking system. These banks operate in traditional credit, securities, 
and investment service functions, thereby subjecting them to the over-
sight of both the German Federal Banking and Securities Trading 
Supervisory Authorities. Both new and increased disclosure require-
ments will impose a greater burden upon these market participants, 
which will be passed along to their customers in terms of higher prices. 
The ultimate costs of complying with these regulations will be a factor 
in the competitiveness of Finanzplatz Deutschland, which makes the 
regulatory burden of concern to the politicians as well as investors. 
532 See id. 
533 See Ermittlungen wegen illegaler BiYrsengeschiifte, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 31, 
1995, at 19. 
534 See Kursmakler Aufsicht, supra note 528, at 16. 
535 See id. 
536 Mr. Schwake was suspended on October 16, 1995, and the report of the criminal decision 
appeared in the paper on December 2, 1995. 
537 See Kursmakler Aufsicht, supra note 528, at 16. 
538 See supra Parts V.A.2, V.B. 
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This Part will discuss the new system and the division of competence 
between the various supervisory authorities. 
1. One Goal of Securities Oversight-Three Entities 
Although the Securities Trading Act establishes a new federal authority 
to oversee securities trading activity, the draft bill of the Second Finan-
cial Market Promotion Act clearly states that the responsibility of the 
Lander for supervision of the stock exchanges remains undisturbed.539 
In addition, the amendments to the Stock Exchange Act establish a 
new Trading Control Board ("TCB") to oversee activity from within the 
stock exchanges themselves.54o At first glance, these provisions appear 
to create three agencies with overlapping authority. One might com-
pare this to the system in the United States, where the states and the 
federal government often independently regulate the same securities 
trading activity. 54! As such, the state securities oversight agencies often 
form a redundant level of supervision below the SEC on the national 
leveP42 The SEC and the state authorities work together to try to 
minimize the costs to both the regulators and the regulated industry.543 
A closer examination, however, reveals that the oversight activities of 
the three German entities complement rather than compound one 
another. The government specifically meant to preclude any overlap 
of competence between the federal Authority and the individual authori-
ties of the Lander.544 At the Land level, the movemen t has actually been 
539 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 39 (art. 1, § 1 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsge-
setz). 
540 See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text. 
541 All 50 states have their own securities laws, generally referred to as "blue sky" legislation, the 
first examples of which preceded federal regulation in this area. See HAZEN, supra note 384, at 
328. The federal securities laws specifically allow for continued state regulation. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77r, 78a (1994). 
542 The most important case where state securities laws would provide an exclusive rather than 
redundant level of oversight is when the securities are exempted from federal registration as "part 
of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77c 
(1994). In general, the state blue sky laws have a broad range of provisions, including securities 
registration and disclosure requirements, broker-dealer registration, and investment advisor regu-
lations. See generally, HAZEN, supra note 384, at 328-45. Compare, e.g., 15 U.S.c. §§ 77f, 78t (1994) 
(federal registration requirements); § 77g (required disclosure in registration statement), § 78m 
(periodical and other reports); and § 780 (registration of brokers and dealers). 
543 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(C) (1994) (authorizing SEC cooperation with state level counterparts). 
544 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 40; see also id. at 59 (explaining art. 2, § no. 1 of the 
Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz amending § 1 (3) of the Borsengesetz) (Fundamentally, 
there cannot be an overlap of competence with the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory 
Authority, which only must fulfill the duties listed in the Securities Trading Act.). 
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towards consolidation, with the previously independent State Commis-
sioner's Office545 now a part of the Land Stock Exchange Supervisory 
Authority.546 The duties of the Lander Stock Exchange Supervisory 
Authorities derive from the Stock Exchange Act and have been ex-
panded by the Securities Trading Act. The duties of the newly estab-
lished Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority, on the other 
hand, stem solely from the Securities Trading Act.547 The competences 
of the Federal Authority are entirely new: supervision of insider activi-
ties; oversight of reporting duties; disclosure of securities turnover and 
holdings in exchange-listed companies; and international cooperation 
in securities oversight.548 The Lander authorities, on the other hand, 
are responsible for supervision of stock exchange trading, over the 
trading participants, and over the electronic systems of the stock ex-
changes for establishing sales contracts (but excluding settlement sys-
tems).549 
The third level of oversight by the newly established TCB at each 
stock exchange will concern the specific issues necessary for trading 
business. These duties include the oversight of price determination 
and trading volume, standing control over trading practices, observa-
tion of the trading of the Kursmakler for their own accounts, compari-
son of prices with other exchanges and trading systems (including 
price differentials due to the interaction of stock and futures ex-
changes), and the upholding of order on the exchange floor.550 The 
TCB was established within the exchanges themselves to oversee trad-
ing, independent of the other exchange functions and decisionmak-
ing. This does not in any way limit or interfere with the supervisory 
jurisdiction of governmental agencies. In fact, the government charac-
terizes the existing structure as one establishing a "four-eyes-principle" 
for the area of stock exchange supervision.55! 
545 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
546 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 59 (explaining art. 2, no. 1 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 1 (3) of the Borsengesetz). 
547 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 40 (explaining art. 1, § 4 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz) . 
548 See id. 
549 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 59 (explaining art. 2, no. 1 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, amending § 1 of the Borsengesetz). 
550 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining art. 2, no. 1 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § 1 b of the Borsengesetz). 
551 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining art. 2, no. 1 of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, creating § Ib of the Borsengesetz). The "four-eyes-principle" stands for 
the requirement that at least two individuals must be responsible for making important decisions 
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Separate competences should not prevent the federal and Lander 
authorities from cooperating with one another as foreseen by the 
drafters of the Act.552 For example, in urgent circumstances that involve 
the prohibition of insider trading on the exchanges themselves, the 
authorities of the Lander may act under transferred administrative 
authority (Organleihe) from the federal Authority.553 Similarly, although 
the TCB has investigatory powers, similar to that of the Lander authori-
ties, an individual Land authority may assume a particular investigation 
begun by the TCB within its jurisdiction if the authority so desires.554 
In the international context, the competences have also been divided. 
For example, the federal Authority serves as the representative of 
Germany in international cooperation measures, even in cases where 
the supervisory activity falls under the jurisdiction of the Lander authori-
ties. The federal Authority acts as the sole representative in interna-
tional negotiations, because most countries do not have such a division 
between the supervision of securities trading and stock exchange ac-
tivities.555 Overall, this complementary system represents a vital political 
compromise between the federal and Lander governments for the 
common goal of enhancing the international competitiveness of Finan-
zplatz Deutschland.556 
The early cooperation between the three entities overseeing securi-
ties activities in Germany appears to have been successful. Mter eleven 
months of working experience, in a joint statement made before the 
Frankfurt Chamber of Commerce, the respective heads of the new 
within a company; i.e., all four eyes must have approved the matter. This principle has come into 
use in the EU as a result of directives requiring the implementation of this principle. See, e.g., 
Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1988 OJ. 
(L 147) art. 3 (3) ('The direction of a firm's business must be decided 1Yy at least two persons meeting 
the above conditions [for an investment firm to receive authorization to carryon investment 
business.]"). 
552 See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 6(2). 
553 See id. This lending of administrative authority is a constitutionally permissible organiza-
tional form, whereby the federal Authority could operate with stock exchanges through existing 
Lander authorities. See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 41 (explaining art. 1, § 6 (2) of the Zweites 
Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). The procedure for such transfer shall be resolved in an agree-
ment between the respective authorities. See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 6(2). 
554 See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
555 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 42 (explaining art. 1, § 7(1) of the Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz). The exception is that the Lander authorities shall represent themselves 
in cooperation with foreign entities regarding specific provisions of the Stock Exchange Act and 
Sales Prospectus Act. ld. 
556 GegenaujJerung der Bundesregierung, no. 1 (general comments on the draft bill), supra note 
166, reprinted in Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 101. 
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Securities Trading Supervisory Authority, the State Commissioner's 
Office for the Land Hessen, and the TCB of the Frankfurt Exchanges 
opined that the three level system of oversight had proved itself.557 
Commissioner Zemmler dismissed as ungrounded suggestions that the 
oversight restrained trading.558 President Wittich of the Supervisory 
Authority noted the importance of his agency as a contact for foreign 
counterparts and believed the agency's work had increased the attrac-
tiveness of the Frankfurt stock exchanges.55g This progress included 
increased transparency as a result of the reporting requirements and 
successful investigations of insider trading violations.56o These early 
assessments bode well for Germany and its attempts to enhance Finan-
zplatz Deutschland. 
2. Allocation of Oversight Between the Federal Securities 
Trading Supervisory Authority and the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Authority 
Although the above-mentioned questions remain as to the ability of 
the German Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority to carry 
out its mandates, the general scope of those mandates in terms of 
discouraging insider trading and promoting market transparency and 
investor protection are relatively clear. Less clear, however, is the effect 
of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act on the competences of 
the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority. At first glance, the compe-
tences of the two agencies appear to overlap, since the securities 
market participants regulated by the former and the credit institutions 
overseen by latter, actually constitute the same institutions in a univer-
sal banking system. 
The German regulatory system is less complicated than the Ameri-
can system both in terms of the number of regulators and in the scope 
of their activities. The system of regulation of financial institutions in 
the United States varies, based upon either the institution itself, the 
activities performed by the institution, or both. A characterization of 
the activities of the German system as overlapping illustrates an evalu-
ation based upon one aspect of the American background-regulatory 
557 See Deutsche BOrsenaufseher mit ihrer Zusammenarbeit zufrieden, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 1, 1995, at 32 [hereinafter BOrsenaufseher zufriedenl (President Georg Wittich, 
Commissioner Regina Zemmler, and Deutsche Borse AG TCB Leader August Schafer, respec-
tively) . 
558 [d. 
559 See id. 
560 See id. 
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division in the financial markets based upon a classification of credit 
institutions. In the United States, different types of commercial banks 
require operating licenses from different regulators, such as the Fed-
eral Reserve Board,561 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,562 
and the individual state regulators.563 In the United States, a single 
institution may not provide both commercial (deposit-taking and lend-
ing) and investment banking (underwriting, placing securities) func-
tions.564 Securities activities, on the other hand, are governed more by 
function than by type of institution, on both the state and federal 
levels. This is reflected by the test for whether or not the securities laws 
apply-the question of whether the financial instrument falls under 
the definition of a security.565 Yet that test only reflects some aspects of 
561 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is responsible for the oversight of 
bank holding companies (12 u.s.c. § 1842 (1994», state "member banks" (§§ 321-324), and 
national banks which are also required to be members of the Federal Reserve System (§ 222). 
562The OCC charters national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 11 (1994). 
563 See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 10 (Conso!. 1994) (declaration of policy that state banks shall 
be regulated by the New York State Banking Department). 
564The most important limitation stems from the Glass-Steagall Act, which essentially prohibits 
a mixture of commercial and investment banking functions: 
The business of dealing in securities and stock by [a national banking association] shall 
be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely 
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, 
and the association shall not underwrite any issues of securities or stock .... Except as 
hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall 
authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any shares of stock of 
any corporation .... 
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994). The premier exception which allows subsidiaries of Federal 
Reserve member banks to engage in securities trading functions stems from an interpretation of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Order Approving Application to Engage 
in Commercial Paper Placement to a Limited Extent, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (Feb. 1987). Since 
the order interprets § 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994», these daughter 
operations are generally referred to as "Section 20 subsidiaries." 
Section 20 prohibits member banks from being affiliated "with any corporation, association, 
business, trust or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, under-
writing, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of 
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities .... " 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). The Federal 
Reserve Board interpreted this provision as a question of the degree of the connection to the 
securities activities rather than an outright ban on affiliation. In approving the application of 
Bankers Trust to establish an indirect subsidiary involved in the placement of commercial paper, 
the Board adopted a proper measure for the term "engaged principally": the bank's gross revenue 
derived from the affiliate's securities activities as a percentage of total gross revenue. In this case, 
the Board approved the indirect subsidiary which was projected to provide not more that 5% of 
the total gross revenue of Bankers Trust. See Order Approving Application to Engage in Com-
mercial Paper Placement to a Limited Extent, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (Feb. 1987). 
565 See supra Part VI.B.l (discussing the definition of "security" and division of authority between 
the SEC and CITC). 
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SEC jurisdiction, not to mention the CITC and state regulators. The 
regulation of insurance activities could be characterized both as func-
tional and institutional, but this is entirely within the competence of 
the individual states. 
The regulation of financial activities under the German system, on 
the other hand, divides regulatory duties based upon the type of 
activity rather than based upon the charter of the institution. In Ger-
many, all credit institutions generically referred to as universal banks 
require an operating license from the Federal Banking Supervisory 
Authority.566 In the future, the German Federal Banking Authority will 
also most likely be responsible for chartering an oversight of other 
types of non-traditional financial institutions. Hence, the sphere left 
to the new securities oversight authority deals with the securities activi-
ties themselves. Section 2(4) of the Securities Trading Act defines 
businesses engaged in securities activities to include certain credit 
institutions defined in the Banking Act, as well as other businesses 
admitted to trading on a German exchange. The connection between 
these credit institutions and other businesses is that they all render 
securities services. 
The draft bill of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act itself 
states that it would be senseless to attempt to allocate duties in the 
oversight of securities trading between the German banking and Secu-
rities Trading Oversight agencies in terms of individual transactions, 
because of the different goals of banking and securities oversight.567 
The two agencies might view a single transaction entirely differently in 
terms of their mandates. For example, in the case of an underwriting 
of a new security by a universal bank, the banking authority may wish 
to protect the bank from excessive risk of carrying unsold securities 
on the bank's balance sheet; such a situation would provide the bank 
a large market risk in one security. On the other hand, the securities 
trading authority may focus on whether all of the proper disclosures 
regarding the security have been made. These interests do not overlap 
despite the fact that they refer to the same underlying transaction. 
Furthermore, although securities activities such as underwriting may 
begin with banks in Germany, the securities oversight activities of the 
new Authority extend far beyond the circle of the credit institutions, 
such as to public corporations and investors.568 
566 Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen § 32, BGBI. I, 1082 (June 30, 1993), last amended in BGBI. I, 
3210 (Oct. 28, 1994). 
567 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 35. 
568 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 36. 
1996] INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY 103 
The goal of creating converging, but not entirely overlapping, inter-
ests of the multiple financial oversight agencies in Germany is reflected 
in the provision of the Securities Trading Act that provides for coop-
eration of the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority with 
the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority, the Federal Insurance Super-
visory Authority, and the Lander Stock Exchange Supervisory Authori-
ties.569 The draft bill merely provided for cooperation in the form of 
sharing observations and determinations deemed helpful in the fulfill-
ment of the agencies' individual duties.57o The federal government 
believed that close cooperation would be important, because of the 
underlying, to some extent institutional, ties between the different 
types of financial service institutions and the growing importance of 
securities trading.571 The finance committee of the Bundestag amended 
this provision to add the cooperation of the German Bundesbank to 
the extent that it was already cooperating with the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Authority.572 The committee reasoned that the new Federal 
Securities Trading Supervisory Authority would address issues impor-
tant to the Bundesbank in terms of the latter's bank oversight and 
monetary policy functions. 573 
This proposal for cooperation recognizes the overlapping actors and 
issues involved in the regulation of financial institutions, but also 
respects the fact that each agency has its own sphere of exclusive 
authority to supervise and to act. The Second Financial Market Pro-
motion Act amendments to existing German laws have sent a signal 
that the oversight of securities trading shall be regarded as equally 
significant to other areas of the financial services sector.574 The most 
fruitful cooperation between these agencies will most likely concern 
the exchange of information, which will help eliminate a redundancy 
569Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, supra note 5, § 6(3). 
570 See Gesetzentwurf, supra note 7, at 6 (art. 1, § 6(3) of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsge-
setz). 
571 See id. at 41. 
572 See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 17 
(amending art. 1, § 6(3) of the draft bill of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). Similar 
cooperation between the Banking Authority and the Bundesbank regarding the exchange of 
information derives from the German Banking Act. Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, § 7. 
573 See BeschluBempfehlungen und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, supra note 167, at 192. 
574 See id. at 270 (explaining the addition of art. 8b of the draft bill (BeschluBempfehlungen, 
at 157), codified at art. 13 of the Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz). This provision amends 
the Bundesbesoldunsgesetzes, the federal act for the remuneration of public officials, to include 
the President of the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority. See Zweites Finan-
zmarktforderungsgesetz, supra note 3, art. 13. 
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of research and data processing and thereby allow a greater allocation 
of resources for other agency specific supervisory functions. 
VII. THE ONGOING PROCESS OF REFORM IN GERMANY 
Despite the changes that have already occurred in the German 
marketplace, one area of consensus in Germany is that the reform 
movements are far from over. Public officials are well aware that further 
steps need to be taken to realize the concept of Finanzplatz Deutschland.575 
A. The Third Financial Markets Promotion Act 
From the legislative side, there are more aspects of the EU Council 
directive on investment services in the securities field576 which remain 
to be implemented into German law.577 The broad purpose of this 
directive is to ensure mutual recognition throughout the EU Member 
States of an authorization from the home country for a credit institute 
or securities firm to provide investment services. To realize this goal, 
the Member States must also follow an authorization process based 
upon common criteria and create a prudential system of consolidated 
oversight for firms in their home country.578 This directive requires 
Member States to adopt the necessary laws for implementation by July 
1, 1995, and for these provisions to enter into effect no later than 
December 31, 1995.579 Other related EU provisions to ensure the li-
quidity of financial institutions through capital requirements580 must 
still be fully implemented into German law. 
Since the German universal banks provide both commercial banking 
and investment banking as well as other investment services such as 
brokerage functions, the issue of an authorization to carryon invest-
ment business falls under the jurisdiction of the German Federal 
Banking Supervisory Authority.581 These directives will be implemented 
575 See, e.g., Gert Haller, Verlorene Geschiifte verringern Liquiditiit und Attraktivitiit, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FUR DAS GESAMTE KREDITWESEN [KREDITWESENj 9 (1995) (This article by the assistant secretary 
of the German Federal Ministry of Finance is part of a series of essays entitled "Finanzplatz 
Deutschland: we/che Wiinsche sind noch offen ?"). 
576 Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field 
(Wertpapierdienstleistungsrichtlinie), 1993 OJ. (L 141). 
577 See Haller, supra note 575, at 9-12. 
578 See id. 
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primarily through a broad amendment and reenactment of the Ger-
man Banking Act.582 To this end, the German Federal Banking Author-
ity and the German Federal Ministry of Finance have composed inter-
nal drafts of the amendments of the Banking Act. In addition to the 
thorough amendment and reenactment of the Banking Act, the final 
bill is expected to emerge in the form of a consolidated act, which will 
include numerous provisions to harmonize related banking and finan-
cial laws. This bill will also provide the first opportunity to amend the 
Securities Trading Act, including for the purpose of addressing deficien-
cies. As .such, this coming piece of legislation is viewed as a successor 
to the Second Financial Market Promotion Act discussed in this Article 
and will most likely be commonly referred to as the Third Financial 
Market Promotion Act.583 Before these changes go into effect, they 
must pass through all the stages of the legislative history of the Second 
Financial Market Promotion Act.584 An optimistic view would place the 
draft bill before the German Parliament in the summer of 1996, with 
the laws as adopted entering into effect no earlier than January 1,1997. 
As in the case of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act with the 
implementation of the Insider Directive, Germany has once again 
fallen behind the deadline set by the EU. Debate may begin over this 
future Act before the Federal Securities Trading Supervisory Authority 
has implemented all the guidelines required by the provisions of the 
Second Financial Markets Promotion Act discussed in this Article. 
B. The Small Stock Corporation Act (Kleine Aktiengesellschaft-Gesetz) 
Even these far-reaching changes are only part of the ongoing reform 
movement in the German financial markets. For example, while the 
Securities Trading Act will promote transparency in publicly traded 
stock, it does not address the underlying liquidity problem in Ger-
many-there are few public stock corporations in the first place. Of 
the over 500,000 public companies in Germany, the vast majority are 
private limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung 
(" GmbH') ); of the three thousand companies that are public stock 
corporations (Aktiengesellschaft ("AG"» and limited partnerships (Kom-
582 Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen, BGBI. I, 1082 (June 30,1993), last amended in BGBI. I, 3210 
(Oct. 28, 1994) (Fifth Act for the Amendment of the Banking Act and Other Regulations 
Regarding Credit Institutions) (full effective date Dec. 31, 1995). The draft amendments are 
commonly referred to as the Sixth Reenactment of the Banking Act (6. KWG-Novelle). 
583 For a description of the "first" Financial Market Promotion Act, see supra note 3. 
584 See supra Part IY.B. 
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manditgesellschajt ("KG")), the stocks of barely a third are listed on the 
German stock exchanges.585 Furthermore, less than a hundred German 
stocks are actively traded. This liquidity concern must be considered 
not just for individual stocks, but in terms of the entire market. Sophis-
ticated investors require diverse investments to lower portfolio risk. In 
summary, the German markets need both more stock listings and more 
active trading of listed stocks. 
Another German law passed in 1994, the Small Stock Corporation 
Act,586 attempts to address one aspect of the liquidity problem by 
making equity financing more attractive to German businesses. The 
Act simplifies the process for small corporations to go public through 
selling equity stakes. More specifically, the Act "deregulates some of 
the more rigid provisions concerning formation, shareholders' meet-
ings, and employees' co-determination,"587 and changes the require-
ments for announcement of shareholder meetings.588 Establishment of 
a corporation under this act is also easier: ''Whereas under the old law 
formation required the participation of at least five shareholders, a 
single shareholder may now form a stock corporation. "589 
Additionally, an important provision in the context of the reforms 
discussed in this Article lessens the burdens of public companies in 
raising more capital through sales of equity. Under the old law, the 
right of subscription (Bezugsrecht) required that current shareholders 
have the option to subscribe to new offers before a public offering, 
unless they waived the option. The new law allows the corporation to 
issue directly to the public if the offering price is not substantially less 
than the current stock exchange quotation and the new shares increase 
the corporation's stock capital by no more than ten percent.590 
A potential increase in the number of public stock corporations and 
the resulting increase in stock trading could strengthen the German 
exchanges and move Germany one step further in promoting Finan-
zplatz Deutschland.591 Experts estimate on average that there are 2000 
German companies, many of them still held by the founding family, 
585 See Detlef Burhoff, Die kleine Aktiengesellschaft, NEUE WIRTSCHAFTS-BRIEFE [NWB 1, Fach 18, 
3349 (Aug. 29, 1994). 
586 Gesetz fur kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur Deregulierung des Aktienrechts [kleine AG], 
BGBl. I, 1961 (Aug. 2, 1994). 
587 Regional Developments: Germany, 29 INT'L LAw. 228, 228 (1995). 
588 See id. 
5891d. 
590 See id. 
591 See Burhoff, Die kleine Aktiengesellschaft, supra note 585, at 3349-50. 
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which are well suited to go public by selling shares.592 But this potential 
remains to be realized. 1995 has been considered a banner year with 
twenty new issuances of securities worth a combined seven billion 
DM.593 Up to this point, it remains unclear whether the Act will increase 
the number of companies going public or even listing on an exchange. 
In this context, one must recall that the obstacles facing the growth in 
the securities markets and underlying reliance on equity financing 
stem from the traditional cultural norms of debt and internal financing 
as well as the regulatory structure of the financial markets. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The above reforms have certainly moved Germany toward the goal 
of increasing the attractiveness of the German financial markets. Al-
though the ultimate goal of Finanzplatz Deutschland has yet to be 
reached, the enactment of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act 
was a giant leap forward that raised the oversight of securities trading 
activities in Germany to world standards. Global competition among 
the world-class financial markets for investment shall be left for the 
market participants to decide. One of the best aspects of these reforms 
is that they do indeed open the German markets up to global compe-
tition; hopefully these competitive forces will continue to provide pres-
sure for progress. The real test of these reforms will be in the markets 
themselves, which have yet to fully digest the effects of the changes. 
The reforms of the Second Financial Market Promotion Act attempt 
to remove the incentive for companies to list stock abroad which 
helped drive Daimler-Benz to the New York Stock Exchange.594 By one 
measure, Germany appears to have been successful-Daimler-Benz 
remains the only German company directly listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange.595 In this context, the German reforms look less like 
592 Brun-Hagen Hennerkes, Familienunternehmen und Borse, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEI-
TUNG, Dec. 4, 1995, at B4. 
593 See Uwe Lill, Spreu und WeizenTest bestanden, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Nov. 13, 
1995, at 15. The reason for this upswing in new public issues has to do with the privatization of 
the German government telephone monopoly. In 1996, the first Telekom issue alone in Germany 
will be for approximately 15 billion DM. So the smaller issuers rushed to get their stock sold, so 
that tight pockets or even disinterest in the face of the larger Telekom offering would not hamper 
their sales. See id. 
594 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
595 Das Interesse deutscher Unternehmen an ADR-Programmen steigt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Oct. 20, 1995, at 30. This by no means translates into a total absence of German 
corporations from the American equities markets. Instead, other German corporations have 
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a move to "catch up" with the standards developed in the United States. 
Rather, the German reforms may be viewed as an attempt to make 
already strong financial markets more competitive with the best in the 
world. 
At the very least, this Analysis has shown the existence of regulations 
and structures providing for reforms ranging from the liberalization 
of the Stock Exchange Act to the allowance of trading in financial 
futures and now commodities futures, to the development of a three 
tier securities and exchange oversight system. In the private sector, the 
effects of these reforms have already been felt, particularly in the 
context of the Rules of Conduct, where the market participants have 
begun to institute the internal safeguards necessary to protect their 
customers. Reform, however, requires more than a change in the 
regulatory or functional framework; true reform requires an accep-
tance and implementation of these changes, embodied in the behavior 
and way of thinking of market participants. In the case of insider 
trading, this Article has shown the importance not only of creating a 
statutory prohibition, but also of combining the ability to implement 
this prohibition and a willingness to enforce it.596 
Only the future will reveal the success of these measures, but the 
mood in Germany has been optimistic. Broad consensus called for 
reform to further the clear goal of promoting Finanzplatz Deutschland. 
The German society is known for its adherence to rule and order. The 
experience surrounding the financial reforms has been positive; the 
Germans have both adopted the very strict laws and will follow them. 
preferred to raise capital in the U.S. markets in the form of American Depository Receipts 
("ADRs")-a total of 16 German companies in 21 ADR offerings by late 1994. See id. 
596 See supra Part Vl.B.2. 
